

# WGCDR BARRY SCHULZ, AFC, QCVSA

AIR FORCE CROSS  
QUEENS COMMENDATION for VALUABLE SERVICE in the AIR

AUSTRALIAN ACTIVE SERVICE MEDAL (1945 - 1975)

VIETNAM MEDAL

DEFENCE FORCE SERVICE MEDAL (THREE CLASPS)

NATIONAL MEDAL

REPUBLIC of VIETNAM CAMPAIGN MEDAL

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE MEDAL

RETURN FORM ACTIVE SERVICE BADGE

USAF AIR MEDAL (9 OAK LEAVES)

REPUBLIC of VIETNAM CROSS of GALLANTRY with PALM UNIT CITATION

MARINE RESCUE SERVICE MEDAL (10 years)



*fac, fci, fwi (USAF FWS), USN FWS (academic), pssc*

**RAAF  
PILOT**

WINJEEL, VAMPIRE, SABRE, MIRAGE, O-2A (USAF)  
MACCHI, F-4 (USAF), CARIBOU (*sshl*), F-18

**SECOND  
PILOT**

F-105 (USAF), OV-10 (USAF), O-1E (USAF), UH-1H  
BELL SIOUX, A-4 (USN, RNZAF), T-38 (USN),  
F-5 (USN, RMAF) F-102 (USAF), F-104 (RCAF),  
F-106 (USAF), YA-7H (prototype), CT-4

**CIVIL  
PILOT**

CHIPMUNK, CESSNA (150, 172, 172RG, 180)  
VICTA, TIGER MOTH, CITABRIA, PIPER CUB, ROBIN  
DUCHESS, BARON



# MY VIETNAM WAR DIARY

## FLGOFF Barry SCHULZ, AFC

# 1970



17 FEB 69 23 JAN 70	RAAF BUTTERWORTH MALAYSIA	3 SQN	MIRAGE FCI
24 JAN 70 24 SEP 70	HEADQUARTERS AUSTRALIAN FORCES REP of SOUTH VIETNAM (HQ AFV)	19th TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT SQUADRON (19 TASS)  BIEN HOA	O-2A FAC  O-2A FCI O-2A IP


In December 69, I was posted to HQ Australia Forces Vietnam as a Forward Air Controller (FAC), attached to the USAF 504 TASG, 19 TASS, Bien Hoa.

I departed RAAF BUTTERWORTH by RAAF C-130 to VUNG TAU, VIETNAM on 24 January 1970.

I returned to RAAF BUTTERWORTH by RAAF C-130 on 18 September 1970.

**JADE 07 - VIETNAM DAIRY**  
(24 JANUARY 1970 - 18 SEPTEMBER 1970)

**FLYING OFFICER BARRY M SCHULZ RAAF**  
**GDPLT O44090**





## The following is a day-to-day Diary of my Vietnam posting



I was assigned by the USAF to the JADE FAC unit at Vung Tau Army Air Base. This unit supported the 1<sup>st</sup> Australian Task Force based at Nui Dat in the Province of Phuoc Tuy. Also, in support from Vung Tau were No 9 Squadron (UH-1H helicopters) and No 38 Squadron (Caribou transport) and their supporting elements.

JADE FACs were accommodated in an old French Hotel occupied by USAF in downtown Vung Tau. We later moved onto Vung Tau Base US Army barracks. We normally ate at the US Army Mess or at the RAAF Mess on Vung Tau Base.

We normally flew six days followed by one day off. On my free days I did the tourist thing around Vung Tau (a relatively safe area) or, more often, flew with the RAAF UH-1H helicopters or Australian Army Sioux helicopters on their missions, enabling me to monitor the development of the in-experienced FACs under my instruction.

I often stayed at the Army pilots' tent-line quarters at Nui Dat. Unfortunately, there was a 105 mm artillery Battery located adjacent and frequently they fired directly over our heads - you could feel the tent collapse and fill with air as the round went overhead; just as you were suddenly awakened from a beery stupor!

The Army pilots had a few party tricks - like stopping an overhead fan with your head (lots of blood with that one), the infamous 3-man lift (where new-guys were tricked into being part of the lifted weight that one guy was to lift; this amounted to two guys holding your legs and arms down while cold water / beer was emptied into your nether regions!), and the merits of the steel VB can versus the BUDWEISER 'aluminum' can when demonstrating the forehead beer can crush trick - more blood!

Being based at RAAF Base Butterworth, I was able to get two one-week R&R periods off, travelling on RAAF C-130.

Weather was normally good but, during the wet monsoon period it became problematic sometimes.



Video summations of the USAF air war or of Forward Air Controlling in Vietnam, the following web sites are recommended.

Additionally, there is a whole series on different USAF aircraft supporting the Vietnam conflict.

**Note: I flew the Cessna O-2A**



[CESSNA O-2 FAC - YouTube](#)

[FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS IN VIETNAM - YouTube](#)

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=odpKxQaOzvw&feature=related>

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6QjMb9RKH1o>

[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b\\_npQTdoGvA](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b_npQTdoGvA)

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8MKQngOuW10>

[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=75EjU3\\_dFIY&feature=youtu.be](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=75EjU3_dFIY&feature=youtu.be)

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sd7G9SpcGjl>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x4EpN9xsGms>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=87EF-41IDaWU>

[Bing Videos](#)


[Overview of O-2A Operations in Vietnam \(video link\)](#)

[http://uploads.worldlibrary.net/uploads/pdf/20121013023626mosquitoes\\_to\\_wolves.pdf](http://uploads.worldlibrary.net/uploads/pdf/20121013023626mosquitoes_to_wolves.pdf)

<https://www.fac-assoc.org/war-stories.html>



# JADE FAC VIETNAM



## O-2A FAC AIRCRAFT - THE 'OSCAR DEUCE'



In 1966, the USAF commissioned the CESSNA Aircraft Company to build a military variant of the CESSNA 337 Skymaster to replace the Cessna O-1 Bird Dog.

The CESSNA 337 was a low-cost twin-engine piston-powered aircraft, with one engine mounted in the nose of the aircraft and a second engine mounted in the rear of the fuselage. The push-pull configuration provided centreline thrust, allowing simpler operation than the low-wing mounting of most twin-engine light aircraft, and allowed a high wing to be used, providing clear observation below and behind the aircraft.

Proposed modifications made for military operations included seating for a pilot and observer, installation of view panels in the doors (for improved ground observation); installation of flame-retardant foam in the wing-mounted fuel tanks (slightly increasing weight, and reducing maximum fuel capacity by 3%); installation of Mil-spec communication and navigation equipment and antennas; removal of propeller spinners; increased gross weight (from 4,400 lb 5,400 lb), with component strengthening as required to support the increase; and removal of interior upholstery.

The Cessna 337 was transformed into the inexpensive and versatile O-2A (also known as the 'Oscar Deuce'). It was purchased by the USAF in 1967. The first O-2A flew in January 1967, and the plane went into production shortly thereafter, with the USAF taking delivery in March 1967.


Performance (especially at cruising altitudes) was degraded due to the added antennas and significant weight increase, but was considered sufficient for the anticipated low-level operation.

The unique fore and aft engine layout and twin tail booms gave the O-2A a distinctive appearance.

The upper wing surfaces of the O-2A were painted white so that they could be seen against the jungle canopy by other aircraft.

Two engines provided a definite advantage over the single engine O-1, but at heavy operating weights and high temperature conditions, O-2A performance with an engine-out could be a problematic (but still better than engine-out performance in the O-1!). Because of the aerodynamics of a pusher propeller, the O-2A performed better on the rear engine alone than on the front engine alone.

<b>Power plant:</b>	2 x 210 HP - Continental 10-360-GB
<b>Wingspan:</b>	12 m
<b>Length:</b>	9 m
<b>Height:</b>	3 m
<b>Wing area:</b>	19 m <sup>2</sup>
<b>Empty weight:</b>	1250 kg
<b>Gross weight:</b>	2105 kg
<b>Max speed:</b>	190 K
<b>Cruise speed:</b>	125 K
<b>Ceiling:</b>	19,300'
<b>Range:</b>	1200 km





The most significant modification of the civilian CESSNA 337 to the O-2A was the addition of armament.



The O-2A had a gunsight. The gunsight was not really needed - a grease pencil mark on the windshield was just as accurate for aiming a WP marking rocket (as used by the right-seat instructor).

Glass panels in the lower starboard door and forward fuselage enhanced visibility.

Under-wing pylons were installed, to carry rockets, flares, and other ordnance to designate targets for air strikes.

The O-2A was used for forward air control, reconnaissance, target identification, fighter control, artillery adjustment, battle damage assessment, air-to-ground coordination, and communications. In-service modifications gave O-2As the capability to carry light weapons, such as HE rockets, bombs, and mini-guns.



The O-2A could carry a selection of offensive weapons, including the 7.62 mm Minigun pod, but the normal load was two LAU-59/A rocket pods with seven 2.75" FFAR (Folding Fin Aerial Rockets) each.

These rockets could be armed with a variety of explosive warheads, but White Phosphorus (WP or 'Willie Pete') heads were normally carried.

On impact, the WP round exploded with a highly visible puff of white smoke which made it useful for marking targets for attacking fighters, particularly in jungle canopy.

An armament control panel and a gun sight were added to the instrument panel to complete the offensive armament suite.

Another change from the civilian model was the additional of an enhanced communications and navigation suite on the O-2A.

The aircraft carried four radios: a UHF set for coordination with tactical aircraft; two FM radios to communicate the troops on the ground and a VHF radio used to communicate with our tactical air control party (TACP) for requesting air support, clearing targets for strikes and other command and control functions.

Successfully working all these radios while conducting close air support missions was the hallmark of a good FAC.



*O-2A REAR RADIO RACK*

The navigation suite consisted of Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN), VHF Omni Range (VOR) and low frequency Automatic Direction Finder (ADF) sets, and a IFF transponder. These and other black boxes whose function I did not know were mounted in a rack occupying a large portion of the passenger compartment behind the pilot.

The accompanying photo shows the bulk of this Mil-spec equipment. It also was heavy which contributed to the less than stellar performance of the O-2A.



*ENTRANCE DOOR (RIGHT SIDE).*

Most pilots who had flown the O-1 prior to the O-2A felt that the only drawback of the 'Oscar Deuce' was the configuration of the windows. Having the pilot seated on the left side of the aircraft rather than the centreline limited visibility from the cockpit of the O-2A.

The extra glazing on the right door and forward fuselage was an attempt to improve visibility to the right, but it was not very effective, particularly when carrying crew in the right seat.

As a result, O-2A FACs tended to prefer left turns for better visibility, a dangerous habit to develop in combat. Also, the main window on the port side of the aircraft did not open. This did not help ventilation in the cockpit and made it harder to hear ground fire. The USAF attempted to develop a tandem seat O-2A with a narrower fuselage, but the effort never proceeded beyond the mock-up stage.



*ORIGINAL PILOT'S SIDE WINDOW*

The small size of the pilot's side window on the original made it difficult to keep fighters in sight while working a target in the preferred left turn.

Later versions of the O-2A featured an enlarged window on the left side to improve visibility above and in a turn, but it still did not open.



*IMPROVED PILOT'S SIDE WINDOW*

Escape from the cockpit by parachute was problematic!

The O-2A would eventually be replaced in the Forward Air Control (FAC) mission by the OV-10 Bronco, the A-37 Dragonfly, and those would be replaced, in turn, by the A-10 Thunderbolt II.

After the Vietnam War, the O-2A continued to operate with both USAF and Air National Guard units into the late 1980s. During its production run, 544 O-2As were built.

# A FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS OFFICE

## PERSONAL FLYING GEAR

NOMEX FLYING SUIT  
NOMEX GLOVES  
BOOTS



BALLISTIC  
HELMET



PARACHUTE  
JUNGLE TREE ESCAPE KIT

(BROWN UNDERWEAR!)

BIG BAG FULL OF TACTICAL MAPS  
GREASE PENCILS & RAG

## PERSONAL WEAPONS


FOLDING BUTT  
M-15 RIFLE  
2 x MAGAZINES



RAAF 9 mm PISTOL  
2 x MAGAZINES



SURVIVAL KNIFE  
'... this is a knife'



## AIRCRAFT RADIOS



VHF  
VHF-FM 1  
VHF-FM 2  
UHF  
ADF  
TACAN

MONITORED 5 AT ALL TIMES

WORKED AT LEAST 3 AT A TIME DURING FAC /  
VR MISSIONS

## PERSONAL SURVIVAL VEST

DISTRESS BEACON / RADIO  
SIGNALLING DEVICES  
FIRST AID KIT  
RATIONS  
WATER  
MAPS  
COMPASS

## AIRCRAFT WEAPONS

14 x HE / 2.75" MARKING ROCKETS  
6 HAND THROWN SMOKE GRENADES  
2 x 210 HP ENGINES WORTH OF NOISE!  
(NOISE WAS A PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSET -  
KEEPING THE ENEMY'S HEAD DOWN - A  
POSITIVE TACTIC SOMETIMES!)


# FAC ROLES

## Rules of Engagement


'Rules of Engagement were directives issued by a competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.'

The Rules of Engagement (ROE) used during the war in Southeast Asia continue to be one of the most controversial aspects of that conflict. ROE are intended to reduce the chance of friendly fire incidents and recognize international law regarding the conduct of war, particularly the need to protect civilians, but in Vietnam they became a political tool as well. The restrictions these rules placed on commanders and individual fighting men became a frustrating and costly example of micromanagement taken to the highest level.

## Tactical Air Control System (TACS)



The Tactical Air Control System (TACS) was how the senior Air Force commander in Southeast Asia was able to plan, direct and control tactical air operations, and coordinate air operations with other services. The TACS consisted of control agencies and communications - electronics facilities which provided the means for centralized control and decentralized execution of missions.



## Tactical Air Control Party (TACP)

As utilized in South Vietnam, a subordinate operational component of the Tactical Air Control System designed to provide air liaison functions and coordination for the control of aircraft consisted of ALOs, FACs, radio operators and their equipment.

The Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) provided an Air Force communications system down to the battalion level.

At the head of the team is an Air Liaison Officer (ALO) who is a key member of the ground commander's staff. The ALO attends the ground commander's meetings, briefs on air activity in the area, and advises on the use and capabilities of tactical airpower. Additionally, the ALO is a senior FAC and supervised the FACs in the TACP. These FACs were Air Force pilots who perform several vital missions from their airborne positions in light observation aircraft. They maintained close contact with local ground forces, helped keep ground units linked by providing timely airborne radio links, direct airstrikes, provide Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) reports, and performed valuable visual reconnaissance during daily patrols of their sector.



The TACPs are located with the ground units down to the battalion level and provide the link from the Army commander to the DASC [Direct Air Support Centre] for acquisition of supporting airpower.

### **Direct Air Support Centre (DASC)**

A subordinate operational component of the Tactical Air Control System was designed for control and direction of close air support and other direct air support operations; it is under the operational control of a tactical air control or tactical air direction centre and was normally located near the command post of the supported ground unit.

## **VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE**

Visual reconnaissance (VR) is a core mission of the Forward Air Controller (FAC). Whether serving as the airborne eyes for the ground commander, searching for transportation and supply targets or gathering routine intelligence information, the basic VR process - look, identify, report - became the role around which all other missions revolved.

This required hours and hours flying over the varied terrain of the Area of Operations (AO) - coastal lowlands, rivers and sea coast, rice paddies, multiple-canopy mountain forest - looking for changes in the normal patterns of activity. These variations could include indications of new or heavier foot or vehicular traffic, changes in local activity patterns, or evidence of new construction, digging or attempts at camouflage.

VR areas of operations were normally directed to allocated grid squares of say, 2 x 5 km and specific to general targets of interest; eg, tracks, bunkers etc.

The biggest challenge in the information-gathering process was separating the unusual from the routine.

Special Air Service (SAS) areas of operations were sensitive. Air operations over their location could be dangerous for their clandestine patrols by bringing attention to a specific area. However, FACs became their first point of contact when under threat to request extraction or support. Often this would come as a whispered radio call over their FM radio.

Accurate air navigation over jungle terrain was therefore critical because, unless known accurately, airstrikes, gunship or artillery could not be used. Friendly locations were always identified using coloured smoke during CAS.

FAC VR was preferably conducted in company with a Light Observation Helicopter (LOH) as the 'eyes' of the FAC. The LOH operated at extreme low-level where small details and tell-tales could be observed. They were of course very vulnerable to ground fire and were tasked in a minimal hostile environment where possible.

In the JADE AO this LOH role was performed by Australian Army 161 Reconnaissance Squadron Sioux helicopters; callsign '*Possum*'. I often flew with '*Possum*' when I had free time; for the experience and, to observe the performance of my FAC trainees at work!

## CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

Aircraft in support of CAS operations ranged from fighters with a ground attack capability (A-1, A-37, F-100, F-4, A-4) and dedicated bomber aircraft (B-52, RAAF Canberra). Other supporting aircraft were helicopter gunships using HE rockets (2.75" HE and 5" HE Zuni rockets) and 7.62 mm machine guns). Larger fire support aircraft; C-47 'Spooky' gunships (7.62 mm Gatling machine guns), C-119 'Shadow' and 'Stinger' (7.62 mm and 20 mm Gatling guns) and C-130 'Stinger 11' gunships (25 mm Gatling gun, a 40 mm Bofors cannon, and a 105 mm howitzer) were formidable platforms. Night operations were conducted using self-dropped flares and target marking-logs or, from artillery flares.

O-1, O-2A, and OV-10 FAC aircraft used 2.75" FFAR rockets - generally only White Phosphorous (WP) marking rockets (HE armed rockets were available) and 7.62 mm machine guns (OV-10).

Close Air Support (CAS) missions were probably the most demanding flown by FACs in Southeast Asia.

Working a troops-in-contact (TIC) situation required the airborne FAC to coordinate with the ground commander, strike aircraft and command and control agencies on three different radios (UHF for fighters, VHF for command and control and FM for the ground troops).

While doing this, he had to maintain visual contact with the friendly forces and attacking aircraft, and locate and mark targets and avoid hostile ground fire.

At times there were mismatches between the tactical situation and the ordnance available on the fighter.

The Rules of Engagement were always there to guide you, but when the chips were down, common sense and your gut always were the best guides.

The knowledge that you were directing the use of deadly munitions near friendly forces whose lives depended on you was a constant motivator.

Throw in mountainous terrain, smoke, bad weather and darkness, and a normally demanding mission would become even more challenging. No two missions were ever the same.

### Close Air Support Role

CAS missions are flown in proximity to friendly forces and require integration of the air assets with the fire and manoeuvre of ground commanders.

In the eyes of the ground commander, the most significant of these missions are support of engaged forces, helicopter landing zone preparation, pre-strike troop airlift cover, and road convoy escort.

Because of intermingling of friendly forces, local population, and enemy forces, all strikes in the RVN required approval by a province chief or higher RVN authority.

For normal operations, this approval was usually granted in advance to ground commanders for their areas of responsibility. This advance approval helped to minimize delays in processing requests for CAS to engage forces.

Typical tasking of these forces often provided over 300 pre-planned sorties daily. Pre-planned and immediate sorties typically totalled over 12,000 monthly in direct support of ground commanders.

## **Pre-planned Strikes**

Pre-planned requests for air support originated with the ground commanders, based on their plan of manoeuvre. Requests may have originated at any level, but were approved up the chain of command to corps level.

The Vietnamese Province Chief approved each request. In many cases, the ground commanders were granted advance approval for a specific area. In the ARVN structure, the Province Chief examined requests from his various districts and forwarded those he approved to Corps.

Approved requests for US support, listed in order of priority, were forwarded by the US advisors to the higher authority for final authority for approving requests and assigning priorities, guided by overall requirements. The CAS tasks were allocated to USAF, USMC, and, when available, USN aircraft. The execution of these tasks was planned, directed, and controlled through the selected Air Operations authorities.

The targets passed were a task to be satisfied within the limits of aircraft available. The requirements were passed to the Strike Plans Branch in the TACC where they were matched with aircraft available for the following day. The strike planners then prepared the orders which tasked the fighter wings with the missions.

## **Typical Pre-planned CAS Strike**

A typical Army-requested pre-planned strike might start at the battalion level. The brigade may be planning a search-and-clear operation and a battalion commander needs an air strike for Landing Zone (LZ) preparation for a helicopter assault. The Brigade ALO had reconnoitred the LZ area to determine the most effective ordnance for the mission. In selecting the ordnance, the ALO considered such factors as the area to be covered, the nature of the terrain, the tree trunk size, and the type and density of the canopy.

In some cases, it was the ALO who recommended to the ground commander that an air strike be requested for a specific purpose.

The Brigade Commander could also have several other air strike requests for the following day. For each request, the grid coordinates, desired ordnance, Time on Target (TOT), latest TOT, a brief target description, and desired results were listed. The requests were then numbered in order of priority and sent to Division. As the request was forwarded, it was examined by the ALO at each level.


The original Battalion request for an LZ preparation air strike was still high on the consolidated list sent for approval. The request, along with others for the next day, were forwarded to the Strike Plans Branch of the TACC. The strike planners determined the number and type of aircraft, the ordnance, TOT, and rendezvous point with the FAC for each strike.

The Strike Plans Branch then consolidated the pre-planned strikes into the daily order and sent it to all involved agencies. The DASC passed the information to the Division ALOs who radioed the targets to the various FACS. In this way, the FAC learned during the early evening what pre-planned strikes he would be directing the next day.

A Fragmentary Order (Frag) is an abbreviated form of an Operation Order, usually issued on a day-to-day basis that eliminates the need for restating information contained in a basic operations order. It may be issued in sections. Fragmentary orders are often necessary due to enemy action

The Frag was received by the tasked aircraft wings the evening before the strikes and the aircraft were armed with the specified munitions.

On the day of the mission, the FAC takes off, calls the TACP advising that he is airborne, and that he is on the way to the target. The FAC also determines if there had been any change in the Time-on-Target (TOT), grid coordinates, etc. He checks with weather, for information on artillery fire to clear himself and to plan a safe approach for the strike aircraft.



He may have also requested detailed target description. The original request may have been only in general terms and provided a six-digit (100 m square) grid location.

The FAC can place the target much more precisely if he can get a specific target description, such as, '250 meters north of the white boulder upstream from the fording site.'

Under no circumstances, was the numerical grid given in the clear earlier than one hour before TOT; if possible, not more than 20 minutes before TOT was preferable.

In some cases, the FAC may have had to be given the call sign and frequency of a company commander far out in the 'boonies' to get the detailed target description.

There may have been several artillery clearances the FAC had to obtain if the target was less than 1000 metres from the boundary between the Battalions. From each of these, the FAC must get friendly locations, confirmation of target grid, and clearance to expend.

The FAC was now ready to contact the ground commander with whom he would be coordinating. Normally, he was the ground commander of the closest friendlies. The FAC obtained from him the latest location of the closest friendlies, the scheme of manoeuvre, and specifically what the ground commander wants from the strike aircraft ordnance. The FAC gave him the latest information on when to expect the strike; had him stand by to mark his position; and, if necessary, advised him to have his troops take cover (depending on the ordnance to be used and the distance from the friendlies to the target). The ground commander needed to know what kind of strike aircraft were on the way, what kind of ordnance they would use, and in what direction they would be working.



Sometimes the ground commander would direct his forces from a helicopter and want to mark the target himself. In these cases, the airborne ground commander could assess damage between strikes, mark new targets, and assess total damage. The FAC was required to let the ground commander know on what UHF frequency the strike aircraft would be handled so that he could monitor FAC directions.

Meanwhile, the strike pilots had been briefed on the mission, the weather conditions and were enroute. They were controlled by the Air Traffic Control authority until about five minutes before reaching the rendezvous point with the FAC, at which time they switched to the FAC frequency. The FAC ensured that he was on the designated frequency 15 minutes or more before the rendezvous time. As soon as he contacted the strike aircraft, he switched them to an operational frequency.

The FAC continued to monitor all his other radios - TACP on VHF, strike aircraft on UHF, and ground commander on FM - so that he could receive instruction from various agencies that may affect his mission.

**FAC BRIEFING SHEET**

PILOTS: R/V BNH / 150 / 35 : AC 0945 : CH 4 2

Callsign: BAT 21 : Miss No 2319 : No & TYP F-100

Alt & Posn: FL 150 @ RV

Ordnance: 8 MK82HD : Time in Area 30 min

500 20 mm : No of Passes 10

Tgt Co-ord: AE 231 846

TARGET Desc: RIVER FORD BRIDGE WORK

Elevation: 50'

Tgt Wx: Sc 1500' HZ

Altim: 29.90

Winds:

Sfc	CALM
1,	CALM
2,	270 10
3,	270 15

FRIENDLIES: 5K E

Enemy/Haz: POSS SMALL ARMS

\*Bailout/Recov: SOUTH 10 nm

Attack Dirn: N=>S

Dirn of Break: L

FAC Posn & Alt: EAST 2000'

Seq of Ord (Grnd Refs): MK 82 HD

BDA/TIMES:

Tgt Co-ords	AE 231 846
% In Tgt Area	80 %
% Tgt Covered	30 %

MINOR DAMAGE BRIDGE / FORD

BCMB:

1.	50S
	50L
	DH
	50R
2.	DRY
	100S
	50S
	50L
	DH

BDA/NOTES: VR MONITOR

R/V On Tgt: 0946

R/V Off Tgt: 0955

1008

JADE FAC

When the FAC contacted the strike aircraft, the FAC ascertained their mission number, altitude, position, number of aircraft, amount and types of ordnance, and the maximum time they could remain in the area.

He described the target to the strike pilots, gave them a clear route of approach, and told them the location of both enemy and friendly troops.

He established attack and break-off headings which would prevent over-flying friendly troops when delivering ordnance and he determined the ordnance delivery sequence.

This exchange of information between the FAC and pilots was essential to effective delivery of ordnance with minimum risk to the FAC, pilots, and friendly ground forces.

When the strike aircraft were overhead and visual contact was clearly established, the FAC may ask the ground commander to mark his location with coloured smoke.




When the friendly positions were positively confirmed, the FAC marked the target with WP rockets (or cleared the ground commander in his helicopter to mark with smoke), and cleared the strike aircraft in. He transmitted specific clearance to expend to each aircraft on each individual pass when he was sure that the aircraft was properly aligned on target.

The FAC positioned himself so that he could always see both the strike aircraft and the target. After the first pass, he directed later passes to ensure adequate target coverage.



One of the most effective methods was to adjust from the last ordnance drop; corrections were given in metres and direction from the last impact. The FAC had the responsibility to approve or disapprove the strike, but this did not relieve the strike pilots of the responsibility to abort the strike if they saw a potentially dangerous situation develop.

After expending their ordnance, the strike aircraft held 'high and dry' out of enemy ground-fire range and received a BDA report from the FAC.



When released by the FAC, the strike flight left the FAC frequency to re-establish radar contact for the flight to home base. Upon return to base, the pilots would have an intelligence debriefing to provide information on type target, tactics used, ground fire received, BDA, and other significant data.

Often the BDA was written in grease pencil on the Perspex canopy!

The FAC passed the BDA to the TACP associated with the ground commander supported. The TACP passed the BDA to the intelligence units.

## Immediate Strikes

It was not possible for the ground commander to know precisely how the battle would evolve or when he might meet unexpected opposition. Thus, there was another type of requirement for CAS – the immediate strike requirement. The same basic approval process took place for immediate requests as for pre-planned ones, except that it was at a much more rapid pace.

Immediate requests were sent through the request net directly to the DASC. Each higher level of the Army command monitored these requests through its respective TACP, remaining silent if the request was approved. If the request could be satisfied by weapons available to a higher commander, the request was disapproved and the requesting commander advised of the support to be furnished. When an immediate strike was requested by ARVN, it was initially forwarded to the province chief, who passed it to corps where it was handed to the DASC.

When the request was approved, it became mandatory for the DASC to fulfill the requirement.

The DASC may have diverted an airborne flight in the corps area to meet the call for immediate help or requested the TACC to divert strike aircraft from an adjacent corps area or to scramble ground alert aircraft. Normally, aircraft were kept on ground alert at all strike bases to respond to immediate requests.

They were usually able to arrive over any target in the RVN in less than 40 minutes after the ground commander had requested them. This response time was adequate for the average tactical situation as it usually took a ground commander about that long to determine friendly positions and the extent of enemy opposition.

To illustrate the immediate strike sequence of events, assume that a US infantry Battalion is suddenly engaged by what is estimated to be major elements of an NVA regiment known to be operating in the area. The battalion is receiving heavy weapons fire and is pinned down.

At the brigade TOC, the ALO had the TACP radio operator call the DASC, requesting an immediate air strike. The DASC diverted an allocated pre-planned strike to satisfy the requirement. In addition, the ALO called either an airborne or ground alert FAC to advise him of the mission. The control of the strike aircraft to the rendezvous point, the duties of the FAC, and the execution of the strike were generally identical to the sequence of events during a pre-planned strike - with two noteworthy exceptions on the part of the FAC.

- His initial task was establishing the location of friendly and enemy troops. Since many enemy attacks occur at night, and much intermingling and movement of ground forces may have taken place, the problem of sorting out who is where could be particularly difficult for both the ground commander and the FAC.
- The FAC must be quick to assess the overall situation as to whether more strikes are needed. If so, the FAC radioed either the division or brigade TACP who passed the request to the appropriate DASC.

## **CAS at Night**

Night operations made up a major part of combat actions in the RVN. The enemy launched most of his attacks at night, both against regular troop units and against small provincial outposts.

FACs were limited in their ability to perform their role at night. This was constrained by visibility and lack of suitable night vision equipment.

It was an extremely demanding flight regime - two FAC pilots were always carried on board the FAC aircraft to spread the workload and provide a safe cockpit workplace. Target marking could be accomplished by the ground forces, by dropping parachute flares or log-markers, and giving relative target position from his rocket smoke marker.

Night operations were really the only time ground fire could be observed - it could be spectacular!

There were three weapons systems specifically designed to counter this night threat.





The AC-47, known as '*Spooky*', a World War II transport aircraft (the C-47 "Sky Train"), modified by adding three side-firing 7.62 miniguns, each capable of firing 6000 rounds per minute. It also carried 25 flares, each of 2,000,000 candlepower.



The '*Shadow*' and the AC-119 '*Stinger*' were other gunships with similar missions. The '*Stinger*' was the later model AC-119. In addition to the armament of the '*Shadow*', it had two 20 mm multi-barrel guns which could fire 2500 HE incendiary rounds per minute; its illuminator is 2,000,000,000 candlepower.



The AC-130 '*Stinger 11*' gunship had an unpressurized cabin, with the weaponry mounted to fire from the port side of the fuselage. During an attack, the gunship performed a pylon turn, flying in a large circle around the target, therefore being able to fire at it for far longer than in a conventional strafing attack.

The AC-130 was armed with two 20 mm M-61 Vulcan cannons, one L60 Bofors 40 mm cannon, and M-137 105 mm cannon and M37 recoil mechanism from the M-102 howitzer; after 1994, the 20 mm cannons were removed. The upgraded AC-130 has a single 25 mm GAU-12 Equalizer cannon in place of the Spectre's two 20 mm cannons, an improved fire-control system, and increased ammunition capacity.

Each night these aircraft orbited bases strategically located throughout the RVN. These aircraft could provide support to the ground commander almost anywhere in the RVN in a matter of minutes. Other gunships were on ground alert.

## Fighter-Bomber Ordnance

There were eight USAF fighter wing equivalents in the region, including VNAF and USMC units. Additionally, there were squadron-size units and USN carriers which had tactical fighters. These wings, squadrons and carriers had the following type aircraft:

- A-1 Skyraider
- A-4 Skyhawk
- A-6 Intruder
- A-37 Dragonfly
- F-4 Phantom
- F-8 Crusader
- F-100 Super Sabre
- The RAAF had No 2 SQN Canberra bombers based at Phan Rang

A wide variety of ordnance was available for CAS operations. The most frequently used were the general-purpose high explosive (HE) bombs, commonly referred to as '*iron*' or, '*dumb bombs*'. The BLU antipersonnel and anti-material weapons and the many CBU types were also used frequently including, napalm. Many aircraft used the highly-effective Zuni or 2.75 inch rockets, 20 mm cannon, 7.62 mm miniguns, and 0.50 calibre machine guns.



General purpose bombs were used when penetration was desired, as against bunkers or caves. The CBU weapons were used against troops in the open, particularly for linear targets such as enemy along canals. Because of the delivery accuracy of most BLU weapons, they were used against a variety of targets, including those in the immediate vicinity of friendly forces.

The 2.75-inch rocket was used against poorly-defined 'soft' targets, such as those found during the escort of herbicide or cargo-drop aircraft when the exact enemy position is not known. The 20 mm cannon was a formidable weapon, highly desired by closely-engaged ground commanders because of the accuracy which could be brought to bear on the enemy.

Preplanned strikes were fragged for specific ordnance; loads of all munition types were available on aircraft standing strip alert for immediate strikes. Many types of ordnance were effective against a variety of targets; this made effective ordnance delivery much easier.

### Aerial Munition Minimum Safe Distances (MSD)

Weapon	Type	Weight (lb)	Protected Troops	Unprotected Troops
MK 81 LD	GP bomb	250	215 m	620 m
MK 82 LD	GP bomb	500	225 m	700 m
MK 82 HD	GP bomb	500	170 m	700 m
M117 LD	GP bomb	750	215 m	830 m
M117 HD	GP bomb	750	160 m	830 m
MK 83 LD	GP bomb	1,000	250 m	
MK 84 LD	GP bomb	2,000	250 m	720 m
M118 LD	GP bomb	3,000	250 m	1,174 m
Napalm	Incendiary		115 m	---
CBU	Cluster Bomb		110 m	250 m
CBU 24/49	Cluster Bomb		1,000 m	1,000 m
Rockets	2.75 inch		215 m	215 m
Guns	20 mm		45 m	---

**NOTE:** LD: Low Drag (no retardation)  
 HD: High Drag ('Snakeye' retardation fins)

## ARTILLERY OPERATIONS for CLOSE AIR SUPPORT



*AUSTRALIAN 105 mm HOWITZER*



*US ARMY 155 mm TRACKED HOWITZER*

FACs were trained to request, control and coordinate artillery operations.

Most scenarios of this nature were generated for immediate response in support of ground contact. Artillery was a rapid response firepower as reaction time of fighter support was often lengthy unless available support could be diverted from nearby tasks.

When a 1ATF infantry patrol had a contact with the enemy, and small arms fire was exchanged, the patrol commander reported 'Contact! Wait, out ...' over the company radio network.

These few words triggered battle procedures that went on well away from the patrol in contact. Those soldiers at the scene of the contact were totally absorbed in fighting their battle.

If the contact was with a significant enemy force and continued for more than a few minutes, the company commander might request artillery, mortar, or helicopter gunship support.

Any FAC in the area could respond and assist and if necessary, initiate a request for an immediate airstrike to follow other action.

Some companies and battalions favoured the automatic application of indirect firepower whenever a patrol was in contact with the enemy, regardless of the size of the enemy force.

But this could create problems:

- Most platoon or half-platoon infantry patrols did not have an artillery Forward Observer or Mortar Fire Controller with them, so the job of adjusting the fire mission fell to the patrol commander who already had his hands full with fighting the infantry battle.
- Most contacts in the jungle occurred at very short range, usually about 20 metres or less. To apply artillery or mortar fire onto an enemy that close risked causing casualties to the friendly patrol. The patrol would have to disengage and withdraw a safe distance while the artillery fire was applied. The enemy often seized this opportunity to break contact as well, so the indirect fire support often fell on an empty battlefield or could be used only in depth, behind the enemy.

One of the rules of applying artillery fire in 1ATF Standing Operating Procedures, was that for safety reasons, the first round of an artillery mission was to impact no closer than 1000 metres from any friendly positions. It was then to be adjusted onto the target. However, it is possible, perhaps even likely, that having studied 1ATF practice, the enemy was aware of this safety precaution. If so, the impact of the first round may have indicated to the enemy that if they withdrew towards it, they could be sure that they would not contact another friendly patrol.

For these reasons, other company commanders (and battalions) favoured staying in contact with the enemy. For them, if indirect fire support was used at all, it would be applied in depth behind the enemy to prevent his withdrawal, cause casualties to him while he withdrew, or channel his withdrawal in a particular direction, perhaps towards waiting ambushes. Patrol and company commanders often thought it was better to fight the battle with infantry weapons rather than allow the enemy to withdraw. Patrols had often spent weeks of difficult and tiring patrolling to find the enemy. Having found him, it made little sense to then break contact to apply indirect fire support, allowing the enemy to escape into the jungle again.

## **Fire discipline**

Fire discipline is a system of communication in the military, primarily for directing artillery. Fire discipline is the language of fire control. It consists of words, phrases, rules, and conventions which have specific meanings and which result in some definite action being taken with the guns. All ranks concerned in fire control needed to be thoroughly familiar with the language and the resulting actions. The aim of fire discipline was to ensure that in response to calls for fire (from a forward observer), the appropriate action was taken at the FPC (future planning cell), FSCC (fire support coordination center), FDC (fire direction center) and at the artillery battery, strictly in accordance with the intentions of the originator and with the minimum of delay.

## **Six elements of a call for fire**

An initial call for fire (to an artillery battery) consisted of six elements:

1. Observer identification
2. Warning order
3. Target location
4. Target description
5. Method of engagement
6. Method of fire and control

SOP radio procedures and discipline (challenge-respond-repeat) was necessarily strictly enforced.

## **Call for fire**

The forward observer then sent a six-digit grid coordinate with a 100,000-metre grid square identifier: eg, DB 324 667.

If the forward observer or any friendly troops were within 600 metres of the impact point, to keep themselves safe, the forward observer would declare 'danger close' situation.

## **Danger close ranges**

1. 600 metres - general artillery ordinance
2. Naval guns 5-inch and under - 750 metres
3. Naval guns over 5" - 1000 metres
4. Naval 16" ICM and MLRS M26 rockets - 2000 metres -



There were many different missions.

The last-ditch mission was 'immediate suppression'. Every gun in any concerned battery immediately fired whatever round and fuse was loaded, possibly from someone else's, or more than one callsign's mission. The FO may end up getting parachute flares, white phosphorus illumination, Multi-purpose, and VT-HE rounds on the target in the same shot.





## TERMINOLOGY

<b>HQ RAAF V</b>	Head Quarters RAAF Vietnam
<b>504 TASG</b>	Tactical Air Support Group
<b>21 TASS</b>	Tactical Air Support Squadron
<b>JADE</b>	Callsign for USAF FAC unit at Vung Tau Air Base supporting 1ATF
<b>1 ATF</b>	Australian Task Force based at Nui Dat
<b>FAC</b>	Forward Air Controller - Artillery, Airstrikes, Reconnaissance
<b>LZ</b>	Landing Zone (for helicopters)
<b>TIC</b>	Troops In Contact (with enemy)
<b>VR</b>	Visual Reconnaissance
<b>RV</b>	Rendezvous
<b>VC</b>	Viet Cong - local insurgents / Nth Vietnam Army
<b>O-1 E</b>	<b>'Bird Dog'</b> USAF FAC aircraft
<b>0-2A</b>	<b>'Oscar Deuce'</b> USAF FAC aircraft - modified Cessna 337 'Skymaster'
<b>OV-10</b>	<b>'Bronco'</b> USAF FAC aircraft
<b>Cessna 180</b>	Aust Army - reconnaissance / liaison
<b>F-100F</b>	<b>'Super Sabre'</b> USAF Fighter Bomber
<b>A-37G</b>	<b>'Dragonfly'</b> USAF Fighter Bomber
<b>B-52H</b>	<b>'Buff'</b> USAF Bomber
<b>CANBERRA</b>	<b>'Magpie'</b> RAAF Bomber
<b>F-5E</b>	<b>'Tiger'</b> RVNAF Fighter Bomber
<b>A-1E</b>	<b>'Skyraider'</b> RVNAF Fighter Bomber
<b>UH-1H IROQUOIS</b>	<b>'Bushranger'</b> RAAF Iroquois gunship
	<b>'Slick'</b> RAAF Iroquois helicopter - troop / supply airlift
	<b>'Medivac'</b> RAAF Iroquois helicopter - emergency medical evacuation
	<b>'Huey'</b> RAAF Helicopter
<b>SHOXT</b>	<b>'Possum'</b> Aust Army reconnaissance helicopter
<b>CHINOOK</b>	<b>'S...hook'</b> US Army heavy-lift helicopter
<b>ACT</b>	Actual Instrument Flight
<b>ADF</b>	Automatic Direction Finder
<b>GCA</b>	Ground Controlled Approach
<b>GF</b>	General Flying
<b>IF</b>	Instrument Flying
<b>LDG</b>	Landing(s)
<b>NAV</b>	Navigation
<b>SIM</b>	Simulated Instrument Flight
<b>TACAN</b>	Tactical Air Navigation
<b>CBU-58</b>	Cluster Bomb Unit
<b>MAVERICK</b>	Optical Guided Missile
<b>MK 82</b>	500 lb HE Bomb
<b>MK 117</b>	750 lb HE Bomb
<b>MK 83</b>	1000 lb HE Bomb
<b>NAPALM</b>	Fuel-mix explosive gel
<b>Rx</b>	Rocket - FAC used 2.75" WP - White Phosphorous marker - 'Willy Pete' - Fighters 5" Zuni HE

<p>24 JAN</p>	 	<p><b>RAAF BUTTERWORTH</b></p> <p><b>=&gt; PENANG</b></p> <p><b>=&gt; VUNG TAU</b></p>	<p><b>RAAF C-130E</b></p>	<p><b>5.0</b></p>
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
<p>24 JAN 70</p> <p>29 JAN 70</p>		<p><b>504th TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT GROUP, BIEN HOA</b></p>	<p><b>THEATRE INDOCTRINATION BRIEFINGS</b></p>
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<p>25</p>	 <p><b>CARIBOU</b></p>	<p><b>VUNG TAU</b></p> <p><b>=&gt; TAN SON NHUT AIR BASE, SAIGON REPUBLIC of SOUTH VIETNAM</b></p> <p><b>VISIT HQRAAF AFV SAIGON (IN-BRIEFING PROCESS)</b></p> <p><b>TAN SON NHUT AIR BASE, SAIGON</b></p> <p><b>=&gt; BEIN HOA (504 TASG)</b></p>	<p><b>RAAF CCO8</b></p>	<p><b>1.0</b></p>
<p>26</p>	 <p><b>OV-10</b></p>	<p><b>504 TASG IN-COUNTRY BRIEF</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>VR</b></p> <p><b>(FLTLT Ray BUTLER)</b></p>	<p><b>OV-10 803</b></p>	<p><b>2.6</b></p>

27	 <p><b>RAAF 'DOG TAGS'</b></p>	<p><b>BRIEFING</b></p> <p><i>504 TASG INTEL</i></p> <p><i>ESCAPE &amp; EVASION INTELLIGENCE AWARDS &amp; DECORATIONS</i></p>
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28	<p><b>VC ROCKET ATTACK BEIN HOA</b></p> <p><i>At 0600 hrs, 6-8 Rockets / mortars landed near the aircraft revetments - and caused confusion - under my bed while trying to fit flak jacket and helmet!</i></p> <p><i>The rockets were detected by AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder radar and responded to with 155 mm artillery. Unknown to me until then, the artillery battery was adjacent to my quarters - heart stopping!</i></p>		
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29 JAN 79 6 FEB 70		21st TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT SQUADRON, CAM RAHN BAY	O-2A CONVERSION FAC REFRESHER
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29		 <p><b>BEIN HOA =&gt; BIHN TUHY =&gt; CAM RAHN BAY (21 TASS)</b></p> <p><i>BIEN HOA AIR MOVEMENTS (1100-1700 hrs on 'standby'!)</i></p>	USAF C-130	2.5
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30		<p><b>21 TASS</b></p> <p><i>O-2A GROUND SCHOOL</i></p>		
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

31		<b>AIRCRAFT FAMILIARIZATION</b> (CAPT STITT) 13 LDGs	<b>O-2 871</b>	<b>1.8</b>
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Year 1970		AIRCRAFT		Crew		DUTY		Day Flying			Night Flying			Flight Time		Instrument Flying		I/F Approaches	
Month	Date	Type and Mark	No	Captain or 1st Pilot	Co-pilot 2nd Pilot Puppl or Crew	(Including number of day or night landings as 1st Pilot or Dual)		1st Pilot (1)	2nd Pilot (2)	Dual (3)	1st Pilot (4)	2nd Pilot (5)	Dual (6)	Total Cals 1-6 (7)	Captain (8)	Sim (9)	Act (10)	Type (11)	No (12)
						-- Totals brought forward		1053:00	1:20	180:30	117:45		11:10	1363:45	11:25	102:20	90:10		
JAN	12	MIRAGE	93	SELF		GF IF		1:05						1:05	1:05	.20	.10		
JAN	13	MIRAGE	90	SELF		15° AIG 15° SKIP L/D		1:25						1:25	1:25	.15	.10		
JAN	13	MIRAGE	99	SELF		INTS ML 30° DIB 15° AIG		1:20						1:20	1:20				
JAN	14	MIRAGE	94	SELF		" " " "		.30						.30	.30				
JAN	15	MIRAGE	91	SELF		" " " "		1:20						1:20	1:20				
JAN	19	MIRAGE	86	SELF		" " " "		1:20						1:20	1:20				
JAN	19	MIRAGE	95	SELF		" " " "		1:20						1:20	1:20				
JAN	20	MIRAGE	88	SELF		KASG		1:10						1:10	1:10				
JAN	21	MIRAGE	98	SELF		INTS 1QT " "		1:15						1:15	1:15				
		Summary for JAN 70		AIRCRAFT TYPES		1 MIRAGE		10:45						10:45		.35		.20	
		No. 3 SON.				2													
		Date 1-24 JAN 70				3													
		Signature [Signature]				4													
JAN	26	O-10	803	FLIT BUTLER	SELF	VR		2:35						2:35					
JAN	31	O-2A	871	CPT STITT	SELF	GF			1:50					1:50					
		SUMMARY FOR : JAN 70		O-2A															
		21 TRGS		O-10															
		DATE : 26-31 JAN 70																	
								1063:45	3:55	182:20	117:45		11:10	1378:55	11:52:10	102:55	90:30		

## FEB 70

1	<b>GF - CAM RAHN BAY / NAH TRANG</b> (CAPT NIEMAN) 13 LDGs	<b>O-2A 871</b>	<b>2.3</b>
2	<b>IF / NAV</b> (CAPT STITT) 10 LDGs (0.5 SIM ADF / TCN / GGA)	<b>O-2A 871</b>	<b>2.0</b>
3	<b>NAV / GF</b> (CAPT KEARNEY) 6 LDGs / 6 Rx (0.3 SIM - ADF)	<b>O-2A 372</b>	<b>1.7</b>
3	<b>NAV / GF</b> SOLO - 5 LDGs	<b>O-2A 871</b>	<b>1.6</b>



	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>FAC / NAV</b> (CAPT PATTERSON)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">8 LDGs / 8 Rx (0.2 SIM - ADF)</p>	O-2A 372	1.9	
4	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>NIGHT FAC</b> (CAPT IRWIN)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">4 Rx (0.3 SIM - GCA)</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>CHLOROQUINE</i></p>	O-2A 365	1.5	
5		<p><b>FAC TACTICS</b> (CAPT STITT)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">4 Rx</p>	O-2A 365	1.9
		<p><b>CHECK FLIGHT</b> (CAPT NIEMAN)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">8 Rx</p>	O-2A 871	1.7
6	 <p style="text-align: center;"><b>CAM RAHN BAY =&gt; TON SAN NUHT =&gt; BEIN HOA</b></p>	USAF C-130	5.5	

6 FEB 70		19 TASS	BRIEFINGS - INTELLIGENT ESCAPE & EVASION RULES of ENGAGEMENT
13 FEB 70			

7	504 TASG BRIEFING - III DASC, II FFV, OPERATIONS
8	19 TASS BRIEFINGS

*FLTLT Chris LANGDON RAAF was 'shot down' by ground fire at night - he safely ejected from his OV-10.*

*He believed it was more likely a maintenance problem, which caused loss of control?*


9	FREE		
		<p><b>AREA FAMIL</b> (CAPT BISHOP)</p> <p>VUNG TAU / HAM TAN / NUI DAT / BEIN HOA</p>	<p>O-2A 344</p> <p>2.5</p>
10	 <p><b>RAAF CANBERRA</b></p> <p>6 x MK 82 HE - 500 lb or, 6 x M117 HE - 750 LB</p>	<p><b>FAC OPS</b> (CAPT SCHMIDT)</p> <p>LAI KHE / BEIN HOA</p> <p>MAGPIE 81 6 x Mk 83</p>	<p>OV-10 634</p> <p>2.5</p>

11



III CORP AREA of OPERATIONS

CHLOROQUINE



AREA FAMIL

(CAPT BISHOP)

PHUC VIHN / LAI KHE / CU CHI  
SAIGON

8 Rx


O-2A  
374

2.3


12



NUI DAT



BEIN HOA => NUI DAT  
(FLGOFF Dave ROBSON)  
JADE 07



*NUI DAT artillery often fired  
over the 'Possum' mess and  
quarters - not appreciated at  
night!*

O-2A  
045

0.5





*MK 82 - 500 lb HE HIGH DRAG*



*20 mm CANNON POD*



*MK 82 500 lb HE 'DAISY CUTTERS'*



*M-117 750 lb HE LOW DRAG*



*F-4D*



*F-4D - MK 82 & 30 mm GATLING GUN*







*F-4D - MK 117 & A-7E MISSILES*



*A-37G - MK 82 & ROCKETS*



14 FEB 70		19 TASS JADE FAC VUNG TAU	0-2A FAC
18 SEP 70			0-2A FCI

<p>13</p>	 <p>VUNG TAU AIR BASE</p>	<p>NUI DAT =&gt; VUNG TAU</p> <p>14 Rx</p>  <p>JADE FLIGHT LINE</p>	<p>O-2A 368</p>	<p>0.8</p>
		<p><i>Visited BARIA orphanage with RAAF Padre, RAAF personnel &amp; FLGOFF Dave Robson</i></p>		
<p>14</p>	 <p>HOTEL VUNG TAU</p>	<p><b>INWARDS CLEARANCES</b></p> <p><i>RAAF PISTOL FLYING EQUIPMENT MAP PREPARATION MAP BAG, KNEE PAD</i></p> <p>FLGOFF Dave ROBSON - OLD JADE 07 =&gt; C-130 to BUTTERWORTH</p>		


At Vung Tau we used standard M-151 US Jeeps for transport on-Base and to our quarters in Vung Tau city. At Nui Dat we had M-151 radio equipped Jeeps.

The RAAF used the L-110 Landrover. The L-110s had very good suspension and the RAAF troops used to lure the US M-151 drivers into hitting the high steep bitumen speed-bumps: the Base Commander's answer to speed control on-Base. The M-151 passengers didn't fare very well!


The US troops answer was to pour fuel on the bitumen speed-bumps. The fuel gradually dissolved the humps and softened them. The Base Commander's response was to replace the humps with old tank tracks! Not to be outdone, the US troops removed them with a large forklift, loaded them into a Caribou and dropped them offshore at the end of the runway. It was quite a spectacular and satisfying drop and splash at impact with the East Vietnamese Sea surface.

'Trading' was a thriving business with US personnel. Just about anything had trading value to either RAAF or US personnel.

- A 'slab' of VB beer could be traded for a 'slab' of frozen prime beef steak. Or, aircraft spare parts.
- RAAF flying gear could be traded for USAF Nomex flight suits, highly desired camouflage poncho liners or, combat knives.





Accommodation in VUNG TAU  
Old French HOTEL  
shared with  
CAPT Chris NEAL, USAF



ABOVE: 2020 IMAGES



15	 <p style="text-align: center;">A-37</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VR / FAC</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">(CAPT John SANDERS)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">2 x A-37 8 x Mk 82</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>O-2A 872</b></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>2.6</b></p>
16	 <p style="text-align: center;">PHUOC TUY PROVINCE</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>AREA FAMIL</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">(CAPT John MCKINNON)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">10 LDGs 14 Rx</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>O-2A 368</b></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>3.1</b></p>
17	<b>GROUNDED - X/WIND</b>			

*TIC APC / TANK / UH-1H - LONG HAI MTs (2 KIA / 30 WIA)*

18	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VR</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">11 Rx</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>TOUCH &amp; GO WITH Rx NOT PERMITTED</i></p>		<p style="text-align: center;"><b>O-2A 972</b></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>2.3</b></p>
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*JADE FACs were based at Vung Tau with occasional landings at Nui Dat.*

*Therefore, they were remote from the JADE TACP and intelligence briefings from IATF sources.*



*The solution was to use the RAAF Operational Support Unit at Vung Tau which, in part, provided an intelligence and briefing facility for 9 SQN helicopters and 35 SQN Caribou operations.*

*Of most interest was ongoing IATF ground operations, the location of Army units especially SAS operations, RAAF helicopter operations, and airspace limitations due to artillery fire missions.*


*This resource was an essential and invaluable opportunity to self-brief, maintain currency in intelligence information, and to prepare for each sortie.*

19	 <p>CANBERRA BOMB RUN</p>	<p><b>FAC / VR</b> (CAPT John MCKINNON)</p> <p>MAGPIE 51 6 Mk 82</p> <p><i>I missed the Arming Switch on the first marking dive (!) - so, I pulled up into the vertical, stall turn, reacquired target, and fired a rocket. Magpie 51 impressed - my IP impressed; never seen that done before...</i></p>	O-2A 368	2.7
		<p><b>VR</b> (LTCOL BAKER) JADE FAC Commander</p>	O-2A 368	2.2
20		<p><b>VUNG TAU =&gt; NUI DAT</b></p>	O-2A 383	0.2
		<p><b>VR</b> POSSUM 22 (161 Australian Army Recce Squadron - NUI DAT)</p>	O-2A 383	1.7
21	 <p>B-52</p>	<p><b>VR</b> POSSUM 22 (BUNKERS)</p> <p><i>B-52 'ARCLIGHT' STRIKE on LONG HAI</i></p> <p><i>TANK / APC HIT MINES</i></p>	O-2A 368	2.6
22		<p><b>VUNG TAU =&gt; NUI DAT</b> (CAPT Chris NEAL)</p>	O-2A 045	0.3
		<p><b>NUI DAT =&gt; VUNG TAU</b> (LT SMITH)</p>	O-2A 383	0.3
23		<p><b>VUNG TAU =&gt; NUI DAT</b></p>	O-2A 050	0.3





	<p>VR</p> <p>POSSUM 25</p>	O-2A 050	2.2	
24	<p>VUNG TAU =&gt; NUI DAT</p> <p>NEW ACOUSTIC HELMET</p>	O-2A 368	0.3	
	<p>VR</p> <p>POSSUM 25</p>	O-2A 368	2.2	
25	<p>VR</p> <p>POSSUM 23</p>	O-2A 050	2.5	
	<p>9 SQN UH-1H =&gt; USN 'CORPUS CHRISTI BAY' RE-SUPPLY FLIGHTS</p> <p>CHLOROQUINE</p>			
26	VR	O-2A 383	2.4	
27	 <p>RAAF IROQUOIS</p>	<p>VR</p> <p>POSSUM 28</p>	O-2A 045	3.1
		<p>UH-1H – NUI DAT / BEIN HOA / NUI DAT</p> <p>POSSUM MESS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 3-man lift masquerade</li> <li>• Head to stop ceiling fan trick</li> <li>• Crush a VB (steel can) versus BUDWEISER ('aluminum' can) head strike trick</li> <li>• ARMY pilot's act - NZ 'Haka'</li> </ul>		

*There were strict SOPs about flying below 1500 ft. This was an obvious restriction for the avoidance of small arms fire.*



*Another SOP forbade the ad hoc 'dogfight' or even formation flight between our own and rival units or any other aircraft operating in the area. This was strictly monitored by various clandestine means.*

*However, the temptation was always there... my 'roomie' ... CAPT Chris Neal (JADE 08) was always ready for a dogfight (he was an ex-F-111 pilot and navigator ... and, frustrated fighter pilot!).*

	<p align="center"><b>VR in SIOUX</b></p> <p align="center"><i>POSSUM (LT Dick EARLY)</i></p>	<p align="center"><b>SIOUX 737</b></p>	<p align="center"><b>1.9</b></p>
<p align="center"><b>28</b></p>	<p align="center"><b>AIRSTRIKE in SIOUX</b></p> <p align="center"><i>POSSUM (LT DICK)</i></p> <p align="center">MAGPIE 51 6 x Mk 82</p>  <p align="center"><i>We marked the target for the FAC and withdrew outside the mandatory 1000 m fragmentation danger area.</i></p> <p align="center"><i>Immediately after the bomb's impact, a jolt and 'twang' was felt &amp; heard behind cockpit - We looked at each other with an unsaid question.</i></p>  <p align="center"><i>A precautionary landing was made at a nearby Fire Support Base to assess any damage.</i></p> <p align="center"><i>A large piece of shrapnel (bomb casing) was found wedged in a non-critical tail-boom space!</i></p>	<p align="center"><b>SIOUX 737</b></p>	<p align="center"><b>2.2</b></p>
<p align="center"><b>UH-1H NUI DAT =&gt; VUNG TAU</b></p>			



*8 RAR - 2 KIA / 20 WIA MINE  
9 SQN MINE*

Year 1970		AIRCRAFT		Captain or 1st Pilot	Co-pilot 2nd Pilot Pupil or Crew	DUTY (Including number of day or night landings as 1st Pilot or Dual)	Day Flying			Night Flying			Flight Time		Instrument Flying		I/F Approval		
Month	Date	Type and Mark	No				1st Pilot (1)	2nd Pilot (2)	Dual (3)	1st Pilot (4)	2nd Pilot (5)	Dual (6)	Total Cols 1-6 (7)	Captain (8)	Sim (9)	Act (10)	Type (11)		
Totals brought forward																			
FEB	1	O-2A	871	OPT NIEMANN	SELF	GF			2:20				2:20						
FEB	2	O-2A	871	OPT STITT	SELF	IF NAV			2:00				2:00		.30			ADF	
FEB	2	O-2A	372	OPT KEANEY	SELF	NAV GF			2:00				2:00		.20				
FEB	3	O-2A	871	SELF		NAV GF	1:35						1:35	1:35					
FEB	4	O-2A	372	CAPT PATTERSON	SELF	TACTICS NAV	1:55						1:55	1:55	.10			ADF	
FEB	4	O-2A	365	CAPT IRWIN	SELF	TACTICS NAV				1:30			1:30	1:30	.20			GCA	
FEB	5	O-2A	365	SELF	CAPT STITT	"	1:55						1:55	1:55					
FEB	5	O-2A	871	SELF	CAPT NIEMANN	STAN / EVAL	1:45						1:45	1:45					
FEB	10	O-2A	344	SELF	CAPT BISHOPP	MOB FAMIL	2:30						2:30	2:30				ADF	
FEB	10	OV10	634	CAPT SCHMIDT	SELF	FAC 1x CANBERRA		2:30					2:30						
FEB	11	O-2A	374	SELF	CAPT BISHOPP	FOL FAMIL	2:20						2:20	2:20					
FEB	12	O-2A	045	FLG OFF ROBSON	SELF	BIEN HOA - NUI DAT	.30						.30						
FEB	13	O-2A	368	FLG OFF ROBSON	SELF	NUI DAT - VUNG TAU	.50						.50						
FEB	15	O-2A	972	CAPT SANDERS	SELF	FAC 2x A37 8 Mk82 LD - VR	2:35						2:35						
FEB	16	O-2A	368	AI SELF	CAPT M'KINNON	VR (ACT)	3:05						3:05	3:05					
FEB	18	O-2A	972	SELF		VR	2:20						2:20	2:20					
FEB	19	O-2A	368	SELF	CAPT M'KINNON	FAC MAGSIE 51	2:00						2:00	2:00					
FEB	19	O-2A	368	SELF	"	VR	.45						.45	.45					
FEB	19	O-2A	368	LT COL BAKER	SELF	VR	2:15						2:15						
FEB	20	O-2A	383	SELF		VUNG TAU - NUI DAT	.15						.15	.15					
FEB	20	O-2A	383	SELF		VR	1:45						1:45	1:45					
FEB	21	O-2A	368	SELF		VR POSSUM 22	2:40						2:40	2:40					
FEB	22	O-2A	045	CAPT NEALE	SELF	VUNG TAU - NUI DAT	.20						.20						
FEB	22	O-2A	383	LT SMITH	SELF	NUI DAT - VUNG TAU	.15						.15						
FEB	23	O-2A	050	SELF	LT COL BAKER	VUNG TAU - NUI DAT	.15						.15	.15					
FEB	23	O-2A	050	SELF		VR POSSUM 25	2:15						2:15	2:15					
FEB	24	O-2A	368	SELF	LT KWING	VUNG TAU - NUI DAT	.20						.20	.20					
FEB	24	O-2A	368	SELF		VR POSSUM 25	2:10						2:10	2:10	.15			GCA	
FEB	25	O-2A	050	SELF		VR " 23	2:30						2:30	2:30					
FEB	26	O-2A	383	SELF		VR	2:25						2:25	2:25					
FEB	27	O-2A	045	SELF		VR - BIEN HOA - VUNG TAU " 28	3:05						3:05	3:05					
FEB	28	O-2A	737	LT EARLEY	SELF	VR		1:55					1:55						
FEB	28	SIoux	737	LT DICK	SELF	AIRSTRIKE JADE 9		2:10					2:10						
SUMMARY FOR FEB 1970							4:4:35		6:20	1:30			52:25	39:20	1:35				
UNIT USAF TACF 1ATF									2:30										
DATE 28 FEB 70									4:05										
SIGNATURE: <i>Barry Schulz</i>																			
AIRCRAFT TYPES																			
1 O2-A																			
2 OV10																			
3 SIOUX																			
4																			
Totals carried forward							1108:20	10:30	188:40	119:45		11:10	1437:55	1191:30	104:30	90:30			





*Kenneth G. Bork* LT COL  
AIR LIAISON OFFICER  
1 ATF



# MAR 70


1	<p>VUNG TAU =&gt; BEIN HOA</p> <p>(LT John SANDERS)</p>	O-2A 045	0.5
	<p>BEIN HOA =&gt; VR =&gt; VUNG TAU</p>	O-2A 045	2.8
	  <p>FAC</p> <p>(MAJ Jim ALLENDER)</p> <p>MAGPIE 71 &amp; 31 12 Mk 82</p> <p>CANBERRA - BOMBS AWAY!</p>	O-2A 045	3.3
2	VR	O-2A 300	2.3
	VR	O-2A 368	2.4
	VR	O-2A 368	2.2
3	<p>VUNG TAU =&gt; NUI DAT</p>	O-2A 050	0.3
	<p>NUI DAT =&gt; BEIN HOA</p>	O-2A 972	0.6
	<p>BEIN HOA =&gt; NUI DAT =&gt; VUNG TAU</p>	O-2A 972	0.8




4 to 5	<b>FREE</b>  <i>CHLOROQUINE</i>		
6	<b>VR</b>  POSSUM 24  <b>=&gt; BEIN HOA</b> <i>(ESCAPE and EVASION / PE BRIEF)</i>	<b>O-2A 972</b>	<b>2.0</b>
	<b>BEIN HOA</b> <b>=&gt; VUNG TAU</b>	<b>O-2A 972</b>	<b>0.5</b>
7	 <p style="text-align: center;"><i>A-37</i></p>	<b>O-2A 383</b>	<b>2.0</b>
	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div style="width: 45%;">  <p style="text-align: center;"><i>F-100</i></p> </div> <div style="width: 45%; text-align: center;"> <p><b>FAC</b> <i>(LT John SANDERS)</i></p> <p>2 x A37 8 Mk 82</p> <p>2 x F-100 8 Mk 82</p> </div> </div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; margin-top: 20px;"> <div style="width: 45%;">  <p style="text-align: center;"><i>F-4E</i></p> </div> <div style="width: 45%; text-align: center;"> <p><b>FAC</b> <i>(LT John SANDERS)</i></p> <p>2 x F-4 4 MAVERICK</p> <p>2 x F-100 8 Mk 82</p> <p><i>(0.5 NIGHT / 0.2 ADF)</i></p>  <p style="color: red; font-style: italic;">A CHINOOK was tasked to drop drums of napalm into LONG HAI Mt cave systems. Once, when the HE containers struck rocks just before drop they exploded, engulfing the CHINOOK in smoke &amp; flames - it flew out other side!</p> </div> </div>		

8	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VR</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>POSSUM 25 - BUSH RANGER 71 / 72 (ILLEGAL BOAT)</i></p>	O-2A 383	3.0
9	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>FAC</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>POSSUM 09</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>2 x A-37 8 Mk 82</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>(0.3 ADF)</i></p>	O-2A 045	3.0
10	<b>O-2A GROUNDED (TAIL PLANE HINGE INSPECTION)</b>		
11	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>FAC</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>(LT John SANDERS)</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>MAGPIE 71 6 x Mk 82</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>6 x F-5 16 Mk 82 / 8 NAPALM</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>CHLOROQUINE</i></p>	O-2A 368	2.2
12	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>COMBAT READY CHECK</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>(CAPT BISHOP)</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>2 x A-37 8 Mk 82</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>(0.3 ADF)</i></p>	O-2 045	1.8
13	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>FAC</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>POSSUM 26 / 20</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>2 x A-37 8 Mk 82</i></p>	O-2A 368	2.5
14	<b>VUNG TAU =&gt; BEIN HOA</b>	O-2A 368	0.6
	<b>BEIN HOA - VR =&gt; VUNG TAU</b>	O-2A 368	1.5

15	<b>VUNG TAU =&gt; NUI DAT</b> <i>(LTCOL BAKER)</i>	O-2A 050	0.3
	<b>VR - SIOUX</b> <i>POSSUM (LT BYSOUTH)</i>	SIOUX 738	2.2
	<b>NUI DAT =&gt; VUNG TAU</b> <i>(LT SMITH)</i>	O-2A 300	0.3
	<b>VR</b> <i>POSSUM 26</i>	O-2A 050	2.0
16	<b>FAC</b> <i>POSSUM 28</i>  2 x A-37 8 Mk 82	O-2A 368	2.0
	<b>NUI DAT =&gt; VUNG TAU</b>	O-2A 368	0.3
17	<b>FAC</b> <i>POSSUM 29</i>  MAGPIE 71 6 Mk 82	O-2A 050	3.0

18	<p><b>VUNG TAU =&gt; BEIN HOA</b></p>  <p><i>(13,275 ft / 70K / 50 min - World Record ??)</i></p>	O-2A 368	1.8
	<p><b>BEIN HOA =&gt; VUNG TAU</b></p> <p><i>(LT SCHWARTZ)</i></p> <p><i>CHLOROQUINE</i></p>	O-2A 046	1.0
19	<p><b>FAC</b></p> <p>POSSUM 22</p> <p>MAGPIE 71 - 6 Mk 82</p> <p><i>RV at 10,000 ft</i></p> <p><i>MAGPIE 71: "Why so high?"</i></p> <p><i>JADE 07: "Not enough time to climb any higher!"</i></p> <p><b>=&gt; BEIN HOA</b></p>	O-2A 300	3.3
	<p><b>BEIN HOA =&gt; VUNG TAU</b></p> <p><i>(LT John SANDERS)</i></p>	O-2A 972	0.5
	<p><i>CAPT John XXX</i></p> <p><i>FRENCH RESTAURANT</i></p>		



*CAPT John XXX regularly flew down from Bien Hoa and we would enjoy an exotic seafood meal at a restaurant on the western side of Vung Tau hill.*

*He would fly back that night, and remove evidence of the flight from the aircraft logbook!*



20	VR POSSUM 24	O-2A 972	2.5
21	VR POSSUM 20	O-2A 050	2.5
22	CROSS WIND >>> 25 K <i>Gusting</i> 35 K		
23	VUNG TAU => NUI DAT  (MAJ Jim ALLENDER)	O-2A 972	0.3
	NUI DAT => VUNG TAU  (LTCOL BAKER)	O-2A 050	0.3
24	VR	O-2A 300	2.6
25	FAC  2 x A-37 8 Mk 82  FLTLT Jack HAYDEN, RAAF FAC  <i>CHLOROQUINE</i>	O-2A 972	2.5
26	VR  FLTLT Jack HAYDEN, RAAF FAC	O-2A 300	2.0
27	VR  PLTOFF Bob TRELOAR, RAAF CHOPPER PILOT  (0.7 SIM ADF / GCA)	O-2A 050	2.5
28	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>FREE</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Sightseeing VUNG TAU township</i></p> <p><i>When driving a radio-jeep to the top of Vung Tau hill, I was on left-hand side of road (Vietnam drives on the right) and had a near miss with Vietnamese Army truck...</i></p> <p><i>I used to make HF radio calls to the MRX Maritime Net at RAAF Butterworth to forward brief messages and occasional talk with NOK</i></p>		





*The greatest danger was from potential mid-air collision with Army helicopters of all types, all aircraft (that just wandered around at will often without clearance) and Artillery live-fire missions.*

*It was always comforting to have a second pilot's eyes with you.*




29	FREE
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*35 SQN CARIBOU destroyed by mortars in Delta*

30	<b>VR</b> 0.5 SIM ADF <i>PLTOFF Tony WHEAL, RAAF CHOPPER PILOT</i>	<b>O-2A 972</b>	<b>2.5</b>
31	<b>IF CHECK =&gt; NUI DAT</b> <i>(MAJ Jim ALLENDER)</i> <i>(0.2 ACT /ADF-GCA)</i> <b>RON - TACP DUTY OFFICER</b>	<b>O-2A 045</b>	<b>0.8</b>



VUNG TAU





Year 1970		AIRCRAFT		Captain or 1st Pilot	Ce-pilot 2nd Pilot Pupil or Crew	DUTY (Including number of day or night landings as 1st Pilot or Dual)	Day Flying			Night Flying			Flight Time		Instrument Flying		1/F Appro			
Month	Date	Type and Mark	No				1st Pilot (1)	2nd Pilot (2)	Dual (3)	1st Pilot (4)	2nd Pilot (5)	Dual (6)	Total Cofc 1-6 (7)	Captain (8)	Sim (9)	Act (10)	Type (11)			
Totals brought forward																				
MAR	1	O-2A	045	SELF	LT SANDER	VUNG TAU - BIEN HOA	.30						.30	.30						
MAR	1	O-2A	045	SELF		VR - VUNG TAU POSSUM 20	2.50						2.50	2.50						
MAR	1	O-2A	045	MAJ ALLENDER	SELF	FAC MAGPIE 71/3	3.20						3.20							
MAR	2	O-2A	368	SELF		VR	2.25						2.25	2.25						
MAR	2	O-2A	368	SELF		VR POSSUM 9	2.15						2.15	2.15						
MAR	3	O-2A	050	COL BAKER	SELF	VUNG TAU - NUI DAT	.20						.20							
MAR	3	O-2A	972	SELF		NUI DAT - BIEN HOA	.35						.35	.35						
MAR	3	O-2A	972	SELF		BIEN HOA - VUNG TAU	.50						.50	.50						
MAR	2	O-2A	300	SELF		VR	2.20						2.20	2.20						
MAR	6	O-2A	972	SELF		VR - BIEN HOA POSSUM 24	2.00						2.00	2.00						
MAR	6	O-2A	972	SELF		BIEN HOA - VUNG TAU	.30						.30	.30						
MAR	7	O-2A	383	SELF	LT SANDERS	FAC DICE 61 A37 F100	2.45						2.45	2.45						
MAR	7	O-2A	045	SELF	"	FAC	.30			2.30			3.00	3.00	.15		ADF			
MAR	8	O-2A	383	SELF		VR POSSUM 25 BR 71/2	3.00						3.00	3.00						
MAR	9	O-2A	045	SELF	LT SANDER	FAC POSSUM 09 A37	3.00						3.00	3.00	.15		ADF			
MAR	11	O-2A	368	SELF	"	FAC POSSUM 27 B57 F5	2.15						2.15	2.15						
MAR	12	O-2A	045	SELF	CAPT BISHOPP	FAC - CRC " A37	1.50						1.50	1.50	.15		ADF			
MAR	13	O-2A	368	SELF		FAC POSS 26/20 A37	2.30						2.30	2.30						
MAR	14	O-2A	368	SELF		VUNG TAU - BIEN HOA	.40						.40	.40						
MAR	14	O-2A	368	SELF		BIEN HOA - VR - VUNG TAU	1.30						1.30	1.30						
MAR	15	O-2A	050	COL BAKER	SELF	VUNG TAU - NUI DAT	.15						.15							
MAR	15	SIoux	738	LT BISHOPP	SELF	VR - AIRSTRIKE		2:15					2:15							
MAR	15	O-2A	050	LT SMITH	SELF	NUI DAT - VUNG TAU	.20						.20							
MAR	15	O-2A	050	SELF		VR POSSUM 26	2.00						2.00	2.00						
MAR	16	O-2A	368	COL BAKER	SELF	FAC A37 " 28	2.00						2.00							
MAR	16	O-2A	368	COL BAKER	SELF	NUI DAT - VUNG TAU	.20						.20							
MAR	17	O-2A	050	SELF		FAC MAGPIE 71 POSS 20	3.00						3.00	3.00						
MAR	18	O-2A	368	SELF		VR 14,700' - BIEN HOA	1.50						1.50	1.50						
MAR	18	O-2A	046	LT SCHWARTZ	SELF	BIEN HOA - VUNG TAU	1.00						1.00							
MAR	19	O-2A	300	SELF		FAC - BH MAGPIE 71 POSSUM 22	3.20						3.20	3.20						
MAR	19	O-2A	972	SELF	LT SANDER	BIEN HOA - VUNG TAU	.30						.30	.30						
MAR	20	O-2A	972	SELF		VR POSSUM 24	2.30						2.30	2.30						
MAR	21	O-2A	050	SELF		VR POSSUM 20	2.30						2.30	2.30						
MAR	23	O-2A	972	MAJ ALLENDER	SELF	VUNG TAU - NUI DAT	.20						.20							
MAR	23	O-2A	050	COL BAKER	SELF	NUI DAT - VUNG TAU	.20						.20							
MAR	24	O-2A	300	SELF		VR	2.40						2.40	2.40						
MAR	25	O-2A	972	SELF		FAC A37	2.30						2.30	2.30						
MAR	26	O-2A	300	SELF	FLTHANDEN	VR	2.00						2.00	2.00						
MAR	28	O-2A	050	SELF	PI OFF TREDER	VR	2.30						2.30	2.30	.45		S/A ADF			
MAR	30	O-2A	972	SELF	PI OFF WHEAL	VR	2.30						2.30	2.30	.25		ADF S/A			
MAR	31	O-2A	045	SELF	MAJ ALLENDER	VR	.45						.45			.10	ADF S/A			
SUMMARY FOR MAR 1970							69.05			2.30			71.35	62.35	1.55	.10				
UNIT USAF TACP IATE								2.15					2.15							
DATE 31 MAR 70																				
SIGNATURE [Signature]																				
AIRBASE 1 O2-A																				
AIRBASE 2 SIoux																				
AIRBASE 3																				
AIRBASE 4																				
Totals carried forward							1177.25	12.45	188.40	121.45		11.10	1511.45	1254.05	106.25	90.40				





*'POSSUM'*



*O-2A LANDING  
SIOUX 'POSSUM FOLLOWING*



*'POSSUM' RECONNAISSANCE*




*TRENCHES / TUNNELS*





*BOMB IMPACT*




*'POSSUM' BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT*

1		<p><b>TACP DUTY OFFICER</b></p> <p><i>1 ATF TIC IMMEDIATE AIRSTRIKES ACTION CHLOROQUINE</i></p>	
2	<p><b>FREE</b></p> <p><i>TROOPS IN CONTACT SAS 15 / 23 IMMEDIATE AIRSTRIKES</i></p>		
3	<p><b>NUI DAT =&gt; BEIN HOA</b></p> <p><i>(MAJ Jim ALLENDER)</i></p>	<p><b>O-2A 972</b></p>	<p><b>0.4</b></p>
	<p><b>BEIN HOA =&gt; NUI DAT</b></p>	<p><b>O-2A 972</b></p>	<p><b>0.4</b></p>
4 to 7	<p><b>4 to 7 APR</b></p> <p><b>FREE</b></p> <p><i>MRX COMMUNICATION TO BUTTERWORTH</i></p>		
8	<p><b>NUI DAT =&gt; VUNG TAU</b></p> <p><i>(LT James KLING)</i></p> <p><i>CHLOROQUINE</i></p>	<p><b>O-2A 050</b></p>	<p><b>0.3</b></p>
9	<p><b>FAC</b></p> <p><i>POSSUM 20</i></p> <p><i>2 x A-37 8 Mk 82</i></p> <p><i>(504 TASG ordered to limit O-2A flying hours!)</i></p> <p><i>Delivered clothing / food donations to BARIA orphanage</i></p>	<p><b>O-2A 045</b></p>	<p><b>1.6</b></p>
10	<p><b>FAC</b></p> <p><i>(CAPT Mike DAVENPORT)</i></p> <p><i>2 x A-37 - 8 Mk 82</i></p>	<p><b>O-2A 045</b></p>	<p><b>2.0</b></p>

11	VR	O-2A 045	1.0
12	FAC  POSSUM 20 / BUSHRANGER 06 & 02  6 x A-37 24 Mk 82  <i>SAS TIC INCIDENT</i>	O-2A 045	2.7
13	FAC  POSSUM 26 / 28  UH-1H BUSHRANGER & 'SLICKS'  <i>SAS TIC EXTRACT</i>	O-2A 045	4.5
14	 <p><i>IROQUOIS</i></p> 	FREE  <i>UH-1H TRAINING -HOISTING / LANDINGS</i>  <i>I piloted some hoist training sorties (RVN Army troops) and practiced general handling / supply sorties.</i>  <i>I also did some winching as crewman duties- the size of the RVN soldiers' eyes as they were brought onboard especially if one jerked the hoist retrieval occasionally - outstanding!!</i>  <i>At end of one sortie, I made a heavy landing and bent a landing skid - sorry Trudy!!</i>  <i>(CAPT: PLTOFF Bob TRELOAR)</i>	
15	VR  (LT JOHNSON) POSSUM 20  => BEIN HOA => VUNG TAU  (0.5 NIGHT)  <i>CHLOROQUINE</i>	O-2A 050	2.5



16	 <p style="text-align: center;"><b>FAC</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">(LT JOHNSON)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">5 x A-1E 30 Mk 82</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>LT Johnston had comms / language issues with the A-1 lead; ended up chasing them for miles trying to turn the flight back to the target area!</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">A-1G</p>	O-2A 045	1.7
17	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>FAC</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">(LT JOHNSON)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">MAGPIE 61 6 x Mk 82</p> <p style="text-align: center;">2 x A-37 8 Mk 82</p>	O-2A 050	2.6
18	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>FAC</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">(LT JOY)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">MAGPIE 41 &amp; 61 12 Mk 82</p>	O-2A 972	2.5
19	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VUNG TAU =&gt; NUI DAT</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">(LT JOY)</p>	O-2A 972	0.3
	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VR</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">POSSUM (LT PARTRIDGE)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">MAGPIE 61 6 Mk 82</p>	SIOUX 728	2.2
	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>NUI DAT =&gt; VUNG TAU</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">(CAPT Mike DAVENPORT)</p>	O-2A 300	0.3
20	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VR</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">(LTCOL BAKER)</p>	O-2A 050	2.5
	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VR</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">(LTCOL BAKER)</p>	O-2A 050	2.4



21	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VR</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>POSSUM 28 / 17</i></p>	O-2A 300	3.3
22	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>FAC</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>POSSUM 09</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">2 <i>xA-37</i> 8 <i>Mk 82</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>=&gt; NUI DAT</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>CHLOROQUINE</i></p>	O-2A 972	2.5
	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>NUI DAT</b> <b>=&gt; VUNG TAU</b></p>	O-2A 972	0.3
23	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>FAC</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">2 <i>xA-1E</i> 12 <i>Mk 82</i></p>	O-2A 972	2.7
24	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VR</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>(LT JOY)</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>0.8 SIM ADF / GCA</i></p>	O-2A 972	2.8
	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>FAC</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>(LT KLING)</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">2 <i>xA-37</i> 8 <i>Mk 82</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>=&gt; BEIN HOA</b></p>	O-2A 300	2.2
	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>BEIN HOA</b> <b>=&gt; VUNG TAU</b></p>	O-2A 300	0.8

# FREE

## 35 SQN CARIBOU DELTA LOGISTIC FLIGHT



### UNIT HISTORY SHEET DETAILS OF OPERATIONS

FROM 2359 HOURS 24 APR 70 TO 2359 HOURS 25 APR 70 BY HQ 35 SQUADRON SOUTH VIETNAM NO OF SHEET 1

D. DATE	AIRCRAFT	CREW	SORTIES	TIME	ROUNDS FIRED	AREA AND TYPE OF OPERATION	FREIGHT	FUEL	PAX	REMARKS
25 APR 70	A4-179	WILSON RICH BRUCE MAIR	13	7.00	-	002 MISSION	27700	-	16	-
25 APR 70	A4-140	WGDR MITCHELL GPCAPT HICKSON FSGT DEBOER FLGOF SCHULZ	10	4.40	-	006 MISSION 35 SQN CARIBOU DELTA SHUTTLE CAO LAHN LONG XUYEN AN THOI CA MAU VIHN LOI TRA VIHN	480	4920	163	-
25 APR 70	A4-191	HILLSGM CALVERT MANNING	9	3.00	-	003 MISSION	5200	1390	113	-
25 APR 70	A4-191	HILLSGM CALVERT MANNING	2	.50	2	007 MISSION	650	350	25	-

25



		<b>VUNG TAU =&gt; NUI DAT</b>	<b>O-2A 045</b>	<b>0.3</b>
26		<b>VR</b>  <i>SIoux - POSSUM (LT PARTRIDGE)</i>  <i>BLACK PONY - 2 x MARINE OV-10</i> <i>16 x 5" ZUNI R x</i>	<b>SIoux 727</b>	<b>1.7</b>
		<b>VR</b>  <i>SIoux - POSSUM (LT PARTRIDGE)</i>	<b>SIoux 728</b>	<b>2.0</b>
		<b>NUI DAT =&gt; VUNG TAU</b>	<b>O-2A 053</b>	<b>0.3</b>
27	  <i>F-100</i>	<b>FAC</b>  <i>(LT JOY)</i>  <i>2 x F-100</i> <i>8 Mk 82</i>  <i>SAS TIC</i> <i>ARTILLERY</i>	<b>O-2A 300</b>	<b>2.0</b>
29	  <i>NAPALM F-100</i>	<b>FAC</b>  <i>POSSUM 20</i>  <i>2 x F-100</i> <i>8 Mk 82</i>  <i>CHLOROQUINE</i>	<b>O-2A 045</b>	<b>2.7</b>

30	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VR / FAC</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>2 x A-37 - 8 Mk 82, ARTY - (SAS TIC)</b></p> <p><i>While conducting a solo VR mission I heard a whispered radio call on the VHF-FM from a SAS Callsign. They advised that they had been exposed to VC patrol and were being pursued by VC.</i></p> <p><i>They advised that they were attempting relocate themselves to their primary LZ for extraction. They were only able to give an approximation of their location and distance from the LZ.</i></p> <p><i>I contacted the TACP and requested immediate support from 'Bushranger' gunships and 'slicks' helicopter for extraction. I put artillery on request and initiated an immediate airstrike request.</i></p> <p><i>I was able to identify the original VC position from SAS description and called in artillery onto that location knowing the SAS were now safely away from the area. I 'walked' the impact area towards the SAS location.</i></p> <p><i>Not long after the SAS were at the LZ. The 'Bushranger' gunships were able to identify the SAS position and began suppressing the area with rocket and mini-gun fire to protect the 'slicks' helicopter's approach.</i></p> <p><i>Once extracted, more artillery was used in the probable position of the VC and later an airstrike was used to target the original contact area.</i></p> <p><i>BDA was planned for another day!</i></p>	O-2A 300	2.9
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Year 1970		AIRCRAFT		Co-pilot 2nd Pilot	DUTY		Day Flying			Night Flying			Flight Time		Instrument Flying		I/F Approaches		
Month	Date	Type and Mark	No	Captain or 1st Pilot	Pupil or Crew	(Including number of day or night landings as 1st Pilot or Dual)	1st Pilot (1)	2nd Pilot (2)	Dual (3)	1st Pilot (4)	2nd Pilot (5)	Dual (6)	Total Cof 1-6 (7)	Captain (8)	Sim (9)	Act (10)	Type (11)	No (12)	
Totals brought forward							1177:25	12:45	188:40	121:45		11:10	1511:45	1254:05	106:25	90:40			
APR	3	O-2A	972	MAJ ALLENDER	SELF	NUI DAT - BIEN HOA	.25						.25						
APR	3	O-2A	972	MAJ ALLENDER	SELF	BIEN HOA - NUI DAT	.30						.30						
APR	8	O-2A	050	LT KLINGS	SELF	NUI DAT - VUNG TAU	.20						.20						
APR	9	O-2A	045	SELF		FAC POSSUM 20 BLADE 07	1:40						1:40	1:40					
APR	10	O-2A	045	SELF		FAC DICE 45	2:00						2:00	2:00					
APR	11	O-2A	045	SELF		VR	1:00						1:00	1:00					
APR	12	O-2A	045	SELF	PILOTT WHEAL	FAC BLADE 05, LITTER 07, DICE 45	2:45						2:45	2:45					
APR	13	O-2A	045	SELF		VR FAC HAWK 09	4:30						4:30	4:30					
APR	15	O-2A	050	SELF	LT JOHNSTON	VR POSSUM 20	2:30			.30			3:00	3:00					
APR	16	O-2A	045	SELF	"	VR FAC 5x A1 30x Mk82	1:45						1:45	1:45					
APR	17	O-2A	050	SELF	"	FAC DICE 45 MAGPIE 61	2:40						2:40	2:40					
APR	18	O-2A	045	SELF	LT JOY	FAC MAGPIE 61/41	2:30						2:30	2:30					
APR	19	O-2A	972	LT JOY	SELF	VUNG TAU - NUI DAT	.20						.20						
APR	19	SIoux	728	LT PARTRIDGE	SELF	FAC MAGPIE 61		2:20					2:20						
APR	19	O-2A	300	LT DAVENPORT	SELF	NUI DAT - VUNG TAU	.20						.20						
APR	20	O-2A	050	SELF	LT COL BAKER	VR	2:30						2:30						
APR	20	O-2A	050	SELF	LT COL BAKER	VR	2:25						2:25	2:25					
APR	21	O-2A	300	SELF		VR	3:20						3:20	3:20					
APR	22	O-2A	972	SELF		FAC BLADE 07	2:50						2:50	2:50					
APR	23	O-2A	972	SELF		FAC 2A1	2:45						2:45	2:45					
APR	24	O-2A	972	SELF	LT JOY	FAC VR	2:50						2:50	2:50	.50			ADF GCA	
APR	24	O-2A	300	LT KLING	SELF	FAC BLADE 01	3:00						3:00						
APR	26	O-2A	045	SELF	LT COL BAKER	VUNG TAU - NUI DAT	.20						.20						
APR	26	SIoux	727	LT PARTRIDGE	SELF	FAC BLACK PONY	1:35						1:35						
APR	26	SIoux	728	"	"	VR	2:00						2:00						
APR	26	O-2A	053	LT KLING	SELF	NUI DAT - VUNG TAU	.20						.20						
APR	27	O-2A	300	SELF	LT JOY	FAC HAWK 07	2:00						2:00	2:00	.30			GCA	
APR	28	O-2A	050	SELF	"	FAC TIC BLADE 07	3:15						3:15	3:15	.10				
APR	29	O-2A	045	SELF		FAC RAP 17	2:45						2:45	2:45					
APR	30	O-2A	300	SELF		FAC TIC LITTER 07	2:55						2:55	2:55					
SUMMARY FOR APR 1970							54:30			.30			55:00	46:55	1:20	.10			
UNIT USAF TACP IATE 19 TASS								5:55					5:55						
DATE 30 APR 70																			
SIGNATURE <i>Barry Schulz</i>																			
AIRCRAFT 1 O-2A																			
2 SIoux																			
3																			
4																			
Totals carried forward							1231:55	18:40	188:40	122:15		11:10	572:40	1301:00	107:45	90:50			

*I had a near mid-air with a F-100 fighter recovering from an aborted dive bomb pass. We were working in a narrow gap between towering cumulus cloud.*

*This forced me to be in the same 'air space' close to the fighter's roll out in dive.*

*He had to abort his pass and recovered early - I had to pull up into the vertical and virtually 'hang there' and wait - I felt & heard him go past - it was too close... he acknowledged that he had me in sight!*

# CASUALTY!

BEFORE



“@#S^\*@”



AFTER



*Just as I lifted off on take-off run at NUI DAT, a large pheasant decided to launch off across the runway and into my flight path.*

*I was committed to the take-off and had no way to avoid the pheasant. The first impact was a loud bang on the nose with the pheasant remains thrown off to the right-hand side where heavy thump was felt as it hit the wing leading edge.*


*No engine or handling effects were noticed and I recovered to VUNG TAU.*

*Damage:*

- *a few heart beats were lost*
- *cracked engine cowling*
- *blood 'n guts all over!*

# MAY 70

1	<b>VUNG TAU</b> <b>=&gt; NUI DAT</b> <i>(LT JOY)</i>	O-2A 045	0.3
	<b>VR - SIOUX</b> <i>POSSUM</i> <i>(LT Greg MONTEITH)</i>	SIOUX 374	1.9
	<b>FAC - SIOUX</b> <i>POSSUM</i> <i>(LT ELLWOOD)</i>	SIOUX 374	2.0
	<b>NUI DAT</b> <b>=&gt; VUNG TAU</b> <i>(LT JOHNSON)</i>	O-2A 050	0.3
2 to 3	FREE		
4	<b>VUNG TAU</b> <b>=&gt; BEIN HOA</b> <b>=&gt; VUNG TAU</b>	O-2A 053	1.4
5	<b>VR</b> <i>POSSUM 26</i>	O-2A 045	2.5
6	<b>FAC</b> <i>POSSUM 28</i> <i>MAGPIE 31</i> <i>6 Mk 82</i> <i>CHLOROQUINE</i>	O-2A 050	2.8
7	<b>FAC</b> <i>POSSUM 26</i> <i>MAGPIE 51</i> <i>6 Mk 82</i>	O-2A 053	3.0



8	<p><b>FAC</b></p> <p>POSSUM 28</p> <p>MAGPIE 51</p> <p>6 Mk 82</p>	O-2A 300	2.7
9	<p><b>FAC</b></p> <p>2 x F-100</p> <p>8 Mk 82</p>	O-2A 300	3.2
	 <p><b>B-52 ARCLIGHT</b></p> <p><i>B-52 HEAVY BOMB ATTACK ON LONG HAI MOUNTAINS EAST OF VUNG TAU</i></p>		
10	<p><b>FAC</b></p> <p>POSSUM 28</p> <p>6 X F-100</p> <p>24 Mk 82</p>	O-2A 300	2.4
11	<p><b>VR</b></p> <p>POSSUM 20</p>	O-2A 972	2.7
12	<p><b>FAC</b></p> <p>POSSUM 22</p> <p>MAGPIE 61</p> <p>6 Mk 82</p>	O-2A 053	2.7
13	<p><b>FAC</b></p> <p>POSSUM 23</p> <p>MAGPIE 51</p> <p>6 Mk 82</p> <p><i>CHLOROQUINE</i></p>	O-2A 045	2.5
14	<p><b>VR</b></p> <p>POSSUM 23</p>	O-2A 045	2.6
15	<b>FREE</b>		



16	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VR</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">=&gt; BEIN HOA =&gt; VUNG TAU</p>	O-2A 045	3.0
17	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VR</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">POSSUM 09</p>	O-2A 972	2.5
18	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VUNG TAU</b> =&gt; BEIN HOA</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>VR</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">POSSUM 26/28</p>	O-2A 300	3.0
19	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VR</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">POSSUM 28</p>	O-2A 045	2.5
	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VR</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">(LTCOL BAKER)</p>	O-2A 053	1.3
20	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>FAC</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">MAGPIE 51 6 x Mk 82</p> <p style="text-align: center;">6 x A-37 24 Mk 82</p> <p style="text-align: center;">2 x F-100 8 Mk 82</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>COMMANDO VAULT</i></p>	O-2A 045	3.0
	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>FAC</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">6 x F-100 24 Mk 82</p>	O-2A 053	2.6
21	<b>FREE</b>		

*POSSUM 28 / JADE 01 'shot at' by D445?*

*Probably delayed fusing of some CBU-58 that F-100s had just dropped, it generated a rush of airstrikes to deter the alleged 'culprits'!!*

22	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VUNG TAU =&gt; RAAF BUTTERWORTH</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>LEAVE</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>23 to 29 MAY</b></p>	C-130	2.0
23 to 29	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around;">   </div> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>CHLOROQUINE</i></p>		
30	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>RAAF BUTTERWORTH =&gt; PENANG =&gt; VUNG TAU</b></p>	C-130	3.0
31	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VR</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>(LT JOY)</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>POSSUM 23</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>IF</i></p>	O-2A 045	2.0
	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VR</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>(LT JOY)</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>POSSUM 23</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>IF</i></p>	O-2A 045	1.5

Year 1970		AIRCRAFT		Captain or 1st Pilot	Co-pilot 2nd Pilot Pupil or Crew	DUTY (Including number of day or night landings as 1st Pilot or Dual)	Day Flying			Night Flying			Flight Time		Instrument Flying		I/F Approaches		
Month	Date	Type and Mark	No				1st Pilot (1)	2nd Pilot (2)	Dual (3)	1st Pilot (4)	2nd Pilot (5)	Dual (6)	Total Cols 1-6 (7)	Captain (8)	Sim (9)	Act (10)	Type (11)	No (12)	
--						-- Totals brought forward													
MAY	1	O2A	045	LT JOY	SELF	VUNG TAU - NUI DAT													
MAY	1	SIoux	374	J MONTIETH	SELF	VR		1:55			1:55								
MAY	1	SIoux	374	J ELWOOD	SELF	FAC		2:00			2:00								
MAY	1	O2A	050	L JOHNSON	SELF	NUI DAT - VUNG TAU													
MAY	4	O2A	053	SELF		VUNG TAU - BIEN HOA - VUNG TAU					1:25	1:25							
MAY	5	O2A	045	SELF		VR					2:30	2:30							
MAY	6	O2A	050	SELF		FAC MAGPIE 31 POSSUM 28					2:50	2:50							
MAY	7	O2A	053	SELF		FAC MAGPIE 51 " 26					3:00	3:00							
MAY	8	O2A	300	SELF		FAC " " 28					2:45	2:45							
MAY	9	O2A	300	SELF		FAC ELECT 51 R					3:15	3:15							
MAY	10	O2A	300	SELF		FAC DICE 41, RAP 13, FALCON 21					2:25	2:25							
MAY	11	O2A	972	SELF		VR POSSUM 20					2:45	2:45							
MAY	12	O2A	053	SELF		VR FAC MAGPIE 61 POSSUM 22					2:45	2:45							
MAY	13	O2A	045	SELF		FAC " 51 " 23					2:30	2:30							
MAY	14	O2A	045	SELF		VR POSSUM 23					2:40	2:40							
MAY	16	O2A	045	SELF		VR					3:00	3:00							
MAY	17	O2A	972	SELF		VR " 9					2:30	2:30							
MAY	18	O2A	300	SELF		VR " 26					3:50	3:50							
MAY	19	O2A	045	SELF		VR " 28					2:30	2:30							
MAY	19	O2A	053	COL BAKER	SELF	VR					1:20	1:20							
MAY	20	O2A	045	SELF	COL BAKER	FAC 6x A37, 1x F100, 1x B57 VAULT					3:00	3:00							
MAY	20	O2A	053	COL BAKER	SELF	FAC 3x F100					2:40	2:40							
MAY	31	O2A	045	SELF		VR POSSUM 23					2:00	2:00							
MAY	31	O2A	045	SELF	LT JOY	IF					1:30	1:30	1:10	-20	ADF GCA	3			
SUMMARY FOR MAY 1970																			
UNIT USAF TACP IAF 10 TASS																			
DATE 31 MAY 70																			
SIGNATURE <i>[Signature]</i>																			
Totals carried forward																			
							1283:45	22:35	188:40	122:15		11:10	629:25	348:10	108:55	91:10			

# JUN 70

1	<p>VR =&gt; BEIN HOA</p>	O-2A 045	2.2
	<p>BEIN HOA =&gt; NUI DAT  (LT JOY)  IF</p>	O-2A 045	1.4
2	<p>FAC  (LT O'GRADY)  POSSUM 21 / 08  4 x F-100 16 Mk 82</p>	O-2A 972	3.6
3	<p>FREE  CHLOROQUINE</p>		

4	<p><b>VUNG TAU =&gt; BEIN HOA</b></p> <p><i>(CAPT Mike DAVENPORT)</i></p>	O-2A 050	0.4
	<p><b>BEIN HOA =&gt; NUI DAT</b></p>	O-2A 300	0.5
	<p><b>VR</b></p> <p><i>POSSUM 25</i></p> <p><b>=&gt; VUNG TAU</b></p>	O-2A 300	2.3
5	<p><b>VR</b></p> <p><i>POSSUM 20</i></p>	O-2A 045	2.8
6	<p><b>FAC</b></p> <p><i>POSSUM 25</i></p> <p>4 x F-100 16 Mk 82</p> <p><i>CHLOROQUINE</i></p>	O-2A 050	2.8
7	<p><b>FAC</b></p> <p><i>MAGPIE 71 / 11 / 81 / 61</i></p> <p>24 Mk 82</p>	O-2A 050	2.9
8	<p><b>INSTRUCTOR PILOT (IP) UPGRADE</b></p> <p><i>(MAJ Jim ALLENDER)</i></p> <p><b>=&gt; BEIN HOA</b></p>	O-2A 972	2.3
	<p><b>BEIN HOA =&gt; VUNG TAU</b></p> <p><i>(0.1 NIGHT)</i></p>	O-2A 300	0.5
9	<p><b>IP UPGRADE</b></p> <p><i>(MAJ Jim ALLENDER)</i></p> <p><i>(0.5 SIM)</i></p>	O-2A 300	2.3



Current and experienced FAC trained fighter pilots were in short supply by the late 1960s. Hence, most junior ranking pilots were arriving directly from the O-2 / FAC School at the 4410th CCTS at Hurlburt AFB (Holley Field), FL. They had basic training but, no operational experience. The Commander & OPSO were ex B-47 and C-141 pilots.

Hence, de facto 'JADE OCU' was created!!

(Similarly in the mid-1970s, experienced qualified F-4 pilots were becoming scarce, and when I was instructing at the 414 Fighter Weapons School at Nellis AFB we, for a short time, were requalifying past F-4 pilots for the strike role, and outstanding junior F-4 pilots as specialized air combat pilots for the air war over North Vietnam.)

	<b>VUNG TAU =&gt; BEIN HOA</b>	<b>O-2A 300</b>	<b>1.2</b>
<b>10</b>	<b>IP UPGRADE</b> <i>(CAPT LIFE)</i> <i>(0.8 SIM / 0.3 NIGHT)</i> <i>CHLOROQUINE</i>	<b>O-2A 046</b>	<b>2.0</b>
<b>11</b>	<b>BEIN HOA</b> <i>4 ROCKETS 0700 Hrs ON AIRFIELD</i>		
<b>12</b>	<b>IP CHECK</b> <i>IPs train students to operate aircraft safely. They teach their students safety rules and aircraft operations.</i> <i>At JADE the role was to train new FACs in threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Support daily training by scheduling, mission planning, creating mission materials, briefing, executing, and debriefing.</i> <i>(CAPT HOGAN)</i> <i>(0.8 SIM)</i>	<b>O-2A 374</b>	<b>2.2</b>
	<b>VR</b>	<b>O-2A 045</b>	<b>1.9</b>
<b>13</b>	<b>VR</b> <i>(LTCOL Tom EDGE)</i> <i>NEW COMMANDER</i> <i>POSSUM 08</i>	<b>O-2A 972</b>	<b>2.5</b>

	<b>BEIN HOA =&gt;VUNG TAU</b>	<b>O-2A 053</b>	<b>0.6</b>
<b>14</b>	<b>FAC</b> <i>(LT Jim FULLER)</i>  4 x F-100 16 Mk 82	<b>O-2A 053</b>	<b>3.1</b>
<b>15</b>	<b>FAC</b> <i>(LTCOL Tom EDGE)</i>  2 x F-100 8 Mk 82	<b>O-2A 972</b>	<b>2.5</b>
	<b>VR</b> <i>(LT Jim FULLER)</i>  POSSUM 20	<b>O-2A 972</b>	<b>2.3</b>
<b>16</b>	<b>FREE</b>		



*NIGHT FAC UNDER FLARES*

*As a part of the in-theatre induction for the low experienced FACs, I regularly engaged the 105 mm or 155 mm artillery batteries at Nui Dat to introduce and maintain FAC currency in artillery procedures. The accuracy of the fall of shot was very impressive!*


*For safety, artillery radio procedures were very structured and had to be strictly used to ensure trouble-free, safe fire missions.*




17	<b>FAC - LONG HAI, COMMANDO VAULT</b> (LTCOL Tom EDGE)  CHLOROQUINE	<b>O-2A</b> <b>375</b>	<b>3.2</b>
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*The BLU-82B / C-130 weapon system, known as 'COMMANDO VAULT' - nicknamed 'daisy cutter' in Vietnam and Afghanistan for its ability to flatten a forest into a helicopter landing zone.*

*It is a 15,000 pound (6,800 kg) conventional bomb, delivered from a C-130 at 10 000 ft under Ground Radar control. The accuracy was about 100 metres and it- cleared an area suitable for about a 3 UH-1H helicopter insertion.*

*We controlled the drop zone - almost a traffic jam with observing aircraft - I once overflew at impact detonation at 2 500 ft - it lifted our O-2A a few 100 ft and had an impressive NUKE vapour front, a big bang and cloud!.*



18	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>FAC</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">(LTCOL Tom EDGE)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">2 x F-100 8 Mk 82</p>	O-2A 972	2.4
19	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>FAC</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">(LTCOL Tom EDGE)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">2 x F-100 8 Mk 82</p>	O-2A 053	2.8
	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VR</b></p>	O-2A 375	1.9
20	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>FAC</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">(LT Tom FULLER)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">2 x F-100 8 Mk 82</p>	O-2A 375	3.8
21	<div style="display: flex; align-items: center;">  <div style="margin-left: 20px;"> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>DUTY OFFICER NUI DAT</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>QUARTERS - 161 RECCE SQN Army Aviation Regiment, NUI DAT</i></p> <p style="text-align: center; color: red;"><i>MRX COMMUNICATION WITH BUTTERWORTH</i></p> </div> </div>		
22 to 23	<div style="display: flex; align-items: center;">  <div style="margin: 0 20px; text-align: center; color: red;"> <p><i>TRANSFERRED ACCOMMODATION FROM VUNG TAU HOTEL TO VUNG TAU AIRFIELD ARMY BARRACKS OPPOSITE JADE FLIGHT-LINE.</i></p> </div>  </div>		
24	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VR</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">(MAJ Ted COTHMAN) NEW OPSO</p> <p style="text-align: center; color: red;"><i>CHLOROQUINE</i></p>	O-2A 045	2.1



25	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>FAC</b> (MAJ Ted COTHAN)  2 x F-100 8 Mk 82</p>	O-2A 053	2.5
26	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>FAC</b> (MAJ Ted COTHAN)  2 x F-100 8 Mk 82</p>	O-2A 375	2.2
	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VR</b> (MAJ Ted COTHAN)</p>	O-2A 375	1.6
27	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>FAC</b> (MAJ Ted COTHAN)  2 x F-100 8 Mk 82</p>	O-2A 053	2.8
28	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VUNG TAU =&gt; NUI DAT</b></p>	O-2A 375	0.3
	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>FAC</b> (LT O'GRADY)  2 x F-100 8 Mk 82</p>	O-2A 375	2.5
29	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VR</b> (MAJ Ted COTHAN)</p>	O-2A 045	1.7
	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VR</b> (LT DEAN)</p>	O-2A 045	2.4
30	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VR</b> (LT DEAN)</p>	O-2A 300	2.6



ANNUAL SUMMARY - 30 JUN 70

PERIODIC SUMMARY			Day Flying			Night Flying			Flight Time		Instrument Flying	
Date	Occasion	Class/Type of A/C	1st Pilot (1)	2nd Pilot (2)	Dual (3)	1st Pilot (4)	2nd Pilot (5)	Dual (6)	Total (7)	Captain (8)	Sim (9)	Act (10)
30 JUN 70	ANNUAL	JET MIRAGE	167.00			27.20			194.20	194.20	4.30	24.45
		PISTON CESSNA 02	297.55		8.10	5.00			311.05	272.35	8.10	1.10
		TURBO PROP OV10		5.05					5.05			
		HELICOPTER SIOUX		16.10					16.10			
		<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>464.55</b>	<b>21.15</b>	<b>8.10</b>	<b>32.30</b>			<b>526.40</b>	<b>466.55</b>	<b>12.40</b>	<b>25.55</b>
Certified Correct for period from 1 JUL 69 to 30 JUN 70 Assessment of ability WELL ABOVE AVERAGE Remarks CHOSEN TO BE UNIT TRAINING OFFICER/INSTRUCTOR PILOT BECAUSE OF HIS OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE AND ABILITY. Signature Robert L. Ridge LT COL USAF Commanding USAF TACP Date 3 JULY 70 IAFV VIETNAM												

JUL 70



1	VR (LT FULLER)	O-2A 053	2.3
	VR CHLOROQUINE	O-2A 972	0.8
2	VR (LT FULLER) (0.2 ACT)	O-2A 053	1.8
3	VR (LT FULLER) (0.7 SIM - 0.1 ACT)	O-2A 050	2.5

4	<p><b>FAC</b></p> <p>(LT O'GRADY)</p> <p>2 x F-100 8 Mk 82</p>	O-2A 045	2.6
5	<p><b>VR</b></p> <p>(LT O'GRADY)</p>	O-2A 053	2.3
	<p><b>VR</b></p> <p>(LT JOY)</p> <p>2 x A-37 8 Mk 82</p>	O-2A 050	3.5
6	<p><b>VR</b></p> <p>(LT FULLER)</p> <p>POSSUM 23</p>	O-2A 045	2.5
7	<p><b>FAC</b></p> <p>(LT FULLER)</p> <p>6 x F-100 24 Mk 82</p>	O-2A 050	4.0
8	<p><b>VR</b></p> <p>(LT O'GRADY)</p> <p>POSSUM 08</p> <p>(0.2 ACT)</p> <p><b>CHLOROQUINE</b></p>	O-2A 050	2.3
9	<p><b>FAC</b></p> <p>(LT O'GRADY)</p> <p>2 x F-100 8 Mk 82</p>	O-2A 050	2.3
	<p><b>VR</b></p> <p>(CAPT Mike DAVENPORT)</p>	O-2A 972	2.7



10	<p><b>FAC</b></p> <p>(LT O'GRADY)</p> <p>2 x F-100 8 Mk 82</p>	O-2A 050	3.0
11	<p><b>VR - SIOUX</b></p> <p>POSSUM 09 (MAJ CALVERT)</p>	SIOUX 734	1.0
	<p><b>FAC</b></p> <p>(LT DEAN)</p> <p>2 x F-100 8 Mk 82</p> <p><i>MRX COMMUNICATION WITH BUTTERWORTH</i></p>	O-2A 050	3.7
12	<p><b>VR</b></p> <p>(LT JOY)</p> <p>4 x A-37 16 Mk 82</p>	O-2A 972	2.7
	<p><b>FAC</b></p> <p>2 x A-37 8 Mk 82</p> <p>(0.5 SIM)</p>	O-2A 050	1.7
13	<p><b>VR</b></p>	O-2A 053	2.8
	<p><b>VR</b></p> <p>(LT FULLER)</p> <p>(NIGHT 1.2)</p>	O-2A 050	2.4
14	<p><b>VR</b></p> <p>(LT JOY)</p> <p>NIGHT 2.0</p>	O-2A 053	3.2

15	<p><b>FAC</b></p> <p>(LT JOHNSON)</p> <p>2 ✕ F-100 4 Mk 82</p>	O-2A 050	2.0
	<p><b>VR</b></p> <p>(LT DEAN)</p> <p>NIGHT 1.1</p> <p>CHLOROQUINE</p>	O-2A 045	2.3
16	<p><b>VR</b></p> <p>NIGHT 0.2 (0.2 SIM)</p>	O-2A 972	1.5
17	<p><b>FAC</b></p> <p>(LT DEAN)</p> <p>4 ✕ F-100 16 Mk 82</p>	O-2A 050	2.9
	<p><b>VR</b></p> <p>(LT FULLER)</p> <p>(NIGHT 1.0)</p>	O-2A 050	2.2
18	<p><b>FAC</b></p> <p>(LT FULLER)</p> <p>2 ✕ F-100 8 Mk 82</p>	O-2A 050	2.3
	<p><b>FAC</b></p> <p>(LT JOHNSON)</p> <p>2 ✕ A-37 8 Mk 82</p> <p>(NIGHT 1.7)</p>	O-2A 053	2.4



19	<p><b>FAC</b></p> <p>(LT FULLER)</p> <p>4 x F-100 16 Mk 82</p>	O-2A 045	3.4
20	<p><b>FAC</b></p> <p>(LT DEAN)</p> <p>2 x F-100 8 Mk 82</p> <p>(0.3 SIM)</p>	O-2A 053	2.6
21	<b>FREE</b>		
22	<p><b>VUNG TAU</b> =&gt; RAAF BUTTERWORTH</p> <p><b>LEAVE</b> 23 to 30 JUL</p>	<b>C-130</b>	<b>2.0</b>
23 to 30	 		
31	<p><b>RAAF BUTTERWORTH</b> =&gt; VUNG TAU</p>	<b>C-130</b>	<b>2.0</b>

*The only time that you were aware of ground fire was at night! And then, only if tracer was used. We did not see it very often as night FAC was in limited use (very hard to navigate on 'black as ...' night). Further, the VC, if they were smart, did not give away their location by announcing it with tracer rounds!*






3	<p>VR</p> <p>POSSUM 09</p>	O-2A 050	2.6
4	<p>VR</p>	O-2A 050	2.6
5	<p>VR</p> <p>(LT DEAN)</p> <p>POSSUM 29</p> <p>=&gt; BEIN HOA</p>	O-2A 053	2.0
	<p>BEIN HOA</p> <p>=&gt; VUNG TAU</p> <p>(LT DEAN)</p> <p>(O.1 ACT)</p> <p>CHLOROQUINE</p>	O-2A 053	0.5
6	<p>VR</p> <p>(LT DEAN) POSSUM 24</p> <p>=&gt; NUI DAT</p>	O-2A 053	1.5
7	<p>NUI DAT</p> <p>=&gt; VUNG TAU</p>	O-2A 050	0.3
8	<p>FAC</p> <p>(LT DEAN)</p> <p>2 x F-100</p> <p>8 Mk 82</p>	O-2A 045	2.6
	  <p>NIGHT FAC</p> <p>(MAJ Ted COTHMAN)</p> <p>4 x F-100</p> <p>16 Mk 82</p> <p>(NIGHT 2.2)</p>	O-2A 045	2.7

9	<p><b>FAC</b></p> <p>(LT DEAN)</p> <p>2 x F-100 8 Mk 82</p>	O-2A 045	3.6
10	<p><b>VR</b></p> <p>POSSUM 09</p>	O-2A 053	2.5
11	<p><b>FAC</b></p> <p>2 x F-100 8 Mk 82</p>	O-2A 053	2.5
12	<p><b>VR</b></p> <p><i>CHLOROQUINE</i></p>	O-2A 050	2.0
13	<p><b>DUTY OFFICER NUI DAT</b></p> <p><b>VR - NUI DAT</b> <b>=&gt; VUNG TAU</b></p>	O-2A 972	0.6
14	<p><b>VR</b></p> <p>POSSUM 24</p>	O-2A 300	2.5
15	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around; align-items: center;"> <div style="text-align: center;">  <p><i>F-5E</i></p> </div> <div style="text-align: center;"> <p><b>FAC</b></p> <p>6 x F-5 24 Mk 82</p> <p>2 x A-37 8 Mk 82</p> </div> <div style="text-align: center;">  <p><i>A-37</i></p> </div> </div>	O-2A 053	3.8
16	<p><b>VR - SIOUX</b></p> <p>POSSUM (LT MACKWORTH)</p>	SIOUX 641	0.7
	<p><b>FAC</b></p> <p>2 x A-37 8 Mk 82</p> <p>(0.2 ACT)</p>	O-2A 972	2.5
17	<p><b>VR</b></p>	O-2A 053	1.2

18	<b>DUTY OFFICER - NIU DAT</b> <i>MRX COMMUNICATION WITH BUTTERWORTH</i>		
19 to 20	<b>FREE</b> <i>CHLOROQUINE</i>		
21	<b>VR</b> <i>POSSUM 22</i>	<b>O-2A 972</b>	2.5
	<b>FAC</b> <i>(LT JOHNSON)</i>  <i>2 x F-100</i> <i>8 Mk 82</i>	<b>O-2A 053</b>	2.3
	<b>VUNG TAU</b> <b>=&gt; BEIN HOA</b>	<b>O-2A 050</b>	0.5
22	<b>BEIN HOA</b> <b>=&gt; VUNG TAU</b>	<b>O-2A 050</b>	0.5
	<b>VR</b> <i>(LTCOL Tom EDGE)</i>  <i>POSSUM 25</i>	<b>O-2A 050</b>	1.9
	<b>=&gt; BEIN HOA</b> <b>=&gt; VUNG TAU</b>  <i>ARTILLERY PROCEDURES LECTURE TO 19 TASS PERSONNEL</i>	<b>O-2A 050</b>	0.5
23	<b>VR</b>  <i>(LT JOY)</i>	<b>O-2A 972</b>	0.8
	<b>VR</b>  <i>LT JOHNSON</i>  <i>(0.3 SIM)</i>	<b>O-2A 972</b>	0.4
24	<b>FAC</b>  <i>POSSUM 28</i>  <i>2 x F-100</i> <i>8 Mk 82</i>	<b>O-2A 045</b>	3.1


25	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VR</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>POSSUM 24</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>DUTY OFFICER - NUI DAT</b></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>O-2A 050</b></p>	<p style="text-align: center;">2.5</p>
26	<div style="display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: center;">  <div style="margin-left: 20px;"> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>DUTY OFFICER - NUI DAT</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>VR</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>(LT AIRD)</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>CESSNA 180</i></p> </div> </div> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>CESSNA 180</i></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>O-2A 045</b></p>	<p style="text-align: center;">1.7</p>
	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>NUI DAT</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>=&gt; VUNG TAU</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>CHLOROQUINE</i></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>O-2A 050</b></p>	<p style="text-align: center;">0.3</p>
27	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VR</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>(LT DEAN)</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>POSSUM 08</i></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>O-2A 053</b></p>	<p style="text-align: center;">2.1</p>
	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>BEIN HOA</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>=&gt; NUI DAT</b></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>O-2A 300</b></p>	<p style="text-align: center;">0.5</p>
28	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VR</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>POSSUM 23</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>(0.4 ACT)</i></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>O-2A 053</b></p>	<p style="text-align: center;">2.5</p>
	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VR</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>(LT JOHNSON)</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>POSSUM 23</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>(0.5 SIM)</i></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>O-2A 050</b></p>	<p style="text-align: center;">2.0</p>
29	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>FAC</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>2 x F-100</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>8 Mk 82</i></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>O-2A 050</b></p>	<p style="text-align: center;">2.7</p>




30	<b>FAC - LZ PREP</b> <i>(LTCOL Tom EDGE)</i>  2 x F-100 8 Mk 82	O-2A 050	2.0
	<b>VR - SIOUX</b> <i>POSSUM (LT Greg MONTEITH)</i>	SIOUX 728	2.0
	<b>NUI DAT =&gt; VUNG TAU</b>  <i>(LT JOY)</i>	O-2A 045	0.3
31	<b>VR</b>  <i>(LT JOY)</i>  <i>(0.5 SIM)</i>	O-2A 045	3.0
	<b>VR - SIOUX</b>  <i>(LT KERR)</i>	SIOUX 641	1.0
	<b>BEIN HOA =&gt; VUNG TAU</b>	O-2A 972	0.8

Year 1970		AIRCRAFT		Captain or 1st Pilot	Co-pilot 2nd Pilot Pupil or Crew	DUTY (Including number of day or night landings as 1st Pilot or Dual)	Day Flying			Night Flying			Flight Time		Instrument Flying		I/F Approaches	
Month	Date	Type and Mark	No				1st Pilot (1)	2nd Pilot (2)	Dual (3)	1st Pilot (4)	2nd Pilot (5)	Dual (6)	Total Cols 1-6 (7)	Captain (8)	Sim (9)	Act (10)	Type (11)	No (12)
						Totals brought forward												
AUG	1	O2A	972	SELF	LT DEAN	FAC TIDE 11 RAP 17	3:15				3:15	3:15						
AUG	2	O2A	300	SELF	LT DEAN	FAC BOBCAT 31	2:30				2:30	2:30						
AUG	2	O2A	053	SELF		VR	1:30				1:30	1:30						
AUG	3	O2A	050	SELF		VR POSSUM 9	2:40				2:40	2:40						
AUG	4	O2A	050	SELF		VR	2:40				2:40	2:40						
AUG	5	O2A	053	SELF	LT DEAN	VR POSSUM 29	2:00				2:00	2:00			.05			
AUG	5	O2A	053	SELF	LT DEAN	BIEN HOA - VUNG TAU	.30				.30	.30						
AUG	6	O2A	050	SELF	LT DEAN	VR POSSUM 24	1:30				1:30	1:30						
AUG	7	O2A	050	SELF		VR	.20				.20	.20						
AUG	8	O2A	045	SELF	LT DEAN	FAC DEVIL 51	2:40				2:40	2:40						
AUG	8	O2A	045	SELF	MAI CO THON	FAC DICE 47 RAP 18	.30		2:20		2:50	2:50						
AUG	9	O2A	045	SELF	LT DEAN	FAC ICON 15	3:40				3:40	3:40						
AUG	10	O2A	053	SELF		VR POSSUM 9	2:30				2:30	2:30						
AUG	11	O2A	045	SELF		FAC SABRE 31	2:40				2:40	2:40						
AUG	12	O2A	050	SELF		VR	2:00				2:00	2:00						
AUG	13	O2A	972	SELF		VR	.40				.40	.40						
AUG	14	O2A	300	SELF		VR POSSUM 24	2:30				2:30	2:30			.10			
AUG	15	O2A	053	SELF		FAC DRAGON 10, PURPLE GREEN, FA	3:40				3:40	3:40						
AUG	16	O2A	972	SELF		FAC YELLOWJACKET 11	2:45				2:45	2:45			.10			
AUG	16	SIoux	641	LT MANNING	SELF	VR	1:15		.35		.35	.35						
AUG	17	O2A	053	SELF		VR	2:30				2:30	2:30						
AUG	18	O2A	972	SELF		VR POSSUM 22	2:20				2:20	2:20						
AUG	21	O2A	053	SELF	LT JOHNSON	FAC BOBCAT 31	.30				.30	.30						
AUG	21	O2A	050	SELF		BIEN HOA - VUNG TAU	2:25				2:25	2:25						
AUG	22	O2A	050	SELF	LT COL EDGE	VR POSSUM 25 - B.H. - VT	.50				.50	.50						
AUG	23	O2A	972	SELF	LT JOY	VR	.25				.25	.25			.20			
AUG	23	O2A	972	SELF	LT JOHNSON	VR	3:10				3:10	3:10						
AUG	24	O2A	045	SELF		FAC SABRE 31 POSSUM 28	2:30				2:30	2:30						
AUG	25	O2A	050	SELF		VR POSSUM 24	.20				.20	.20						
AUG	26	O2A	050	SELF		NOI DAT - VUNG TAU	1:45				1:45	1:45						
AUG	26	CESSNA 180	198045	LT AIRD	SELF	LOW LEVEL 1 <sup>st</sup> LIGHT RECCO	2:10		1:45		2:10	2:10						
AUG	27	O2A	053	SELF	LT DEAN	VR POSSUM 28	.30				.30	.30						
AUG	27	O2A	300	SELF		BIEN HOA - VUNG TAU	2:30				2:30	2:30			.25			
AUG	28	O2A	053	SELF		VR POSSUM 23	2:00				2:00	2:00			.30			
AUG	28	O2A	050	SELF	LT JOHNSON	VR POSSUM 23	2:45				2:45	2:45						
AUG	29	O2A	050	SELF		FAC BOBCAT 61	2:00				2:00	2:00						
AUG	30	O2A	045	SELF	LT COL EDGE	FAC BOBCAT 31 LZ	2:00				2:00	2:00						
AUG	30	SIoux	728	LT MONTIETH	SELF	VR	.20		2:00		.20	.20						
AUG	30	O2A	050	SELF	LT JOY	VR	3:00				3:00	3:00			.25			
AUG	31	O2A	045	SELF	LT JOY	VR	1:00				1:00	1:00						
AUG	31	SIoux	641	LT KERR	SELF	VR	.50				.50	.50						
AUG	31	O2A	972	SELF		VR												
SUMMARY FOR AUGUST 1970						O2A	72:50				75:10	75:10	1:15	.50				
UNIT USAF TACD 14TF RIN						SIoux	3:35				3:35							
DATE 31 AUG 70						CESSNA 180	1:45				1:45							
SIGNATURE [Signature]																		
						Totals carried forward												
							1500:10	28:55	188:10	132:35		11:10	1861:30	1573:05	114:25	92:55		

# SEP 70

1	VR	O-2A 972	2.1
2	VR <i>POSSUM 22</i> <i>CHLOROQUINE</i>	O-2A 053	2.4
3	 VR (LT SYNNOTT) CESSNA 180	O-2A 045	1.2
4	VR <i>POSSUM 23</i> => BEIN HOA	O-2A 972	2.5
	BEIN HOA => VUNG TAU	O-2A 972	0.5
5	WX CANCELLED		
6	VR	O-2A 053	2.6
7	FAC <i>2 x F-100</i> <i>8 Mk 82</i>	O-2A 972	2.5
8	DUTY OFFICER - NUI DAT  NUI DAT => VUNG TAU	O-2A 050	0.3

9	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VR</b> (LT JOHNSON) <i>CHLOROQUINE</i></p>	O-2A 045	2.0
	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VR</b> (LT DEAN) (0.7 NIGHT)</p>	O-2A 972	1.0
10	 <p style="text-align: center;"><b>VR – SIOUX</b> <i>POSSUM 20 (LT JENKINS)</i></p>	O-1E 976	2.3
11	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>FAC</b> <b>=&gt; BEIN HOA</b>  2 ✕ F-100 8 Mk 82</p>	O-2A 045	2.8
12	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>BEIN HOA</b> <b>=&gt; VUNG TAU</b></p>	O-2A 045	0.5
	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VR</b> <i>POSSUM 23</i></p>	O-2A 045	2.6
13	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>DUTY OFFICER - NUI DAT</b>  <b>NUI DAT</b> <b>=&gt; VUNG TAU</b>  <i>MRX COMMUNICATIONS WITH BUTTERWORTH</i></p>	O-2A 053	0.3
14	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VR</b> <i>POSSUM 20</i></p>	O-2A 045	2.7
15	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VR</b> <i>POSSUM 04</i></p>	O-2A 045	2.5
16	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>VUNG TAU</b> <b>=&gt; NUI DAT</b> <b>=&gt; VUNG TAU</b>  <i>CHLOROQUINE</i></p>	O-2A 053	0.6



## FINAL FLIGHT

VUNG TAU  
=> NUI DAT  
=> VUNG TAU

17

MRX COMMUNICATIONS WITH BUTTERWORTH

O-2A  
045

0.6

*The Commander was terrified that I would perform an un-authorized 'beat-up' of the Base upon return from my last flight.*

*I spared him the angst!*



*'Short Time Calendars' probably started during the Vietnam War. Many personnel had a calendar on which they crossed out the days spent in Vietnam. When you were considered 'short' the calendar was taken more seriously.*

*Usually, nothing more than a simple, pocket sized calendar or piece of paper with numbered squares, each one representing a day and that was carried by a soldier who marked off the days 'in-country' one by one until his rotation date came up.*

*Some got creative, some were 'works of art'; pictures divided up like a 'paint-by-numbers' drawing where you coloured in one day at a time, but basically, they were just a way to keep track of the days left until end of tour.*

*Some had more appeal than others!*

*Many personnel used the calendar to justify removing themselves from operational activity well before their end of tour date.*

*I personally flew up until the last day!*

**FINI ...!**



**VUNG TAU => RAAF BUTTERWORTH**

**18  
JAN**



**RAAF  
C-130**

**2.0**

1970		AIRCRAFT		Crew		DUTY		Day Flying			Night Flying			Flight Time		Instrument Flying		L/P Approaches		
Month	Date	Type and Mark	No	Captain or 1st Pilot	Co-pilot 2nd Pilot	Including number of day or night landings as 1st Pilot or Dual		1st Pilot (1)	2nd Pilot (2)	Dual (3)	1st Pilot (4)	2nd Pilot (5)	Dual (6)	Total (7)	Captain (8)	Sim (9)	Act (10)	Type (11)	No (12)	
Totals brought forward																				
SEP	1	O2A	972	SELF		VR		15:00-10	28:55	188:40	132:35		11:10	1861:30	578:05	114:25	92:55			
SEP	2	O2A	053	SELF		VR POSSUM 22		2:10						2:10	2:10					
SEP	3	CESNA 180	MR 045	LT SINNOT	SELF	1 <sup>st</sup> LIGHT RESCUE LOW LEVEL		2:25						2:25	2:25					
SEP	3	O2A	300	SELF		NUIDAT - WING TAU			1:15					1:15						
SEP	4	O2A	972	SELF		VR POSSUM 23		-20						-20	-20					
SEP	6	O2A	053	SELF		VR		3:00						3:00	3:00					
SEP	7	O2A	972	SELF		FAC HAWK 01		2:40						2:40	2:40					
SEP	8	O2A	050	SELF		NUIDAT - WING TAU		2:30						2:30	2:30					
SEP	9	O2A	045	SELF	LT JOHNSON	VR		-30						-30	-30					
SEP	9	O2A	972	SELF	LT DEAN	FAC		2:00						2:00	2:00					
SEP	11	O2A	045	SELF		FAC TIDE 21		.20			-45			1:05	1:05					
SEP	12	O2A	045	SELF		VR POSSUM 23		2:50						2:50	2:50					
SEP	13	O2A	053	SELF		NUIDAT - WING TAU		3:10						3:10	3:10					
SEP	10	O1E	976	LT JENSON	SELF	VR POSSUM 20		.20						.20	.20					
SEP	14	O2A	045	SELF		VR POSSUM 20		2:45	2:30					2:45	2:45					
SEP	15	O2A	045	SELF		VR POSSUM 04		2:30						2:30	2:30					
SEP	16	O2A	053	SELF		WING TAU - NUIDAT - WING TAU		-40						-40	-40					
SEP	17	O2A	045	SELF		FINI		-40						-40	-40					
Summary For: AVG 1970																				
UNIT: USAF TACP INTF								O2A							28:40	29:25				
DATE: 18 SEP 70								CESNA 180						1:15	1:15					
								O1E						2:30	2:30					
Totals posted forward																				
1528:50	32:30	188:40	133:20										11:10	1894:30	1604:30	114:25	92:55			

**ON POSTING - 24 SEP 70**

PERIODIC SUMMARY			Day Flying			Night Flying			Flight Time		Instrument Flying	
Date	Occasion	Class/Type of A/C	1st Pilot (1)	2nd Pilot (2)	Dual (3)	1st Pilot (4)	2nd Pilot (5)	Dual (6)	Total (7)	Captain (8)	Sim (9)	Act (10)
17 SEP 70	END OF TOUR	CESNA O2A	465:05		8:10	15:35			488:50	450:20	11:30	2:25
	RUN	CESNA O1E		2:20					2:20			
		CESNA 180		3:00					3:00			
		SIDUX OH13		20:45					20:45			
		OVI0		5:05					5:05			
		<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>465:05</b>	<b>31:10</b>	<b>8:10</b>	<b>15:35</b>			<b>520:00</b>	<b>450:20</b>	<b>11:30</b>	<b>2:25</b>
Certified for period from			24 JAN 70			to			24 SEP 70			
Assessment of ability			WELL ABOVE AVERAGE									
Remarks			DISPLAYS OUTSTANDING HANDMANSHIP; A SUPERIOR INSTRUCTOR PILOT; A CONSCIENTIOUS AND DEDICATED AERIAL LEADER.									
Signature			Robert K. Ridge LT. COL. USAF			Commanding USAF TACP IAAF VIETNAM			Date: 24 SEPT 70			

**24 SEP 70**  
**1 DEC 70**

**RAAF**  
**BUTTERWORTH**

**3 SQN**

**MIRAGE - FCI**



# AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

## RAAF AIRCREW RECORD OF OPERATIONAL TOUR

ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE ~~RESTRICTED~~  
~~SECRET~~

Form P/P. 138  
(Revised September, 1950)

### AIRCREW RECORD OF OPERATIONAL TOUR

(Do not attempt to fill in return without reading instructions inside front cover.)

Member's Number 044090 Rank Flt Lt

Name B.M. SCHULZ

Category GD PILOT

Part 1 — RECORD of OPERATIONAL TOUR with No. \_\_\_\_\_ SQN. in REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM } AREA  
HQRAAFV } GROUP

Date Tour Commenced 24 JAN 70 By posting to No. \_\_\_\_\_ Squadron

Date Tour Finished 24 SEP 70 By posting from No. \_\_\_\_\_ Squadron to 3 SQN


#### Part 2 — DETAILS of FLYING on TOUR between ABOVE DATES

	Whilst on posted strength of No. _____ Squadron	Whilst on posted strength of No. _____ Squadron
(a) Number of operational sorties performed .. .. .	} 253	
(i) Strikes and attacks .. .. .		
(ii) Other ops. .. .. .		
(b) Number of operational hours flown .. .. .	504.25	
(i) Day .. .. .		
(ii) Night .. .. .	15.35	
(c) Number of other hours flown .. .. .	-	
(d) Approximate date of first operational sortie .. .. .	26 JAN 70	
(e) Approximate date of last operational sortie .. .. .	17 SEP 70	
(f) Approximate period, if any, non-effective between (d) and (e) due to minor casualties, sickness, or leave beyond the area .. .. .	20 days	

Signature of Member B.M. Schulz FLT LT

(g) Logbook assessment at Squadron N/A.

(h) Commanding officer's recommendation as to the subsequent duty for which the member is considered suitable .. .. .

  
N. B. ...  
 Officer Commanding.  
 33N HQ  
 ASO

*This space for use by R.A.A.F. Hqs. only.*





**FLTLT BARRY M SCHULZ, AFC**



**AIR FORCE CROSS  
QUEENS COMMENDATION for VALUABLE SERVICE in the AIR**

**AUSTRALIAN ACTIVE SERVICE MEDAL (1945 - 1975)**

**VIETNAM MEDAL**

**DEFENCE FORCE SERVICE MEDAL (THREE CLASPS)**

**NATIONAL MEDAL**

**REPUBLIC of VIETNAM CAMPAIGN MEDAL**

**AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE MEDAL**

**RETURN FROM ACTIVE SERVICE BADGE**

**USAF AIR MEDAL (9 OAK LEAVES)**

**REPUBLIC of VIETNAM CROSS of GALLANTRY with PALM UNIT CITATION**

**MARINE RESCUE LONG SERVICE MEDAL (10 years)**

## AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

### **AUSTRALIAN ACTIVE SERVICE MEDAL 1945 - 1975**

*The Australian Active Service Medal 1945-1975 recognizes the service of Australian Defence Force and certain other persons in prescribed warlike operations in the period after World War II, and prior to February 1975. The medal was established in December 1997*



### **DEFENCE FORCE SERVICE MEDAL**

*The Defence Force Service Medal (DFSM) is an Australian Military award given for long service by permanent members of the Australian Defence Force. It is part of the suite of defence force service awards introduced in 1982,). Additional service clasps are issued for each further 5 years after the initial 15 year qualifying service period.*

*On the ribbon, a rosette indicates the award of each clasp, although the fifth and subsequent clasps are indicated by a small Federation Star. With the introduction of the Defence Long Service Medal, the DFSM is now a closed award with only clasps to existing awards continuing to be issued.*





## VIETNAM MEDAL

*The Vietnam Medal was a joint Australian and New Zealand campaign medal awarded for service in the Vietnam War.*



## REPUBLIC of VIETNAM CAMPAIGN MEDAL

*The Vietnam Campaign Medal is a military campaign medal of the former country of South Vietnam (Republic of Vietnam). Established in 1966, it was awarded to members of United States, Australian, and New Zealand military forces serving six months or more in support of Republic of Vietnam military operations.*

*The medal is issued with a device known as the '1960 Bar'. The bar displays the date of 1960 followed by a dash and a blank space. The unusual appearance was caused by the government of the Republic of Vietnam stating that the 1960 bar would show the dates of the Vietnam War from start to finish, with the ending date placed on the 1960 bar after the South Vietnamese had triumphed over North Vietnam (the Democratic Republic of Vietnam). Since South Vietnam fell, and the government ceased to exist, an ending date for the 1960 Bar was never established.*

*The Vietnam Campaign Medal is considered a foreign award by the U.S., Australian and New Zealand governments.*

*The joint Australian and New Zealand campaign medal awarded for service in the Vietnam War is the Vietnam Medal.*





## AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE MEDAL

*The Australian Defence Medal (ADM) has been established to recognise Australian Defence Force Regular and Reserve personnel who have demonstrated their commitment and contribution to the nation by serving for an initial enlistment period or four years' service whichever is the lesser.*



## REPUBLIC of VIETNAM CROSS of GALLANTRY with PALM UNIT CITATION

*The Citation was awarded by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) to military units that distinguished themselves in battle. All Australian military units under the operational control of the United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam were eligible for the Citation.*



## RETURN FROM ACTIVE SERVICE BADGE


The Returned from Active Service Badge (RASB) is issued to Australian Defence Force personnel who have rendered warlike service. Its purpose is to enable individuals to display their involvement in warlike service while in civilian attire, where the wearing of a medal denoting such service is not appropriate or possible.

The ability for veterans to wear a badge recognising the service and sacrifice involved in rendering war service to Australia is a befitting tribute to these veterans.



## VETERAN LAPEL PIN

Australian Government recognition of Defence service



18 AUGUST 1973



# UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AWARDS

IT TOOK OVER 38 YEARS TO HAVE OUR SERVICE RECOGNISED  
BY THE US GOVERNMENT



**9 OAK LEAF CLUSTERS**

## USAF AIR MEDAL

*The Air Medal is a military decoration of the United States. The award was created in 1942, and is awarded for meritorious achievement while participating in aerial flight.*

*The Air Medal was established by Executive Order 9158, signed by Franklin D. Roosevelt, on 11 May 1942. The Air Medal was awarded retroactive to 8 September 1939.*

*The medal is awarded to any person who, while serving in any capacity in or with the Armed Forces of the United States, shall have distinguished himself/herself by meritorious achievement while participating in aerial flight.*

*Award of the Air Medal is primarily intended to recognize those personnel who are on current crew member or non-crew member flying status which requires them to participate in aerial flight on a regular and frequent basis in the performance of their primary duties.*



*An oak leaf cluster is a ribbon device to denote preceding decorations and awards consisting of a miniature bronze or silver twig of four oak leaves with three acorns on the stem. The bronze oak leaf cluster represents one additional award, while the silver oak leaf cluster is worn in lieu of five bronze oak leaf clusters.*



**THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

**TO ALL WHO SHALL SEE THESE PRESENTS, GREETING:**

**THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT**

**THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

**AUTHORIZED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER, MAY 11, 1942**

**HAS AWARDED**

**THE AIR MEDAL**

**TO**

**FLIGHT LIEUTENANT BARRY M. SCHULZ**

**FOR**

**MERITORIOUS ACHIEVEMENT**

**WHILE PARTICIPATING IN AERIAL FLIGHT**

Flight Lieutenant Barry M. Schulz, Royal Australian Air Force, distinguished himself by meritorious achievement while participating in sustained aerial flight as a Forward Air Controller in Southeast Asia from 17 February 1970 to 9 March 1970. During this period, the airmanship and courage exhibited by Flight Lieutenant Schulz in the successful accomplishment of these important missions, under extremely hazardous conditions, demonstrated his outstanding proficiency and steadfast devotion to duty. The professional ability and outstanding aerial accomplishments of Flight Lieutenant Schulz reflect great credit upon himself and the Royal Australian Air Force.

**GIVEN UNDER MY HAND**

1 February 2008



Special Order G-075, dated 1 Feb 08



## AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

### LETTER FROM US PRESIDENT GEORGE W BUSH



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 24, 2008

Congratulations to the members of the Royal Australian Air Force on receiving the Air Medal, given by the United States Air Force.

The Air Medal is a high military distinction bestowed on those who have shown valor beyond the call of duty, and this award is being given to the Australian airmen who selflessly supported the United States Armed Forces during the Vietnam War. Americans admire the bravery of those Australian friends who fought in the face of great danger to protect the ideals we share.

On behalf of a grateful Nation, I thank you for your distinguished service during the Vietnam War and for your contributions to the security and liberty of both our countries.

Laura and I send our best wishes. May God bless you.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "GWB", written in a cursive style.



United States  
of America

# Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 107<sup>th</sup> CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

## House of Representatives

▲  
RECOGNIZING THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE AND THE  
NEW ZEALAND ROYAL AIR FORCE

### HON. GARY G. MILLER

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*September 19, 2002*

Mr. GARY MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to pay tribute to a group of individuals who did a great service to our nation. These men are fighter pilots from the Royal Australian Air Force and the New Zealand Royal Air Force who were assigned to US combat units and served as Forward Air Controllers during the Vietnam War. I would like to honor the following individuals:

Royal Australian Air Force: Wg. Cdr. Col Ackland, Flt. Lt. Ray Butler, Flg Off. Peter Condon, Flt. Lt. Garry Cooper, Flg. Off. Mac Cottrell, Wg. Cdr. Vance Drummond, Flg. Off. Huck Ennis, Flt. Lt. Brian Fooks, Flt. Lt. Tony Ford, Flg Off. Frank Fry, Flt Lt. Dick Gregory, Flt. Lt. Jack Hayden, Flg. Off. Chris Hudnott, Flg. Off. Dick Kelloway, Flt. Lt. Chris Langton, Wg. Cdr. Peter Larard, Flg. Off. Chris Mirow, Flt. Lt. Ken Mitchell, Flg. Off. Bruce Mouatt, Sqn. Ldr. Graham Neil, Sqn. Ldr. Dave Owens, Wg. Cdr. Tony Powell, Sqn. Ldr. Rex Ramsay, Flt. Lt. Doug Riding, Flg. Off. Dave Robson, Flg. Off. Barry Schulz, Flt. Lt. Bruce Searle, Flt. Lt. Ken Semmler, Flt. Lt. Arthur Sibthorpe, Flt. Lt. Ron Slater, Flt. Lt. Peter Smith, Wg. Cdr. Barry Thomas, Flt. Lt. Gavin Thoms, Sqn. Ldr. Nobby Williams, Flt. Lt. Roger Wilson, Flt. Lt. Bruce Wood

New Zealand Royal Air Force: Flt Lt. Murray Abel, Flg Off. Mike Callanan, Flt. Lt. J.M.. Denton, Flg. Off. B.W. Donnelly, Flt. Lt. Ross Ewing, Flt. Lt. Graeme Goldsmith, Wg. Cdr. R.F. Lawry, Flt. Lt. Bryan Lockie, Flg. Off. Darryl McEvedy, Flt. Lt. Dick Metcalfe, Sqn. Ldr. John Scrimshaw, Flt. Lt. G.R. Thompson, Wg. Cdr. Wallingford, Flt. Lt. Peter Waller

I would also like to recognize Lt. Col. Eugene Rossel and Flt. Lt. Garry Cooper for actively pursuing decorations for these men who served our country in a time of need.



# AIR MEDAL RECOMMENDATION

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

RECOMMENDATION FOR DECORATION		DATE
TO: (Organization and address)		03 September 1970
FROM: (Organization and address)		
504 TASS APO 96227		19 TASS APO 96227
RECOMMENDATION		
RECOMMEND INDIVIDUAL INDICATED BE AWARDED		
1. NAME OF DECORATION (Indicate number of clusters, if appropriate)		
Air Medal (B)		
2. RECOMMENDATION IS BASED ON:		
<input type="checkbox"/> HEROISM <input type="checkbox"/> MERITORIOUS SERVICE (Based on completed period of service) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OUTSTANDING ACHIEVEMENT		
3. INCLUSIVE DATE(S) OF ACT, ACHIEVEMENT OR SERVICE		
FROM: 17 February 1970 TO: 09 March 1970		
PERSONAL DATA ON INDIVIDUAL BEING RECOMMENDED		
4. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE INITIAL		5. AFSN
Schulz, Barry M.		044090
7. PRESENT ORGANIZATION AND STATION		6. GRADE
19 TASS APO 96227		Flight Lieutenant
8. PRESENT DUTY ASSIGNMENT		
Forward Air Controller		
9. PERMANENT HOME ADDRESS		10. ORGANIZATION OF NEXT DUTY ASSIGNMENT (If applicable)
61 Vista Avenue, Soldiers Point, NSW, 2317, Australia		NA
11. ORGANIZATION, DUTY ASSIGNMENT AND GRADE AT TIME OF ACT OR SERVICE		12. DATE OF PROMOTION TO GRADE IN WHICH SERVING
19 TASS Forward Air Controller - 1444 Flight Lieutenant - Pilot - O2A		27 February 1970
		13. INDIVIDUAL'S SERVICE IN AIR FORCE SINCE ACT OR SERVICE HAS BEEN HONORABLE
		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO
14. DATE OF REASSIGNMENT, RETIREMENT OR SEPARATION, AS APPLICABLE: DEPOS: 18 September 1970		
RETIREMENT OR SEPARATION IS <input type="checkbox"/> VOLUNTARY <input type="checkbox"/> INVOLUNTARY, AND THE FOLLOWING SERVICE DATES APPLY		
CDOS: _____ TAFCS: _____ TAFMSD: _____		
PLSD: _____ TFCSD: _____ TMSD: _____		
15. PREVIOUS UNITED STATES DECORATIONS, COMPLETE AUTHORITY THEREFOR, AND INCLUSIVE DATES OF SERVICE RECOGNIZED		
(Do not include service medals, battle credits, unit citations or foreign decorations)		
None		
16. ARE OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AWARDS TO THIS INDIVIDUAL PENDING? (If yes, state awards)		17. ARE OTHER INDIVIDUALS BEING RECOMMENDED FOR THE SAME ACT OR SERVICE?
<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO		<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO
18a. IF ANSWER TO ITEM 17 IS YES, ARE THE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE OTHER INDIVIDUALS FORWARDED AS A PART OF THIS RECOMMENDATION?		
<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		
b. IF ANSWER TO ITEM 18a IS NO, EXPLAIN REASON FOR DELAY, INCLUDING DATE RECOMMENDATION(S) WILL BE FORWARDED, AND IDENTIFY THE INDIVIDUAL(S) BY GRADE, NAME, SERVICE NUMBER, PRESENT ORGANIZATION AND STATION.		
NA		
19. HAS PREVIOUS AWARD BEEN MADE TO THIS INDIVIDUAL FOR THIS ACT OR SERVICE?		20. HAVE ALL AVAILABLE RECORDS AND SOURCES OF INFORMATION THAT WOULD HAVE A BEARING ON THIS RECOMMENDATION BEEN CONSIDERED AND NO CONDITION EXISTS WHICH WOULD MAKE APPROVAL OF THIS AWARD INAPPROPRIATE?
<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO
21. IF AWARD IS POSTHUMOUS, OR INDIVIDUAL RECOMMENDED IS MISSING IN ACTION OR A PRISONER OF WAR, LIST NAME, ADDRESS AND RELATIONSHIP OF NEXT OF KIN.		
NA		
22. DATE WHICH PRESENTATION OF AWARD IS DESIRED, IF APPROVED.		23. IF APPROVED, FORWARD FOR PRESENTATION TO (Organization and address)
03 October 1970		Barry M. Schulz 61 Vista Ave., Soldiers Point, 2317, Australia

AF FORM NOV. 66 642 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM WILL BE USED UNTIL STOCK IS EXHAUSTED.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

24. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION (Description of the act, achievement or service, including specific dates, places and facts. If additional space is needed, use plain 8 x 10 1/2 bond paper, the last sheet of which must be signed by the recommending individual.)

1. Description of Achievement  
Flight Lieutenant  
Barry M. Schulz distinguished himself by meritorious achievement while participating in sustained aerial flight as a combat crew-member in Southeast Asia from 17 Feb 1970 to 09 Mar 1970. During this period, outstanding airmanship and courage were exhibited in the successful accomplishment of important combat support missions under extremely hazardous conditions including the continuous possibility of hostile ground fire. His highly professional efforts contributed materially to the tactical air mission of the United States Air Force in Southeast Asia. The professional ability and outstanding aerial accomplishments of Flt Lt Schulz reflect great credit upon himself and the United States Air Force.

II. Support Data:

Decoration	Category of Mission	Type of Aircraft	Number of Missions	Number of Hours	Crew Position	Inclusive dates of Award
AM (B)	II	O-2A	31	55.5	Pilot	17 Feb 70 - 09 Mar 70

III. Statement of Air Crewmember's Performance

The above named air crewmember's accomplishments and service during the entire period/group of missions has reflected laudable performance and effort beyond normal expectations, with no instance of non-professionalism. This member has not been charged with pilot error, either directly or indirectly or involved in an aircraft accident or incident and has consistently demonstrated a high order of air discipline.

25. TYPED NAME, GRADE AND TITLE OF INDIVIDUAL INITIATING RECOMMENDATION.

26. SIGNATURE

27. ATTACHMENTS

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (Citation and supporting statement/for other official documents)

# AIR MEDAL RECOMMENDATION - 1 to 7 OAK LEAVE CLUSTERS

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

RECOMMENDATION FOR DECORATION		DATE
		18 September 1970
TO: (Organization and address) 504 TASG APO 96227	FROM: Organization and address 19 TASS APO 96227	
RECOMMENDATION		
RECOMMEND INDIVIDUAL INDICATED BE AWARDED		
1. NAME OF DECORATION (Indicate number of clusters, if appropriate) Air Medal (1st thru 7th OLCs)		
2. RECOMMENDATION IS BASED ON:		
<input type="checkbox"/> HEROISM <input type="checkbox"/> MERITORIOUS SERVICE (Based on completed period of service) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OUTSTANDING ACHIEVEMENT		
3. INCLUSIVE DATE(S) OF ACT, ACHIEVEMENT OR SERVICE		
FROM 10 March 1970		TO 27 July 1970
PERSONAL DATA ON INDIVIDUAL BEING RECOMMENDED		
4. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE INITIAL Schulz, Barry M.		5. AFSN 044090
		6. GRADE Flight Lieutenant
7. PRESENT ORGANIZATION AND STATION 19 TASS APO 96227		8. PRESENT DUTY ASSIGNMENT Forward Air Controller
9. PERMANENT HOME ADDRESS 61 Vista Avenue, Soldiers Point, NSW, 2317, Australia		10. ORGANIZATION OF NEXT DUTY ASSIGNMENT (If applicable) NA
11. ORGANIZATION, DUTY ASSIGNMENT AND GRADE AT TIME OF ACT OR SERVICE 19 TASS Forward Air Controller - 1444 Flight Lieutenant - Pilot - O2A		12. DATE OF PROMOTION TO GRADE IN WHICH SERVING 27 February 1970
		13. INDIVIDUAL'S SERVICE IN AIR FORCE SINCE ACT OR SERVICE HAS BEEN HONORABLE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO
14. DATE OF REASSIGNMENT, RETIREMENT OR SEPARATION, AS APPLICABLE: DEROS: 18 September 1970 RETIREMENT OR SEPARATION IS <input type="checkbox"/> VOLUNTARY <input type="checkbox"/> INVOLUNTARY, AND THE FOLLOWING SERVICE DATES APPLY CDOS _____ TAFCSO _____ TAFMSD _____ PLSD _____ TFCSD _____ TMSD _____		
15. PREVIOUS UNITED STATES DECORATIONS, COMPLETE AUTHORITY THEREFOR, AND INCLUSIVE DATES OF SERVICE RECOGNIZED (Do not include service medals, bottle credits, unit citations or foreign decorations)  None		
16. ARE OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AWARDS TO THIS INDIVIDUAL PENDING? (If yes, state awards) AM(B) 17 Feb 70 - 09 Mar 70 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		17. ARE OTHER INDIVIDUALS BEING RECOMMENDED FOR THE SAME ACT OR SERVICE? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO
18a. IF ANSWER TO ITEM 17 IS YES, ARE THE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE OTHER INDIVIDUALS FORWARDED AS A PART OF THIS RECOMMENDATION? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		
b. IF ANSWER TO ITEM 18a IS NO, EXPLAIN REASON FOR DELAY, INCLUDING DATE RECOMMENDATION(S) WILL BE FORWARDED, AND IDENTIFY THE INDIVIDUAL(S) BY GRADE, NAME, SERVICE NUMBER, PRESENT ORGANIZATION AND STATION.  NA		
19. HAS PREVIOUS AWARD BEEN MADE TO THIS INDIVIDUAL FOR THIS ACT OR SERVICE? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO		20. HAVE ALL AVAILABLE RECORDS AND SOURCES OF INFORMATION THAT WOULD HAVE A BEARING ON THIS RECOMMENDATION BEEN CONSIDERED AND NO CONDITION EXISTS WHICH WOULD MAKE APPROVAL OF THIS AWARD INAPPROPRIATE? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO
21. IF AWARD IS POSTHUMOUS, OR INDIVIDUAL RECOMMENDED IS MISSING IN ACTION OR A PRISONER OF WAR, LIST NAME, ADDRESS AND RELATIONSHIP OF NEXT OF KIN. NA		
22. DATE WHICH PRESENTATION OF AWARD IS DESIRED, IF APPROVED. 18 October 1970		23. IF APPROVED, FORWARD FOR PRESENTATION TO (Organization and address) Barry M. Schulz 61 Vista Ave., Soldiers Point, 2317, Australia

FORM NOV. 66 642 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM WILL BE USED UNTIL STOCK IS EXHAUSTED.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

24. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION (Description of the act, achievement or service, including specific dates, places and facts. If additional space is needed, use plain 8 x 10 1/2 bond paper, the last sheet of which must be signed by the recommending individual.)

I. Description of Achievement  
Flight Lieutenant  
Barry M. Schulz distinguished himself by meritorious achievement while participating in sustained aerial flight as a combat crew-member in Southeast Asia from 10 Mar 1970 to 27 Jul 1970. During this period, outstanding airmanship and courage were exhibited in the successful accomplishment of important combat support missions under extremely hazardous conditions including the continuous possibility of hostile ground fire. His highly professional efforts contributed materially to the tactical air mission of the United States Air Force in Southeast Asia. The professional ability and outstanding aerial accomplishments of Flt Lt Schulz reflect great credit upon himself and the United States Air Force.

II. Support Data:

Category of Decoration	Type of Mission	Type of Aircraft	Number of Missions	Number of Hours	Crew Position	Inclusive dates of Award
AM 1stOLC	II	O-2A	25	43.9	Pilot	10 Mar 70 - 29 Mar 70
AM 2ndOLC	II	O-2A	21	26.3	Pilot	30 Mar 70 - 18 Apr 70
AM 3rdOLC	II	O-2A	27	53.7	Pilot	19 Apr 70 - 08 May 70
AM 4thOLC	II	O-2A	13	35.1	Pilot	09 May 70 - 28 May 70
AM 5thOLC	II	O-2A	22	49.9	Pilot	29 May 70 - 17 Jun 70
AM 6thOLC	II	O-2A	24	58.1	Pilot	18 Jun 70 - 07 Jul 70
AM 7thOLC	II	O-2A	19	48.1	Pilot	08 Jul 70 - 27 Jul 70

III. Statement of Air Crewmember's Performance

The above named air crewmember's accomplishments and service during the entire period/group of missions has reflected laudable performance and effort beyond normal expectations, with no instance of non-professionalism. This member has not been charged with pilot error, either directly or indirectly or involved in an aircraft accident or incident and has consistently demonstrated a high order of air discipline.

25. TYPED NAME, GRADE AND TITLE OF INDIVIDUAL INITIATING RECOMMENDATION.

26. SIGNATURE

27. ATTACHMENTS

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (Citation and supporting statements or other official documents)



## AIR MEDAL RECOMMENDATION - 8 to 9 OAK LEAVE CLUSTERS

RECOMMENDATION FOR DECORATION		DATE: 18 September 1970
TO: (Organization and address) 504 TASS APO 96227		FROM: Organization and address 19 TASS APO 96227
RECOMMENDATION		
RECOMMEND INDIVIDUAL INDICATED BE AWARDED		
1. NAME OF DECORATION (Indicate number of clusters, if appropriate) Air Medal (8th thru 9th OLCs) (End of Tour)		
2. RECOMMENDATION IS BASED ON: <input type="checkbox"/> HEROISM <input type="checkbox"/> MERITORIOUS SERVICE (Based on completed period of service) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OUTSTANDING ACHIEVEMENT		3. INCLUSIVE DATE(S) OF ACT, ACHIEVEMENT OR SERVICE FROM: 28 July 1970 TO: 05 September 1970
PERSONAL DATA ON INDIVIDUAL BEING RECOMMENDED		
4. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE INITIAL Schulz, Barry M.		5. AFSN 044090
		6. GRADE Flight Lieutenant
7. PRESENT ORGANIZATION AND STATION 19 TASS APO 96227		8. PRESENT DUTY ASSIGNMENT Forward Air Controller
9. PERMANENT HOME ADDRESS 61 Vista Avenue, Soldiers Point, NSW, 2317, Australia		10. ORGANIZATION OF NEXT DUTY ASSIGNMENT (If applicable) NA
11. ORGANIZATION, DUTY ASSIGNMENT AND GRADE AT TIME OF ACT OR SERVICE 19 TASS Forward Air Controller - 1444 Flight Lieutenant - Pilot - O2A		12. DATE OF PROMOTION TO GRADE IN WHICH SERVING 27 February 1970
		13. INDIVIDUAL'S SERVICE IN AIR FORCE SINCE ACT OR SERVICE HAS BEEN HONORABLE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO
14. DATE OF REASSIGNMENT, RETIREMENT OR SEPARATION, AS APPLICABLE: DEROs 18 September 1970 RETIREMENT OR SEPARATION IS <input type="checkbox"/> VOLUNTARY <input type="checkbox"/> INVOLUNTARY, AND THE FOLLOWING SERVICE DATES APPLY CDOS _____ TAFCSO _____ TAFMSD _____ PLSD _____ TFCSD _____ TMSD _____		
15. PREVIOUS UNITED STATES DECORATIONS, COMPLETE AUTHORITY THEREFOR, AND INCLUSIVE DATES OF SERVICE RECOGNIZED (Do not include service medals, battle credits, unit citations or foreign decorations)  None		
16. ARE OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AWARDS TO THIS INDIVIDUAL PENDING? (If yes, state awards) AM(B) 17 Feb 70 - 09 Mar 70 - <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO 70/Am(1 thru 7 OLCs) 10 Mar-27 Jul 70		17. ARE OTHER INDIVIDUALS BEING RECOMMENDED FOR THE SAME ACT OR SERVICE? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO
18a. IF ANSWER TO ITEM 17 IS YES, ARE THE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE OTHER INDIVIDUALS FORWARDED AS A PART OF THIS RECOMMENDATION? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		
b. IF ANSWER TO ITEM 18a IS NO, EXPLAIN REASON FOR DELAY, INCLUDING DATE RECOMMENDATION(S) WILL BE FORWARDED, AND IDENTIFY THE INDIVIDUAL(S) BY GRADE, NAME, SERVICE NUMBER, PRESENT ORGANIZATION AND STATION.  NA		
19. HAS PREVIOUS AWARD BEEN MADE TO THIS INDIVIDUAL FOR THIS ACT OR SERVICE? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO		20. HAVE ALL AVAILABLE RECORDS AND SOURCES OF INFORMATION THAT WOULD HAVE A BEARING ON THIS RECOMMENDATION BEEN CONSIDERED AND NO CONDITION EXISTS WHICH WOULD MAKE APPROVAL OF THIS AWARD INAPPROPRIATE? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO
21. IF AWARD IS POSTHUMOUS, OR INDIVIDUAL RECOMMENDED IS MISSING IN ACTION OR A PRISONER OF WAR, LIST NAME, ADDRESS AND RELATIONSHIP OF NEXT OF KIN. NA		
22. DATE WHICH PRESENTATION OF AWARD IS DESIRED, IF APPROVED. 18 October 1970		23. IF APPROVED, FORWARD FOR PRESENTATION TO (Organization and address) Barry M. Schulz 61 Vista Ave., Soldiers Point, 2317, Australia

AF

FORM NOV. 66

642 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM WILL BE USED UNTIL STOCK IS EXHAUSTED.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

24. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION (Description of the act, achievement or service, including specific dates, places and facts. If additional space is needed, use plain 8 x 10 1/2 bond paper, the last sheet of which must be signed by the recommending individual.)						
1. Description of Achievement Flight Lieutenant Barry M. Schulz distinguished himself by meritorious achievement while participating in sustained aerial flight as a combat crew-member in Southeast Asia from 28 Jul 1970 to 05 Sep 1970. During this period, outstanding airmanship and courage were exhibited in the successful accomplishment of important combat support missions under extremely hazardous conditions including the continuous possibility of hostile ground fire. His highly professional efforts contributed materially to the tactical air mission of the United States Air Force in Southeast Asia. The professional ability and outstanding aerial accomplishments of Flt Lt Schulz reflect great credit upon himself and the United States Air Force.						
II. Support Data:						
	Category of	Type of	Number of	Number of	Crew	Inclusive dates of
<u>Decoration</u>	<u>Mission</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Missions</u>	<u>Hours</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Award</u>
AM 8thOLC	II	O-2A	19	42.8	Pilot	28 Jul 70 - 16 Aug 70
AM 9thOLC	II	O-2A	28	46.5	Pilot	17 Aug 70 - 05 Sep 70
III. Statement of Air Crewmember's Performance						
The above named air crewmember's accomplishments and service during the entire period/group of missions has reflected laudable performance and effort beyond normal expectations, with no instance of non-professionalism. This member has not been charged with pilot error, either directly or indirectly or involved in an aircraft accident or incident and has consistently demonstrated a high order of air discipline.						
25. TYPED NAME, GRADE AND TITLE OF INDIVIDUAL INITIATING RECOMMENDATION.					26. SIGNATURE	
27. ATTACHMENTS						
NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (Citation and supporting statements or other official documents)					
1	Aircrew Record of Operational Tour.					
2	Copy of Flying Logbook pages. (16 pages)					




## O-2A FLYING HOURS – VIETNAM

**24 JAN to 18 SEP 70**



MONTH	IP	1st PILOT		CAPTAIN	DUAL	TOTAL	INSTRUMENT FLYING	
		DAY	NIGHT				SIM	ACTUAL
JAN					1.9	1.9		
FEB		44.7	1.5	39.2	6.3	52.4	1.6	
MAR		69.1	2.5	62.6		71.7	1.9	0.2
APR		54.5	0.5	46.9		55.0	1.3	0.2
MAY		51.8		47.2		51.8	1.2	0.3
JUN	44.1	77.9	0.5	76.7		78.4	2.2	0.5
JUL	69.3	65.7	7.5	73.2		73.2	2.1	0.4
AUG	34.4	72.8	2.3	72.8		75.2	1.3	0.8
SEP	3.2	28.7	0.7	29.4		29.4		

**SUMMARY    155.0    465.2    15.5    448.0    8.2    488.8    11.6    2.4**



**COMBAT MISSIONS FLOWN**  
**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM**  
**24 JANUARY to 18 SEPTEMBER 1970**

<b>AIRCRAFT</b>	<b>No of MISSIONS</b>	<b>FLIGHT HOURS</b>	<b>GROUP / UNIT</b>	<b>UNIT SUPPORTED</b>
<b>O-2A</b>	<b>237</b>	<b>488.8</b>	<b>20 TASG, CAMN RHAN BAY 21 TASG, BIEN HOA 19 TASS, BIEN HOA JADE FAC, VUNG TAU</b>	<b>1st AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE NUI DAT</b>
<b>O-1E</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2.3</b>	<b>20 TASG, CAMN RHAN BAY 21 TASG, BIEN HOA</b>	
<b>SIOUX</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>20.8</b>	<b>161 RECCE SQN ARA NUI DAT</b>	
<b>CESSNA 180</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>161 RECCE SQN ARA NUI DAT</b>	
<b>OV-10</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5.1</b>	<b>21 TASG, BIEN HOA</b>	<b>US ARMY</b>

**TOTAL                    254                    520.0 hrs**



## AIRSTRIKES CONTROLLED (SETS of FIGHTERS) - FLTLT SCHULZ O44090

	A-1E (4)	A-37 (2)	F-5 (4)	F-100 (2)	F-4 (2)	CANBERRA (1)	TOTAL
<b>FEB</b>		1				1	2
<b>MAR</b>		6	1	2	1	1	11
<b>APR</b>	3	4		8		3	18
<b>MAY</b>		5	1	5		6	17
<b>JUN</b>		6		8		4	18
<b>JUL</b>		3	1	14			18
<b>AUG</b>	3	3	1	10			17
<b>SEP</b>				2			2
<b>TOTAL SETS</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>103</b>
<b>NUMBER OF FIGHTERS</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>211</b>

**TYPICAL WEAPONS LOAD:**

<b>A-1</b>	6 x Mk 82/83	20 mm
<b>A-37</b>	4 x Mk 82 / NAPALM / CBU	7.62 mm
<b>F-5</b>	4 x Mk 82 / NAPALM	20 mm
<b>F-100</b>	4 x Mk 82/83 / NAPALM / CBU	20 mm
<b>F-4</b>	9 Mk 82/83 / 3 x Mk 84 / NAPALM / CBU / ROCKETS / MAVERICK	20 mm
<b>CANBERRA</b>	8 x Mk 82/83	

**WEAPONS EXPENDED ABOVE:      715 x Mk 82/83      150 x NAPALM      70 x CBU      4 x MAVERICK      10 000 x 20 mm**

## O-2A AIRCRAFT SORTIES FLOWN BY AIRFRAME


TAIL No	SORTIES
300	23
344	1
365	2
368	16
372	3
374	4
375	6
383	5
045	49
046	2
050	47
053	35
871	5
972	41

239

## AIRCREW RECORD OF OPERATIONAL TOUR



MEMORABILIA



FLTLT	Doug Riding	Apr 69-Dec 69	Sidewinder 35 Sluggler 35
FLGOFF	Pete Condon	Apr 69-Dec 69	Tamale 15 Sluggler 23
FLGOFF	Huck Ennis	Apr 69-Dec 69	Tamale 23 Sidewinder 37
FLGOFF	Dave Robson	Jun 69-Feb 70	Jade 07
FLTLT	Chris Langton	Jul 69-Mar 70	Sluggler 13 Sidewinder 13
FLTLT	Ron Slater	Aug 69-Apr 70	Sluggler 22
SQNLDR	Dave Owens	Sep 69-May 70	Drama 02 Sluggler 35
FLTLT	Bruce Searle	Nov 69-Jun 70	Sluggler Issue
FLTLT	Dick Gregory	Nov 69-Jun 70	Issue 25 Drama 03
FLTLT	Ray Butler	Nov 69-Aug 70	Drama 02 Issue 23
SQNLDR	Graham Neil	Nov 69- Oct 70	Sluggler 23 Issue 21
FLGOFF	Barry Schulz	Jan 70-Sep 70	Jade 07
FLGOFF	Ken Semmler	Feb 70-Oct 70	Issue 28 Rash 38
FLTLT	Jack Hayden	Mar 70-Nov 70	Helix 15
FLTLT	Chris Hudnott	Aug 70-Apr 71	Issue 27
FLTLT	Frank Fry	Sep 70-May 71	Helix 37
FLTLT	Gavin Thoms	Oct 70-Jun 71	Helix 15
WGCDR	Colin Ackland	Oct 70-Oct 71	Helix 02 Helix 01
FLTLT	Bruce Wood	Apr 71-Dec 71	Helix 33
FLGOFF	Bruce Mouatt	Apr 71-Dec 71	Helix 24
FLGOFF	Chris Mirow	May 71-Dec 71	Helix 36
SQNLDR	Nobby Williams	Jul 71-Dec 71	Bilk 02

WGCDR	Vance Drummond	Jul 66- Nov 66	Unk.
WGCDR	Tony Powell	Dec 66- Dec 67	Jade 01
SQNLDR	Rex Ramsey	Jan 67-May 67	Ascot 09 Bart 97
FLTLT	Pete Smith	Oct 67-Apr 68	Sidewinder 33 Drama 05
FLTLT	Tony Ford	Oct 67-Apr 68	Tamale 17
FLGOFF	Brian Fooks	Oct 67-Apr 68	Issue 05 Jade 07
WGCDR	Barry Thomas	Dec 67-Nov 68	Thirsty 07 Rod 01
FLTLT	Garry Cooper	Apr 68 - Oct 68	Tamale 35
FLTLT	Roger Wilson	Apr 68 -Oct 68	Jade 07 Sidewinder 32
FLGOFF	Mac Cottrell	Apr 68 - Oct 68	Sidewinder 34
FLTLT	Arthur Sibthorpe	Oct 68-Apr 69	Issue 37 Tamale 15
FLTLT	Ken Mitchell	Oct 68-Apr 69	Sidewinder 32
FLGOFF	Dick Kelloway	Oct 68-May 69	Sidewinder 34 Nile 05
WGCDR	Peter Larard	Nov 68-Nov 69	Sidewinder 31 Jade 01





JANUARY 24  
to  
SEPTEMBER 18

1970



JANUARY 1970	JANUARI 十二月 1970
18 Sunday (Ahad) 十一	十五 Thursday (Khamis) 22 Pub Hol
19 Monday (lthnain) 十二	十六 Friday (Juma'at) 23 leave.
20 Tuesday (Thalatha) 十三 INTS DB A/G ✓	十七 Saturday (Sabtu) 24 Rt - PG- RUT-VG 0730-1230 Helen 3 R Seale cleared P Owen letter?
21 Wednesday (Rabu) 十四 IRT ✓	十八 Sunday (Ahad) 25 MEMO Dave Wilson Tom Foley Bill Rabby Rae Burt Nigel Rappin Col Mearns Tim Sedwapa

JANUARY 1970	JANUARI 十二月 1970
18 Sunday (Ahad) 十一	十五 Thursday (Khamis) 22 Pub Hol
19 Monday (lthnain) 十二	十六 Friday (Juma'at) 23 leave.
20 Tuesday (Thalatha) 十三 INTS DB A/G ✓	十七 Saturday (Sabtu) 24 Rt - PG- RUT-VG 0730-1230 Helen 3 R Seale cleared P Owen letter?
21 Wednesday (Rabu) 十四 IRT ✓	十八 Sunday (Ahad) 25 MEMO Dave Wilson Tom Foley Bill Rabby Rae Burt Nigel Rappin Col Mearns Tim Sedwapa

JANUARY 1970	JANUARI 十二月 1970
25 Sunday (Ahad) 十八 VT-TSN Walaby Airlines HORNBY - SAGON 504 TASC BH 1400	廿二 Thursday (Khamis) 29 11am - 1700 sat at A/Rent C130 BH-BT04-CRB 1930 arrive
26 Monday (lthnain) 十九 meets 50° room 70° maid Ground School shuffled G - air land 2.6 803 0V10 Butler VR BEN WAA	廿三 Friday (Juma'at) 30 met slt Roger young slt Braetnd Groundschool !! Wx cold
27 Tuesday (Thalatha) 二十 Ground School letter →	廿四 Saturday (Sabtu) 31 at 871 Gpt Stitt land 1.8 Wx 1400 13 land slt beach
28 Wednesday (Rabu) 廿一 Gan = 6-8 Redet attack procedure - sound.	廿五 Sunday (Ahad) 31 MEMO 19 TASI HOWT GONTR A452 fatigue camouflage numex fly out MIC 5th beats DAGP BAV 83V

FEBRUARY 1970	FEBRUARI 十二月 1970
1 Sunday (Ahad) 廿五 Nieman 23 871 GF 12 lands - Nakh Trang	廿九 Thursday (Khamis) 5 365 1.9 CAPT STITT FAC TACTICS A/R 871 2.7
2 Monday (lthnain) 廿六 STITT CAPT 2.0 871 1F NAV KEANEY 1.7 372 NAV GF 8Ry cheesboroughs!	初一 Friday (Juma'at) 6 CRB-TSN-BH 1500-2030. C-130.
3 Tuesday (Thalatha) 廿七 871 solo 1.6 NAV GF SL	初二 Saturday (Sabtu) 7 Bridging R1 DASC GAV-15 IFFV OPS
4 Wednesday (Rabu) 廿八 Chitofogitane 372 CPT PATTERSON 1.9 FAC TR 2.2 SIM ADF 8Ry NAV 365 CPT IRWIN 1.5 372 NITE FAC 20.	MEMO



**FEBRUARY** 二月 1970

8 Sunday (Ahad) 初三  
IN Processing MOVIE 1200  
1500 Briefing IG TASS OPS  
538 gear  
CRIS LANGSTON SHOT DOWN - EJECT - OK

9 Monday (Ithnain) 初四  
340 Bishop 2-5 2M081  
ON10 624 CRT SCHMIDT 2-5 FAC  
Mag 61

11 Wednesday (Rabu) 初六  
Chloroquine 5  
Wx to SA BH  
374 2-3 Bishop  
(2800) Rv Leth FOL Tow

**FEBRUARI** 正月 1970

初七 Thursday (Khamis) 12  
Uzole Am, Pm, Adelaide  
BH - VT  
F6 P28 BH - ND .5 045

初八 Friday (Juma'at) 13  
368 P28 BH - ND - VT 1.8 Rv

DEPLINAGE  
Posted Mail  
Equip  
Jim Loday  
Loday VT - BUT

MEMO

**FEBRUARY** 二月 1970

15 Sunday (Ahad) 初十  
972 Sander 2-6  
2 x A37

16 Monday (Ithnain) 十一  
368 McKinnon 3.1  
10 load 14 Rv

17 Tuesday (Thalatha) 十二  
XWca  
TIC Aussie 2 KIA  
30 KIA  
AK + tank + 9 Spm Mine  
Chloroquine 5

18 Wednesday (Rabu) 十三  
972 23 Solo  
Tulae go? not permitted!! 11 Rv

**FEBRUARI** 正月 1970

十四 Thursday (Khamis) 19  
368 McKinnon 2-0 FAC May 51  
388 4.8 BH 2.2 VR 1  
VR CTS  
VR 1

15 Friday (Juma'at) 20  
383 1.2 17-ND  
383 1.7 VR Power 22

16 Saturday (Sabtu) 21  
852 tank/ARC Mine  
Long H  
368 2-6 VR P22  
R. Latta SA

MEMO  
map - index 11:00  
Radio Frog card 11:50  
map case  
knee pad/board?

**FEBRUARY** 二月 1970

22 Sunday (Ahad) 初七  
045 Gt Neale VT-ND 3  
383 Lt Smith ND-VT 3

23 Monday (Ithnain) 初八  
050 2-3 -VT-ND  
2-2 → VR → VT P28

24 Tuesday (Thalatha) 初九  
368 2-3 P28 VT-ND  
new helmet 2-2 VR P28  
met DTD + Glang P28 35M GA

25 Wednesday (Rabu) 初十  
Chloroquine 5  
050 2-5  
VH-1 to COMEX KRIST BH  
write Am / SA / MW

**FEBRUARI** 正月 1970

33 初九 Thursday (Khamis) 26  
883 2-4 VR

初十 Friday (Juma'at) 27  
045 3-1 VR P28  
Hoquois → NB - BH - VT  
Proxim MESS heavy lift 3man

初十一 Saturday (Sabtu) 28  
1.55 Spm 2820 VR  
2.10 Spm 2820 VR  
2 KIA 20WIA mine  
2 Spm mine  
Wugawu ND-VT

MEMO  
5BX flipped

**MARCH** 三月 1970

1 Sunday (Ahad) 初四  
045 2-5 VR  
045 2-2 VR  
045 3-2 FAC M71/31

2 Monday (Ithnain) 初五  
382 2-4 VR  
045 2-2 VR  
Pure post deems  
Photo Chumook - 045 5BX

3 Tuesday (Thalatha) 初六  
972 ND - BH - 6  
050 VT - ND - 3  
972 BH - ND - VT - 8

4 Wednesday (Rabu) 初七  
NB 300 2 MAR 2-3 VR

**MACH** 正月 1970

初八 Thursday (Khamis) 5  
Wedding  
15-2  
11-6

初九 Friday (Juma'at) 6  
972 2-0 VR P28 - BH  
EFE + PE Brief 17-7  
972 1-5 BH - VT 14-1

初十 Saturday (Sabtu) 7  
383 2-7 Sanders 2-17  
045 2-5 Nela 2-24  
045 1-5 day 2-10  
Sander 1-5 day 2-10

MEMO  
6-6 3-3  
4-6 4-6  
1-7 1-4  
2-3 2-3  
15-2 11-6

**MARCH** 三月 1970

8 Sunday (Ahad) 初一  
383 3-0 VR P28 25  
3. ADF 28-8  
28-8

9 Monday (Ithnain) 初二  
045 3-00 FAC Pass 09  
3. ADF 29-4  
29-4  
25-8

10 Tuesday (Thalatha) 初三  
at grounded  
Write Am

11 Wednesday (Rabu) 初四  
Chloroquine 5  
368 2-2  
Sander

**MACH** 二月 1970

初五 Thursday (Khamis) 12  
045 1-8 BISHOP CRC  
3 ADF A37 33-4  
28-8

初六 Friday (Juma'at) 13  
045 3-00 FAC Pass 27 A37  
3 ADF P28 35-9  
31-3

初七 Saturday (Sabtu) 14  
06 868 VT - BH 38-0  
1-5 368 BH - VR - VT 38-4  
2-1

MEMO  
57 30 117  
F100 8 150  
8 Nap  
A37 16 82  
FS 12 82

**MARCH** 三月 1970

15 Sunday (Ahad) 初八  
Saw 758 BY SOUTH 2-15  
3ND SMITH 3  
050 2-0 VR P28 35-4  
16 Monday (Ithnain) 初九  
01 368 2-0 FAC A37 P28  
3 ND - VT 42-9  
35-4

17 Tuesday (Thalatha) 初十  
071 050 3-00 P28  
2-1 45-9  
38-4

18 Wednesday (Rabu) 十一  
Chloroquine 5  
1-8 368 VT - BH 43-7  
1d, 100' Tok 50'

**MACH** 二月 1970

初十 Thursday (Khamis) 19  
2-8 FAC 300 M71 P28  
5 BH 52-5  
5 BH - VT 972 Sander  
French Restaurant

初十一 Friday (Juma'at) 20  
972 2-5 VR P28 24  
55

初十二 Saturday (Sabtu) 21  
2-5 050 VR P28  
57-5

MEMO  
TOTAL FEB 70 1438  
night MAR 7 02 54-15  
MAR 43-00  
SACT FEB 22 MAR 25



MARCH	三月	1970
22 Sunday (Ahad)	十五	Wind
23 Monday (Ithnain)	十六	3 972 alle de VT 3 OSD Baka → VT 58.1
24 Tuesday (Thalatha)	十七	2-6 300 VR 60.7
25 Wednesday (Rabu)	十八	Chloroquine 2-5 972 PAC PAP17 A37 63.2

MEMO  
ROBEY - SPURGEON

MARCH	三月	1970
29 Sunday (Ahad)	廿二	Day off
30 Monday (Ithnain)	廿三	Waltaba Monitored 2.5 16 wheel VR 972 0.5 sim ADF
31 Tuesday (Thalatha)	廿四	4.5 Allender - 10ACT ADFGCA Duty off

APRIL	四月	1970
1 Wednesday (Rabu)	廿五	Chloroquine

MEMO

APRIL	四月	1970
5 Sunday (Ahad)	廿九	Rx Ann Dad
6 Monday (Ithnain)	初一	
7 Tuesday (Thalatha)	初二	Rachel 2 sent message MAX
8 Wednesday (Rabu)	初三	Chloroquine OSD Khg ND-VT

MEMO

APRIL	四月	1970
12 Sunday (Ahad)	初七	Blade 05 LZ 7.3 7.3 8.5 9.5 Dice 45 Boss 20
13 Monday (Ithnain)	初八	7.045 4.5 VR P20 2A 2.0 VR P28 SAC extract Hunk 09
14 Tuesday (Thalatha)	初九	OFF 15:00-17:00 harists + had 0.4 Bob Tieloo / Slots
15 Wednesday (Rabu)	初十	Chloroquine 2.5 OSD Post 20 → 0.4 US LT Johnson

MEMO

APRIL	四月	1970
19 Sunday (Ahad)	十四	972 3 0 Tot VT-ND 300 3 Davey MB-VT 728 2-150 Entrefe LT Mbl
20 Monday (Ithnain)	十五	Rx Ann OSD Baka 2.5 OSD - Baka 2.4 Tx ANN
21 Tuesday (Thalatha)	十六	3-3 VR 300 P28 P17
22 Wednesday (Rabu)	十七	Chloroquine 2.5 972 BLADE 07 3 072 ND-VT

MEMO

APRIL	四月	1970
26 Sunday (Ahad)	廿一	Halastia 3 727 1:35 Entrefe 2 27 2:00 1 3 Baker VT-ND 2 3 Kler ND-VT
27 Monday (Ithnain)	廿二	2 0 300 Joy HK 0.5 sim ADF
28 Tuesday (Thalatha)	廿三	Rx Ann Mum 3-2 Joy OSD Blade 07 -2 ACT 39-8 SAS TIC Tx Ann 47.7 Anty
29 Wednesday (Rabu)	廿四	Chloroquine 2-7 045 PAP17 P20

MEMO



MAY 1970	MEI 四月 1970
3 Sunday (Ahad) 廿八 OFF Dick Stone / Phillips	初三 Thursday (Khamis) 7 3.0 053 M51 P26
4 Monday (Ithnain) 廿九 Tx Mumdad	初四 Friday (Juma'at) 8 2.7 500 M51 P28
5 Tuesday (Thalatha) 卅一 Tx Ann 2.5 045 VR P26	初五 Saturday (Sabtu) 9 3.2 300 FLEEC 51 Floo
6 Wednesday (Rabu) 初二 Chloroquine 11 2.8 050 M31 P28	初六 Sunday (Ahad) 10 Mini Overlight Rx Mumdad MEMO check leave 22-30 With Best Wishes Barry Schulz RRAF JAN-SEP 70

MAY Mothers Day 1970	MEI 四月 1970
10 Sunday (Ahad) 初六 300 DICE 41 RAP 15 FALCON 21. Pass 28	初十 Thursday (Khamis) 14 check leave ✓ 2.6 045 VR P23
11 Monday (Ithnain) 初七 2.7 P20 VR 972	十一 Friday (Juma'at) 15 OFF
12 Tuesday (Thalatha) 初八 Ann. 2.7 053 P22 m 61	十二 Saturday (Sabtu) 16 Tx Ann check leave 045 VR 8H 30
13 Wednesday (Rabu) 初九 Chloroquine 2.5 045 P23 M51	十三 Sunday (Ahad) 17 MEMO Booze - goodies

MAY 1970	MEI 四月 1970
17 Sunday (Ahad) 廿三 972 2.5 FG	初七 Thursday (Khamis) 21 OFF! Rx ANN dated 11MAY
18 Monday (Ithnain) 廿四 300 5 07-BH 3.3 VR P26/28 3.8	初八 Friday (Juma'at) 22 Chris Neale Funi Fit dept 1500 arrive 1700 VT-BUT
19 Tuesday (Thalatha) 廿五 VR 2.5 P26 045 UR 1.3 LG baka 053	初九 Saturday (Sabtu) 23 MEMO
20 Wednesday (Rabu) 廿六 Chloroquine 11 3.0 045 DICE 69 2.6 Pave 51 DICE 47 Flood SABRE 41 DICE 71 acct 65 M51 Comm	初十 Sunday (Ahad) 24 MEMO

MAY 1970	MEI 四月 1970
24 Sunday (Ahad) 二十	廿四 Thursday (Khamis) 28 Monkey Gdn
25 Monday (Ithnain) 廿一	廿五 Friday (Juma'at) 29 Penang Beh
26 Tuesday (Thalatha) 廿二 Natasha 1 Mederka	廿六 Saturday (Sabtu) 30 Chloroquine tablets atalm clock * Tax. BUT-PG-VT, 18 Pacex badge
27 Wednesday (Rabu) 廿三 Chloroquine Pool	廿七 Sunday (Ahad) 31

MAY 1970	JUN 五月 1970
31 Sunday (Ahad) 卅一 045 VR P23 2.0 045 IF J04 1.5	初一 Thursday (Khamis) 4 050 VT BH J04 .4 300 BH-ND .5 ND VR P25 2.3 Sonus radio 3.2
JUNE 3.5	初二 Friday (Juma'at) 5 045 2.8 VR P20
1 Monday (Ithnain) 廿八 045 2.2 VR	初三 Saturday (Sabtu) 6 Tx Mumdad
Rx Tx Ann 1.4	初四 Sunday (Ahad) 7 045 05 P25 H05 2.8
2 Tuesday (Thalatha) 廿九 972 LI OGARDY 1.6 RAP U/17 2.0 VR P21/8 3.6	初五 Monday (Ithnain) 8 Chloroquine MEMO
3 Wednesday (Rabu) 卅一 Tx Ann OFF 5.8	初六 Tuesday (Thalatha) 9

JUNE 1970	JUN 五月 1970
7 Sunday (Ahad) 初四 050 + M51 TAX DEPT 1.9 M51 Tx ANN M51	初八 Thursday (Khamis) 11 Rc 7am
8 Monday (Ithnain) 初五 972 2.3 allender IP 300 BH-UT NITE	初九 Friday (Juma'at) 12 2.2 8sim 374 Hogan 4.1
9 Tuesday (Thalatha) 初六 Rx ANN Tx ANN 300 2.3 allender IP 5 sim	初十 Saturday (Sabtu) 13 7.6 045 Tx Ann 2.5 Edge VR
10 Wednesday (Rabu) 初七 300 VT-BH 046 2.0 day 8 Sim LIFE 3 mite	初十一 Sunday (Ahad) 14 MEMO



JUNE Tx ANN 1970		JUN 五月 1970	
14 Sunday (Ahad) 18	053 6 VT BH 348	15 Thursday (Khamis) 18	Edge 2.4 46.4
053 Fuller 3.1 36.0	RAP Hawk 36.6	972 RAP 61 48.2	
15 Monday (Ithnain) 19	053 2.5 Edge 40.9	16 Friday (Juma'at) 19	Edge 2.8 Xuan Loc 51.1
972 2.3 Fuller P20 42.6	4.8 Tx SA 42.6	375 VR 1.9 4.7 52.9	
16 Tuesday (Thalatha) 20	OFF stern	375 Fuller 3.8 54.9	
17 Wednesday (Rabu) 21	Chloroquine 44.0	805 56.7	
2.8 Edge limit 35 45.8	3.4 CV 45 Wx		

JUNE Tx ANN 1970		JUN 五月 1970	
14 Sunday (Ahad) 18	053 6 VT BH 348	15 Thursday (Khamis) 18	Edge 2.4 46.4
053 Fuller 3.1 36.0	RAP Hawk 36.6	972 RAP 61 48.2	
15 Monday (Ithnain) 19	053 2.5 Edge 40.9	16 Friday (Juma'at) 19	Edge 2.8 Xuan Loc 51.1
972 2.3 Fuller P20 42.6	4.8 Tx SA 42.6	375 VR 1.9 4.7 52.9	
16 Tuesday (Thalatha) 20	OFF stern	375 Fuller 3.8 54.9	
17 Wednesday (Rabu) 21	Chloroquine 44.0	805 56.7	
2.8 Edge limit 35 45.8	3.4 CV 45 Wx		

JUNE 1970		JUN 五月 1970	
21 Sunday (Ahad) 18	Duty Officer Nui Dat	25 Thursday (Khamis) 25	053 Cothran DOG 61 59.5
(HF to BOT)		2.5 60.3	
22 Monday (Ithnain) 19	DO ND	26 Friday (Juma'at) 26	575 Cothran 2.2 B'cat 91 63.3
23 Tuesday (Thalatha) 20	DO ND	1.6 VR 65.1	
24 Wednesday (Rabu) 21	Chloroquine 51.00	3.8 66.1	
045 2.1 Cothran VR 58.8		2.8 Tude 81 67.9	

JUNE 1970		JULAI 五月 1970	
28 Sunday (Ahad) 25	375 2.5 O'Grady Tude 81 68.9	29 Thursday (Khamis) 29	053 0'G 1.8 (S) 4.1
3 Self 4 Inst 70.7		30 Friday (Juma'at) 30	050 2.5 Fuller 7I 6.6
29 Monday (Ithnain) 26	045 Dean 2.4 VR 73.0	31 Saturday (Sabtu) 31	045 0'G 2.6 (3) 9.2
30 Tuesday (Thalatha) 27	3 Tx SA 4.1 Tx Ann 74.8		
31 Wednesday (Rabu) 28	Dean 2.6 VR 75.6		
	3 Inst 77.4		

JULY 1970		JULAI 六月 1970	
5 Sunday (Ahad) 12	053 0'G 2.3 (S) 15.0	初七 Thursday (Khamis) 9	053 0'G YJSI 2.3 30.8
050 Joy 3.5 5.8		972 Dipat VR 2.7 30.8	
6 Monday (Ithnain) 13	045 Fuller VR 2.5 17.5	初八 Friday (Juma'at) 10	050 0'G Dewill 3.0 33.8
7 Tuesday (Thalatha) 14	050 Fuller 23.5	初九 Saturday (Sabtu) 11	050 3.7 BLO7 Deem. 37.5
8 Wednesday (Rabu) 15	050 0'G VR (2.ack) 23 25.8		

JULY 1970		JULAI 六月 1970	
12 Sunday (Ahad) 19	053 Joy 2.7 41.9	14 Thursday (Khamis) 16	053 Johnson 1.7 D YJSI 65.9
050 1.7 (S) 41.9	4.4 81.07 A37	15 Friday (Juma'at) 17	050 0'G 1.2 D 1.0 N 61.2
13 Monday (Ithnain) 20	053 Self 2.8 VR 47.1	16 Saturday (Sabtu) 18	050 Fuller 2.3 Tide 61
053 Joy 1.2 day 50.3	972 Fuller Day 1.2 Night 1.2 5.2		
14 Tuesday (Thalatha) 21	053 Johnson 1.7 D YJSI 65.9		
15 Wednesday (Rabu) 22	045 Dean 1.2 D 1.1 N 54.6 (4)		



JULY 1970		JULAI 六月 1970	
19 Sunday (Ahad) 十七	045 3.4 Felle BC61 H03 (69.5)	廿一 Thursday (Khamis) 23	
20 Monday (Ithnain) 十八	2.6 3.1 053 Dean (72)	廿二 Friday (Juma'at) 24	Renewal Parley
21 Tuesday (Thalatha) 十九	0 A/C delayed at But	廿三 Saturday (Sabtu) 25	
22 Wednesday (Rabu) 二十	Spinks VT-BUT	廿六	MEMO

JULY 1970		JULAI 六月 1970	
26 Sunday (Ahad) 廿四	forewell Parley	廿八 Thursday (Khamis) 30	
27 Monday (Ithnain) 廿五		廿九 Friday (Juma'at) 31	BUT VT
28 Tuesday (Thalatha) 廿六		OGOS	
29 Wednesday (Rabu) 廿七		三十 Saturday (Sabtu) 1	Dean 972 3.2 Tide II Rap 17 (3.2)
		31 Sunday (Ahad) 2	Posting 3 Sam 24SEP MEMO 27

AUGUST 1970		OGOS 七月 1970	
2 Sunday (Ahad) 七月初一	200 2.5 Dean Blat 31 053 1.5 Solo (7.2)	初五 Thursday (Khamis) 6	1.5 Dean VR P24 (16.4)
3 Monday (Ithnain) 初二	050 2.6 UR P09 (9.8)	初六 Friday (Juma'at) 7	3 ND-VT. (16.7)
4 Tuesday (Thalatha) 初三	Tx Ann moved 050 2.6 VR (12.4)	初七 Saturday (Sabtu) 8	Rx Ann/Mum Dean 2.6 DEW 15 (22.0)
5 Wednesday (Rabu) 初四	Rx Wendy 053 VR P29 Dean 2.0 053 BH-VT Dean 2.5 05ACT (14.9)	初八 Sunday (Ahad) 9	MEMO 28

AUGUST 1970		OGOS 七月 1970	
9 Sunday (Ahad) 初八	preparation Gazette 045 3.6 Dean Icon 15 286	十二 Thursday (Khamis) 13	DO ND Tx Ann Mum Wendy (33.3)
10 Monday (Ithnain) 初九	053 2.5 UR P09 28	十三 Friday (Juma'at) 14	ND-VT 6 6
11 Tuesday (Thalatha) 初十	045 2.6 Sabic 81 30	十四 Saturday (Sabtu) 15	VR P24 2.5 (35.8)
12 Wednesday (Rabu) 十一	Rx Ann 050 VR 2.0 32	十五 Sunday (Ahad) 16	Tx Ann

AUGUST 1970		OGOS 七月 1970	
16 Sunday (Ahad) 十五	641 Sam Mackworth 972 2.5 4311 (42.4)	十九 Thursday (Khamis) 20	Chinook! (433)
17 Monday (Ithnain) 十六	Rx Ann (15 Aug) 1.2 053 UR (43.3)	二十 Friday (Juma'at) 21	OFF! 5
18 Tuesday (Thalatha) 十七	Tx Ann DO ND HF to BUT (43.3)	廿一 Saturday (Sabtu) 22	2.5 972 VR P22 2.3 053 FK BC31 Johnson 5.5 050 BH-VT (48.6)
19 Wednesday (Rabu) 十八	Rx Mum 053 050 Edge VR P25 5.0 050 BH-VT = 7.4 51.0 (43.3)	廿二 Sunday (Ahad) 23	19 050 Edge VR P25 5.0 050 BH-VT = 7.4 51.0

AUGUST 1970		OGOS 七月 1970	
23 Sunday (Ahad) 廿二	8 972 Toy VR (52.2) 4 3 Sin John 1.2 Tx Smith	廿六 Thursday (Khamis) 27	053 2.4 Dean P25 300-5 BH-VT 2.6 4 (60.7)
24 Monday (Ithnain) 廿三	3.1 Sabic 81 045 (55.3)	廿七 Friday (Juma'at) 28	2.5 053 P23 (4ACT) 2.0 (-5.5 sim) 050 Johnson 4.5 Rx Ann (65.2)
25 Tuesday (Thalatha) 廿四	Tx Ann 1.40 198-045 LT AKD 2.5 050 VR P24 (57.8)	廿八 Saturday (Sabtu) 29	2.7 050 Babal 61 (67.9)
26 Wednesday (Rabu) 廿五	DO ND Rx Mum (58.1)	廿九 Sunday (Ahad) 30	MEMO



**AUGUST 1970**

30 Sunday (Ahad) 廿九  
 045 sage PC 31 LZ 2.0  
 729 Monwell VR J9 2.0  
 053 304 ND-VT 3

31 Monday (Ithnain) 三十  
 005 304 3.0 74.0  
 841 Ker 1.8  
 977 Rx Ann

**SEPTEMBER 1970**

1 Tuesday (Thalatha) 初一  
 972 2.1 VR (2.1)  
 Tx Ann

2 Wednesday (Rabu) 初二  
 05: 46 045 SYNNOT LIS  
 05: 053 VR P22 2.4 (4.5)

**SEPTEMBER 八月 1970**

初三 Thursday (Khamis) 3  
 048-045 SYNNOT LIS  
 300 ND-VT 3 (4.8)  
 DOND 3

初四 Friday (Juma'at) 4  
 972 VR P23 2.5 BH 7.8  
 5 BH-VT  
 Budgees Rx Ann  
 leave applic in  
 Wx  
 Jade Party Mess. Tx Ann

初五 Saturday (Sabtu) 5  
 MEMO  
 Hwc 18<sup>th</sup> P6 800  
 21 m759  
 23 VT 507  
 25 P6 507

**SEPTEMBER 1970**

6 Sunday (Ahad) 初六  
 053 2.6 VR (10.4)

7 Monday (Ithnain) 初七  
 972 2.5 HOI (12.9)

8 Tuesday (Thalatha) 初八  
 090 3 ND-VT 13.2  
 DOND

9 Wednesday (Rabu) 初九  
 2.0 Johnson 045  
 3.0 Dean 972 16.2  
 Rx Ann

**SEPTEMBER 八月 1970**

初十 Thursday (Khamis) 10  
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## COPING WITH FEAR

*"I must not fear.  
Fear is the mind-killer.  
Fear is the little-death that brings total obliteration.  
I will face my fear.  
I will permit it to pass over me and through me.  
And when it has gone past, I will turn the inner eye to see its  
path. Where the fear has gone there will be nothing.  
Only I will remain."*

*—Frank Herbert, Dune*



# Combat Experience in Vietnam and its Effects

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## Purpose

This fact sheet outlines some defining features of the Vietnam combat and some effects on veterans who served there.

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## What were the main features of the Vietnam combat?

The Vietnam War was:

- conducted as a guerilla war, largely in the jungle, by the Viet Cong. Their strategies included surprise attacks, ambushes, acts of sabotage and booby traps. Extensive underground tunnels were dug by the Viet Cong, enabling them to quickly disappear after such attacks.
  - fought by the United States, with support from Australia and other countries in the region, with all available non-nuclear weaponry. Their approach relied heavily on extensive conventional bombing and the use of chemicals such as napalm, Agents Orange, Blue and White etc. Both sides made extensive use of land mines, with the Viet Cong managing to use their opponents' own mines against them.
  - a war without a front line. The same areas were fought over several times. The Viet Cong were able to move successfully in all parts of the country.
- 

## The Australian forces in Vietnam

In Vietnam, the Australian forces – army, air force and navy – were regarded as highly professional. On the ground, they showed expertise in jungle warfare. They employed bushmanship – navigating through the jungle instead of using paths and roads – rather than superior firepower. They were trained to fight an anti-guerilla war from the beginning, becoming skilled in techniques of search and destroy, ambush, counter-insurgency and so on.

The Australian forces comprised both regular troops and conscripted national servicemen, 'nashos'. There were occasional tensions between these groups.

### Returning home

Vietnam veterans returned to a country that was significantly divided in its support for Australia's involvement in the Vietnam War. Conscription and the use of conscripted troops in Vietnam were important factors in that division. As well, the Australian public had, for the first time, been exposed nightly to the horrors of war on their television sets.

The initial returning home parades for the troops were cancelled as they became a focus for the sometimes hostile public opposition to Australia's involvement in the war. This opposition often turned to criticism of those who had given service there. There were large public demonstrations and many veterans felt personally betrayed by their country rather than supported and recognised for their sacrifices and actions.

Some felt they had become cut off from their previous lives. They had undergone a long period of life-threatening service while others in Australia had continued to enjoy the pleasures of life in the late sixties and early seventies.

Being involved in an unpopular war, being withdrawn before the war was over and feeling rejected by society has resulted in many veterans remaining silent about their experiences. Some may not even acknowledge that they are a Vietnam veteran; many have never marched in an Anzac Day parade or joined an ex-service organisation.

These factors may lead to veterans feeling isolated and disconnected from mainstream community and experiencing a range of psychological and other problems. Many veterans can overcome these feelings and reconnect with their families and communities by talking to others about their experiences or seeking assistance through counselling and other specific treatment programs.

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## **Combat Experience in Vietnam and its Effects, *continued***

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### **Psychological impact of military training**

All Australian troops who went to Vietnam underwent extensive military training. This training taught them to survive and fight, and promoted rational and logical thinking. However, while this approach may be essential in military action, it can leave those who experience combat with little preparation for its emotional impact.

Australian troops in Vietnam often lived under constant threat of injury or attack. They may have seen friends wounded or killed, they were required to kill or injure others, and they were encouraged to treat the Viet Cong as less than human by dehumanising and depersonalising them as 'gooks', 'slopes' and 'charlie'. The troops lived with uncertainty and the potential of life-threatening mistakes. They often developed feelings of intense loyalty and mateship, and at the end of the day they had to cope with a profound 'flatness' after danger was over.

The legacies, for some veterans, of the military training and combat experience in Vietnam include:

- difficulty in making sense of emotions in themselves and others
  - difficulty in relationships
  - excessive emotions or emotional bluntness
  - resorting to 'learned' action responses (violence and other forms of abuse) and
  - difficulty relating to Asian people living in Australia.
- 

### **Psychological impact of combat in the Vietnam War**

Combat in the Vietnam War exposed veterans to severe traumatic situations of threat, death or serious injury for themselves and those around them. These experiences often involved feelings of fear, helplessness or horror.

Many veterans may have recurring thoughts and feelings about such traumatic events and in some veterans there will be a longer lasting disorder such as Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).



# PTSD: General Information

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## Purpose

This fact sheet describes post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) relating to combat experiences.

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## What is combat trauma?

For military personnel a trauma may relate directly to combat duties or being in a war zone. Even though military people are trained for the intensity of combat, the training may not prepare people for the emotional impact of events.

Traumatic events:

- may overwhelm a person immediately. In some cases, however, a person may handle the situation at the time, but feelings about the event can hit months or years later. Sometimes, these feelings occur again and again over time.
- do not always affect everyone in the same way. An event which traumatises one person can be less significant for another and have no long term effects. Individual personalities and the circumstances surrounding the event affect response.

Traumatic reactions to combat have been documented since the ancient Greeks. During World War I, they were called 'shell shock'. In World War II, some common terms included 'combat neurosis' or 'combat fatigue'.

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## What is PTSD?

A diagnosis of PTSD is based on the following features:

- Exposure to an extreme traumatic stressor involving direct personal experience of an event that involves actual or threatened death or serious injury, or other threat to one's physical integrity; or witnessing an event that involves death, injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of another person; or learning about unexpected or violent death, serious harm, or threat of death or injury experienced by a family member or other close associate.
- A response of intense fear, helplessness, or horror.



### What is PTSD? *continued*

- Persistent re-experiencing of the event.
- Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general responsiveness (not present before the trauma).
- Persistent symptoms of increased arousal (not present before the trauma).
- The re-experiencing, avoidance, numbing, and increased arousal symptoms have been present for more than one month.

*Reference: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders IV pp. 424-429.*

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### What are the symptoms of PTSD?

PTSD symptoms may include:

Anger	Mood swings
Anxiety	Numbing and emotional detachment
Avoidance of distressing reminders associated with trauma	Physiological reactions eg headaches, stomach upsets, rashes
Confusion	Restricted range of emotions eg. unable to have loving feelings
Continuous alertness for future threats eg. physical or emotional threat	Sadness
Depression	Self-preoccupation
Fearfulness	Sense of foreshortened future
Guilt including survivor guilt	Shame
Helplessness	Shock
Illusions or hallucinations	Sleep disturbance including dreams and nightmares
Intrusive memories and feelings eg. flashbacks	Social withdrawal
Irritability	Substance abuse eg alcohol and other drug abuse
Loss of confidence	Tension and agitation
Mental reactions eg. poor concentration	

### **Is recovery possible?**

Recovery from trauma means that the person is no longer thinking all the time about the event, that the negative and disabling symptoms have been reduced.

If a person has recently been exposed to a trauma, there is an excellent chance of full recovery with or without medical treatment or counselling. If the problems have continued for some time after the traumatic event, or they only begin to show some time afterwards, recovery may be more difficult especially if the symptoms are very severe. In these circumstances, symptoms may be triggered or exacerbated by things which remind the person of the traumatic event (eg. noises, smells, people, places, feelings of guilt, etc.)

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### **What helps recovery?**

Counselling, various relaxation-based therapies, anger management techniques, medication and group treatment programs can all assist in recovery. Self-help group programs have also been effective.

By the time most veterans and their partners seek counselling, they may have a number of problems. Although trauma may be a significant part of the difficulties, counselling may initially focus on basic problem solving around relationships, work or friendships and leisure. Sometimes the symptoms of trauma may be so marked that the counselling will need to focus exclusively on ways the veteran can manage.

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### **Is medication sufficient to control PTSD?**

Medication is not sufficient to control PTSD.

Medication can reduce high levels of arousal and stabilise mood or ease the depression associated with PTSD. The traumatic event and its effects on daily living usually need to be looked at in counselling or managed by other strategies such as relaxation or exercise.

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### **How does alcohol affect PTSD?**

Veterans often use alcohol and drugs to relieve their PTSD symptoms.

Relief is usually short-lived. Alcohol in large amounts has a depressive effect. Instead of numbing feelings and thoughts, alcohol tends to make distressing memories more accessible.

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### **How does alcohol affect PTSD? (continued)**

Recovery or an easing of symptoms is more difficult to achieve if a person with PTSD also drinks a lot of alcohol. The situation is further complicated if prescribed medications for PTSD are used.

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### **Looking for help?**

Many veterans affected by trauma have sought help after it has become increasingly difficult to cope. They may have:

- a succession of difficulties in all parts of their life
- wondered if they were 'going mad' due to their dreams and intrusive memories
- found it difficult to find comfort from others or in themselves
- severe conflict in their marriages
- problems continuing with work
- friends who recommend they 'get some counselling'.

The Vietnam Veterans Counselling Service has been assisting Vietnam veterans with the effects of war-trauma since 1982. Our experience is continuously being extended, and now the service provides counselling for Australian veterans of all wars and peace-keeping forces.

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## "OUR COUNTRY IS IN MOURNING, A VETERAN (DIGGER) DIED TODAY"

'He was getting old and paunchy  
And his hair was falling fast,  
And he sat around the RSL.,  
Telling stories of the past.

Of a war that he once fought in  
And the deeds that he had done,  
In his exploits with his mates;  
They were heroes, everyone.

And 'tho sometimes to his neighbours  
His tales became a joke,  
All his mates listened quietly  
For they knew where of he spoke.

But we'll hear his tales no longer,  
For ol' Jack has passed away,  
And the world's a little poorer  
For a Digger died today.

He won't be mourned by many,  
Just his children and his wife.  
For he lived an ordinary,  
Very quiet sort of life.

He held a job and raised a family,  
Going quietly on his way;  
And the world won't note his passing,  
'Tho a Digger died today.

When politicians leave this earth,  
Their bodies lie in state,  
While thousands note their passing,  
And proclaim that they were great.

The Media tell of their life stories  
From the time that they were young,  
But the passing of a Digger  
Goes unnoticed, and unsung.

Is the greatest contribution  
To the welfare of our land,  
Some smoothie who breaks his promise  
And cons his fellow man?

Or the ordinary fellow  
Who in times of war and strife,  
Goes off to serve his country  
And offers up his life?

The politician's stipend  
And the style in which they live,  
Are often disproportionate,  
To the service that they give.

While the ordinary Digger,  
Who offered up his all,  
Is paid off with a medal  
And perhaps a pension, small.

It is not the politicians  
With their compromise and ploys,  
Who won for us the freedom  
That our country now enjoys.

Should you find yourself in danger,  
With your enemies at hand,  
Would you really want some cop-out,  
With his ever-waffling stand?

Or would you want a Digger  
His home, his country, his kin,  
Just a common Digger,  
Who would fight until the end?

He was just a common Digger,  
And his ranks are growing thin,  
But his presence should remind us  
We may need his likes again.

For when countries are in conflict,  
We find the Digger's part,  
Is to clean up all the troubles  
That the politicians start.

If we cannot do him honour  
While he's here to hear the praise,  
Then at least let's give him homage  
At the ending of his days.

AUTHOR: A. Lawrence Vaincourt



## PUBLISHED ARTICLES

### JADE COUNTRY - A RELATIVELY EASY AREA of OPERATIONS

*Contribution to 'Hit my Smoke: Targeting the enemy in Vietnam'  
Coulthard-Clark 1997, ISBN 1 86448 480 2*

*WGCDR Barry Schulz, 1997*



# JADE 07



**BARRY M SCHULZ, AFC  
(THEN FLYING OFFICER)  
ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE**

**24 January 1970 – 18 September 1970**



**VIETNAM MEDAL**



**REPUBLIC of  
VIETNAM  
CAMPAIGN  
MEDAL**



**AUSTRALIAN  
ACTIVE SERVICE  
MEDAL 1945-1975**



**USAF AIR MEDAL  
(9 OAK LEAF  
CLUSTERS)**



**REPUBLIC of  
VIETNAM CROSS  
of GALLANTRY  
with PALM UNIT**

Upon my arrival in Vietnam (by RAAF C-130 from RAAF Base Butterworth, Malaysia where I was MIRAGE FCI at No 3 Squadron), I was attached for about a week to the 21<sup>st</sup> TASS at Cam Rahn Bay AFB for O-2A conversion.


I then made my way, via 19th TASS in-briefings at Bien Hoa, to Vung Tau where I replaced Flying Officer Dave Robson. The JADE FAC TACP supported the 1<sup>st</sup> Australia Task Force (1ATF) based at Nui Dat (about 20 nm north of Vung Tau). The 1ATF AO was in Phuoc Tuy Province, north and east of Vung Tau.

We routinely flew six days, followed by a one-day break. One or two three-hour sorties were flown each day. Being based at Vung Tau, we received daily briefings from the RAAF Operational Support Unit that also supported the RAAF Caribou transport and Iroquois squadrons. When we flew out of Nui Dat, the JADE TACP and Australian Army staff conducted pre and post-sortie briefings.

Most sorties accompanied a Sioux helicopter (from the Australian Army Aviation Corps based at Nui Dat), callsign *'Possum'*. Their primary role was low-level visual reconnaissance and, when appropriate, assisting in marking targets. *'Possum'* was our low-level eyes and we flew top-cover, navigating, reporting, and reacting to any sightings. These were our day-to-day 'bread and butter' missions.



VUNG TAU ARMY AIR BASE  
- JADE COMPOUND



PHUOC TUY PROVINCE  
JADE FAC AREA OF OPERATIONS

If *'Possum'* found a target of opportunity, or if any of the Australian SAS patrols, or 'grunts' got into trouble, we would react by calling in an Immediate Air Strike, Artillery Fire Support or Helicopter Gunship support (US Army Cobras or RAAF *'Bushrangers'* – UH-1H Iroquois gunships). Selection of support agency depended on the ground tactical situation and threat level. Often the SAS required immediate extraction and things often got a little 'hairy' for them until the Air Support arrived. RAAF Iroquois *'slicks'* with Gunship cover enacted the extraction.

Air Support assets were generally formations of USAF F-100, A-37 and F-4 aircraft, occasional VNAF F-5 or A-1 and, RAAF Canberra bomber aircraft. Some B-52 missions were also coordinated. Bien Hoa Air Base was only 15-20 minutes away so reaction time was generally good. If friendly troops were involved, Iroquois gunships were always on alert and response was almost immediate. Most of the immediate activities involved extraction of SAS patrols under direct threat from VC.

Most operations were pre-planned with airstrike and artillery Landing Zone (LZ) preparation and Gunship covered insertions of company-size elements. Quite a few of these involved the spectacular *'Commando Vault'* LZ preparation missions involving a C-130 parachute-delivered 15,000 pound 'bomb'.

Most of the time the Phouc Tuy Province was relatively quiet. The threat from the ground wasn't considered high, so 'Possum' operated 'in the weeds' while conducting Visual Reconnaissance. Often, they sighted tracks, camps, and bunker systems. The main difficulty was determining from the available signs whether these were in recent use. Usually, it was impossible to say until an air strike opened the vegetation cover. Later a SAS patrol would often be inserted to determine BDA (Bomb Damage Assessment) and follow up with Ground Reconnaissance.

Working this way with 'Possum' meant we were able to locate targets more accurately and reliably. I guess 'Possum' marked about 90% of targets for the pre-planned airstrikes resulting in accurate marks and better bombing results. If a 'Possum' was not present, it was up to the FAC to map read into the area and, if you could fix the position of the target in dense jungle less than a hundred metres, you could be considered doing well (at least an honest FAC would admit to that!).

## BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (BDA)

### BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT


If bomb damage assessment (BDA) was the best measure of effectiveness in the tactical war over South Vietnam, then the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that No 2 Squadron, with its Canberra Mk 20 jet bomber, rated very highly. Dr Coulthard-Clark, RAAF Historian, reported that the squadron's total BDA for the four years at Phan Rang, from April 1967 to June 1971, totalled 786 confirmed KBA (killed by air), 3390 estimated KBA, 8737 structures destroyed, 15 568 bunkers destroyed, 1267 sampans destroyed and 74 bridges destroyed.<sup>314</sup>

Unfortunately, the reliability of BDA data was questionable as the process created, amongst US operational units and in higher command headquarters in Vietnam, a propensity to stretch the truth. RAAF FAC Flying Officer Barry Schultz (callsign *Jade 07*, flying in support of the 1st Australian Task Force in Phouc Tuy Province in 1970), was concerned about this matter at the time. Flying higher up and moving relatively fast, he recognised his own limitations in determining BDA accurately, and preferred to have a low flying helicopter (in his case, Bell 47G Sioux light observation helicopters of the Australian Army's 161 Reconnaissance Flight) to take a closer look at the results of air strikes. In his opinion, 'a lot of other BDAs (given solely by FACs) were estimations and sometimes exaggerations'.<sup>315</sup>

BDA was always more accurate if 'Possum' was present to examine the target from low level and close range. Our reporting was, then, on time, on the spot and accurate, whereas a lot of other BDAs were – as I think were widely acknowledged – rather exaggerated. The only time we claimed enemy personnel presence or casualties was when SAS patrols confirmed the BDA.

*From: 'Dreadful Lady over the Mekong Delta: An analysis of RAAF Canberra Operations in the Vietnam War' by WGCDR Bob Howe*

I flew about a dozen missions, both Visual Reconnaissance and target marking for airstrikes with WP grenades, (checking on my solo students!) in 'Possum' Sioux aircraft. They certainly earned their flight pay on each mission.



They occasionally were exposed to ground fire and, on one sortie, our aircraft was hit by a Mk 82 bomb fragment despite us being over 1,000 metres away, supposedly outside the fragmentation envelope. We felt an impact and as a precaution landed at a nearby Fire Support Base. We found a large fragment lodged in the fuselage frame (the lattice work tail-boom saved the day!).

*POSSUM DURING A BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT*

On the domestic front we were 'comfortable'. Although JADE supported the Australian forces, it was fully integrated within the USAF system and was housed, fed and operated entirely by the USAF. We were accommodated in the 'Hotel Vung Tau' – for want of a better name – which was a seconded old French hotel. My 'roomie' was the infamous CAPT Chris Neale, USAF! We had a full-time kitchen at the hotel. The last two months of my tour were spent in military barracks at Vung Tau airfield. On base, we used the usual 'chow lines' at the USAF or US Army messes. I guess we were fortunate in that we were not subjected to the conditions rumoured to exist elsewhere – tents and bunkers etc!



Operating as part of the Australian team did not create any real problems. In fact, because we shared the Vung Tau airfield with the RAAF squadrons supporting the Australian Army, there was very close liaison and, indeed, a lot of social contact. The USAF guys in JADE become very much part of the Australian scene because they personally got to know the RAAF and Army guys well. When they were out flying, all they had to do was call on the radio, identify themselves, and often they would find they were talking to someone they knew personally and with whom they had had tried to sink a million VBs the night before, solving the problems of the world. This relationship promoted a close cooperative working relationship at all levels.

One of the problem areas that were encountered arose about halfway through my tour. The USAF began injecting young inexperienced pilots (virtually straight out of pilot training and with 5-6 weeks on the O-2A) and older pilots (with no recent flying experience or frequently no fighter experience at all) into the FAC system. From this period on, the low FAC experience levels were starting to become evident, and in fact, the last half of my tour was almost totally dedicated to training these pilots. This created some concern for the Army commanders, because the FAC experience levels were so low. As soon as we got them up to speed, they were poached and sent elsewhere. In effect, the JADE Unit became an operational FAC training unit.

The O-2A, despite its obvious limitations, was a dual-seat aeroplane and, although normally crewed by one, it was quite a good training platform. There were no real hassles training these 'new guys', it just took longer to get them qualified if they hadn't flown for a while or had no fighter experience. This meant they had to learn how fighters operated and how to FAC, all of which entailed quite a deal of responsibility when providing close air support to troops on the ground. There was a lot to learn and the pressure was really on them to perform.

Phouc Tuy province was an ideal area to be giving these new FACs their training. For one thing, because we were not in the middle of a lot of air routes and point-to-point navigation activities, we were immune from much of the Air Traffic Control (considered to be over-control or even out-of-control by many!) which frustrated a lot of FACs elsewhere in-country. In fact, Phuoc Tuy had the opposite situation of under-control usually applied. The greatest fear we had was not being shot-down, shot at or whatever, but of running into somebody else (especially US Army helicopters, which roamed around with no control at all!) because of the density of air traffic and frequent poor visibility conditions

Congestion in the air could become quite heavy, depending on the time of year. For instance, during the monsoon season when other Corps areas were experiencing adverse weather, it was common for air strikes to be diverted and fighters were left looking for targets of opportunity in other areas. There would be some days when large numbers of strike aircraft would head for the coast and turn up in JADE country looking for work. We often had so much Air Support available that we did not know what to do with it at all! You could almost say that we'd become a dumping ground although, that suited us because it was great training for the young guys.

How effectively this ordnance was employed could be debated and the tasking agencies were often hard pressed to generate legitimate targets.

Occasionally we got RAAF Canberra bombers over Phuoc Tuy. Most of these that I can recall were diverted missions from other Corps areas, although some would have been pre-planned sorties to provide crew training in the relative benign JADE country. The Canberra bomber was a little limited in other than a pre-planned role, chiefly because its reaction time was slow but also on account of the nature of its delivery pattern. This entailed a long straight run-in to release each bomb(s) resulting in a 5-6-minute interval between each run.





This technique was not suitable for Close Air Support. Fighter aircraft types worked in dive-bombing pairs (or more) and were able to keep pressure on the target area, having the added psychological impact of visibility and noise.

*RAAF CANBERRA ON A BOMBING RUN*

The Canberra had some advantages in that it had long endurance, could level bomb under cloud which precluded dive-bombing, carried six big bombs (750 or 1000 pounders versus 500-pound Mk 82 bombs), and was generally reasonably accurate – although there were notable exceptions!

The Canberra also proved acceptable for initial FAC training (due to the pace of its operations) before pilots graduated to the more demanding and hectic pace of multiple fighter patterns.

My recall of specific events has been eroded by 50 years of time but, looking back, one impression which still strikes me is that I was never subjected to the controversy over whether we should have been in Vietnam. Australian Government commitment to the conflict was seen to be a right and just thing. Like most of my colleagues, I supported the Government's aims, even though these were not achieved in the end, and I had no qualms about why I went and what I did there. Personally, I found the experience valuable in consolidating my fighter training and there was no doubt that Vietnam was a very good opportunity for the RAAF fighter community to conduct air operations in an operational environment, even though we were not operating fighter aircraft.

*I managed to re-live O-2A FAC operations in 1972 - 74 while instructing on F-4E at the USAF Fighter Weapons School, Nellis AFB NEVADA, USA.*

*During the Weapons Delivery Phase of the Fighter Weapons Instructor Courses, O-2A FACs were employed in the Tactical and Close Air Support phase (a precursor to USAF 'Red Flag' exercises).*

*I participated in a few nostalgic flights!!*

## JADE COUNTRY

by FLGOFF Barry M. Schulz, RAAF Jade 07, 1970

*Contribution to 'Cleared Hot'*  
*FAC Association Book ISBN 978 09703 0682 1*  
*Submitted by WGCDR Barry SCHULZ (Ret'd) 2003*



1968-1969



1970+ (SCHULZ DESIGN)

Upon my arrival in Vietnam, I was attached for about a week to the 21st TASS at Cam Ranh Bay to train in the O-2A. I then made my way, via the 19th TASS at Bien Hoa, to Vung Tau where I replaced Flying Officer Dave Robson, RAAF. The JADE FAC TACP supported the 1st Australian Task Force (ATF) based at Nui Dat, about 20 miles north of Vung Tau. The 1st ATF AO was in Phuoc Tuy Province, north and east of Vung Tau.

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Most sorties accompanied a Sioux helicopter from the Australian Army Aviation Corps based at Nui Dat. Their call sign was 'Possum,' and their primary role was low-level visual reconnaissance and, when appropriate, assisting in marking targets. They were our low-level eyes. We flew top-cover, navigating, reporting, and reacting to any sightings.

Most of the time, the Phuoc Tuy Province was relatively quiet. The threat from the ground was not considered high, so Possum operated 'in the weeds' in relative safety. Often, they sighted tracks, camps, and bunker systems. The main difficulty was determining from the available signs whether these were in recent use. Usually, it was impossible to say until an airstrike removed some of vegetation. Often, an SAS patrol followed up with ground reconnaissance and BDA.

Working this way, we were able to locate targets more accurately and reliably. I would guess that Possum marked about 90% of our pre-planned targets. Their very accurate marks produced commensurately better bombing results. If a Possum was not available, it was up to the FAC, and if you could determine the location of a point in dense jungle within 100 metres, you were doing well - at least an honest FAC would admit to that!

If Possum found a target of opportunity, or if any of the Australian SAS patrols, or "grunts" got into trouble, we would react by calling in an immediate air strike, artillery fire, or US or RAAF helicopter gunship support. Selection depended on the tactical situation. Often the SAS required immediate extraction, and we accomplished that with RAAF Iroquois 'slicks' covered by 'Bushranger' gunships. RAAF helicopters were always on alert, and response was almost immediate. Bien Hoa was only 15-20 minutes away so tactical fighter air support reaction time was also generally good.

BDA was always more accurate if Possum was present to examine the target from low level and close range. Their BDA was on time and on the spot whereas a lot of other BDAs were estimations, and sometimes, exaggerations. The only time we claimed enemy casualties was when SAS patrols confirmed the BDA.

I flew about a dozen missions, both visual reconnaissance and target marking for airstrikes with WP grenades, with a Possum. They certainly earned their pay. On one sortie, our aircraft was hit by a MK-82 fragment even though we were over 1,000 metres away, supposedly well outside the fragmentation envelope. We felt an impact and as a precaution landed at a nearby FSB. We found a large fragment lodged in the fuselage frame. Fortunately, the latticework tail-boom saved the day!

On the domestic front we were comfortable. We were fully integrated with the USAF system and were as housed, fed, and operationally supported by the USAF. We were accommodated in the 'Hotel Vung Tau' – for want of a better name – that was a seconded old French hotel with a full-time kitchen. My "roomie" was the infamous Captain Chris Neale, USAF. The last two months of my tour were spent in military barracks at Vung Tau airfield. On Base we used the usual 'chow lines' at the USAF or US Army messes. We were fortunate in that we were not subjected to the conditions rumoured to exist elsewhere – tents, bunkers etc!

Operating as part of the Australian team did not create any real problems. In fact, because we shared the Vung Tau Airfield with the RAAF squadrons supporting the Australian Army, there was very close liaison and, indeed, a lot of social contact. The USAF guys in Jade become very much part of the Australian scene, and got to know the RAAF and Army guys well. When they were out flying, they often they would find they were talking to someone they knew personally and with whom they had had tried to sink a million VBs the night before!

My recall of specific events has been eroded by 50 years of time but looking back, one impression that still strikes me is that I was never subjected to the controversy over whether we should have been in Vietnam. Australian Government commitment to the conflict was seen to be a right and just thing. Like most of my colleagues, I supported the Government's aims, even though these were not achieved in the end, and I had no qualms about why I went and what I did there.

From a RAAF fighter pilot point of view, I found the experience valuable. There was no doubt that the opportunity to participate in combat air operations, even though we weren't flying fighter aircraft, complemented and augmented my fighter training.

**Editor's Note:** The authors comments about the commitment of his fellow-countrymen is interesting in that he appears not to have run into the hostility mentioned by several of his colleagues.

**WGCDR Barry Schulz, AFC**

## FLGOFF Dave ROBSON OBSERVATIONS

Callsign '*JADE 07*' Dave Robson learned lessons in Vietnam – none more valuable than looking after the bloke on the ground.

We watched the news from the US and were shocked about the protest marches and how we servicemen were seemingly blamed for the war.

Between missions, morale was generally low, but airborne was a different matter – we each had a job to do. We looked for whatever fun or joy we could find in each day. Flying was a pleasure compared to being on the ground.

We drank too much and slept too little. We played card games. We told dirty jokes. We listened endlessly to Glenn Campbell on the jukebox and we drooled over the centrefolds of Playboy magazine. That was what we were fighting for – the freedom to enjoy our way of life, and to return home to our loved ones.

In our area we experimented with air power in direct support of the troops and how to maximize the result with minimal resources – we needed accuracy, safety, and low-cost weapons.

I developed a technique where I fired a pair of 'Willy-Pete' (white phosphorous rockets) on a marking pass – one a little short and one a little long. Initially I used it for the Aussie Canberra bombers so the pilot, and navigator, could line up for their bomb run. The two smokes provided two references – a line for the fighters to set their attack direction, and a distance reference for aim-off.

Each fighter pilot had very different estimates of distance and, if you wanted to move an aim point say 100 metres left of the previous bomb, the result would vary from 50 to 150 meters.

By using two smokes I could use proportional distance, which was consistent for all pilots. It worked very well. "Hit my smoke" became "split my smokes".

The most important lesson for me was that war must be won on the ground and that the air war must contribute to that end. Also, the will to win is more important than any other weapon of war. I was disillusioned by the reaction of our people to the servicemen who served in Vietnam.

Our R&R was a week home in Australia. We were warned not to wear uniform at home as paint had been thrown over some servicemen on leave and fights had broken out.

I suddenly felt that what I was doing was not appreciated and would achieve nothing in the long term. I went back to the war zone with one intention – to protect my troops on the ground to the best of my ability and to ignore the political and media crap.

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The forward air controller commands the combined firepower of offensive airborne platforms on the battlefield – making him the most powerful pilot in the skies.



“The most important lesson for me was that war has to be won on the ground and that the air war must contribute to that end,” says former RAAF pilot David Robson. Dave Robson was a breed of pilot – a specialist – known as a forward air controller (FAC) who saw action close and personal in Vietnam. Although the popularity of, or emphasis on, forward air controlling as a capability seems to ebb and flow – especially in Australia – it is certainly in favour with the ADF now.

But what is FAC? Forward air control, as a legitimate method of targeting sophisticated air assets, is popularly thought to have had its first real genesis during the D-Day invasions in northern France 60 years ago.

However, Australian pilots of the RAAF’s No. 4 and 5 Squadrons, operating over the jungles of Papua New Guinea, employed classic FAC tactics as early as 1943. Flying Wirraway and Boomerang aircraft, these pilots guided precision strikes by faster Beaufighters, in close support of ground troops holding out against the Japanese advance.

The basic theory behind FAC is the control and precision employment of offensive air assets to attack ground targets that are often near friendly forces. In this regard, FAC was extensively and famously employed in the jungles of South Vietnam where Australian pilots, like Dave Robson, were seconded to specialist American units in support of Australia’s ground troops.

All Vietnam-bound Aussie forward air controllers underwent FAC training in Australia at the Joint Warfare School at RAAF Base Williamtown, north of Sydney.

With about 1000 hours fighter-pilot experience on Sabres and Mirage behind him, Flying Officer Robson underwent further training in-country at the 504 Theatre Indoctrination School (TIS - FAC U), Phan Rang, before being assigned to 19TASS, Bien Hoa and, from there, deployed to support the Australian task force at Nui Dat.

He was based at the coastal airfield of Vung Tau and at Luscombe Field (Nui Dat) where his unit maintained a TACP [tactical air control party] in support of the First Australian Task Force (1ATF). The FACs in support of 1ATF – to which there was usually one Australian attached – were assigned the callsign Jade.

Originally equipped with Cessna O-1s, the Jade callsigns were upgraded, in 1969, to the Cessna O-2A – ‘Oscar Deuce’. Robson flew the Cessna O-2A exclusively during his tour of duty from June 1969 to February 1970 and flew a total of 240 missions over 333 flying hours calling in more than 80 air strikes.

Flying the Oscar Deuce was a huge change for Robson. Not only was he stepping down from the fast jets of a substantial fighter career, but had the extra burden of switching master hand. “Every airplane I had flown was operated with a joystick by the right hand. The throttle, radios, speed brakes and so on were operated by the left,” he says. “On top of that, I was left-handed.

“To fly the O-2A, I had to change to a left-hand operated yoke in an airplane with sluggish response – compared to a fighter – and to writing with my right hand. “It certainly was a learning experience.”

Recalling the following mission, Dave Robson can give us a reasonable insight into the role and importance of the FAC to the ground forces he was there to support.

“An ARVN convoy, with US Army advisers, was in transit to their fire-support base. The VC detonated mines under the lead and tail-end APCs, trapping the entire column on an elevated road with rice paddies on either side. They were totally exposed and trapped – there was no escape. Then the VC opened fire from lines of trees on both sides of the rice paddies. It was a well-planned ambush. The convoy was pinned down and very vulnerable.

They called for an immediate air (air-strike support). I was already airborne on a visual reconnaissance (VR) mission several clicks to the east. The fighters were called as I was on the way and we arrived in short time. We cleared the Aussie helicopter gunships in first – callsign Bushranger.

As I briefed the first flight of fighters – F-4s – and rolled in to mark the target, I saw muzzle flashes directed at me from the tree-line to the west. As I pulled off the marking run, a US Army officer on the ground warned there was ground fire coming at me from the tree-line to the east.

I called for more air support while I directed the first set of fighters onto the target. It was an easy target for the fighters as the tree-lines were clearly defined and there was a clear area of rice paddies between the trees and the friendlies. The fighters could make a clear run along the tree-lines with high-drags and napalm.

I continued the first flight of fighters on the eastern side with 20 mm cannon passes as the second flight arrived. As I briefed the second flight – F-100s – and marked the western tree-line, we were able to keep Charlie’s head down in the meantime with cannon fire. The action ended as quickly as it had started. The guns went silent. Charlie had retreated – perhaps wounded – and I was able to provide top cover until relieved by another FAC – and until additional ground support arrived. Dust-off helicopters collected some wounded.”

A forward air controller is a lone-wolf type of operator on the battlefield with arguably the greatest firepower of any individual at his disposal.

Apart from offensive airpower he can also call upon or be asked to control naval gunfire support (NGS), artillery, mortars, heavy machineguns, or even main battle tanks.

## The O-2A

The O-2A Skymaster was manufactured by Cessna and designed for forward air control, visual reconnaissance, target identification, target marking, ground to air coordination, counter-insurgency, leaflet dropping, and damage assessment.

The O-2A had four under wing pylons for external stores, including rocket pods, flare pods, napalm canisters, or other light ordnance such as a 7.62 mm mini-gun pod. In the FAC role, the O-2A identified and marked enemy targets with smoke rockets, coordinated air strikes and reported target damage.

This was a dangerous mission and many O-2As and their pilots were lost to enemy fire. A total of 546 O-2As flew 1,808,763 hours between 1967 and 1988. With back-up push-pull engines and other advanced features, the O-2A earned a reputation as one of the safest planes in the world. (Note: That reputation is for the O-2A, flown by military pilots. The civilian C-337 has only an average safety rating for multiengine piston airplanes.)

The O-2A was intended as an interim aircraft, replacing the single engine O-1 Bird Dog (also made by Cessna) until the OV-10 Bronco could be deployed. As it happened, the O-2As continued in service after the OV-10s were fielded. This was partly due to the growing importance of night air interdiction missions.

The O-2As pioneered the aerial employment of night vision devices for target spotting. This was done by a Forward Area Navigator, or FAN, who would look through the open side window of the O-2A, using a telescope-like night vision device made for Army ground troops.

This option was not available to crews of the OV-10 and early models of the Bronco were determined to be unsuitable for night FAC missions.

This led to continued employment of the O-2As, often alongside of the O-1s they were supposed to have replaced. Some pictures from the time show all three-observation aircraft on the same ramp.

<b>Specifications:</b>	O-2A/M337B
<b>Years of Manufacture:</b>	1967 through 1970
<b>Number built:</b>	501
<b>Number surviving:</b>	Less than 50 airworthy and flying (estimate)
<b>Nicknames:</b>	'Oscar Duck', 'Sky-pig', 'Mixmaster', 'push-pull', other even less flattering monikers
<b>Mission Role:</b>	Forward Air Control
<b>Overall length:</b>	29 feet, 9 inches
<b>Wingspan:</b>	38 feet, 2 inches
<b>Empty weight:</b>	3029 pounds (N424AF)
<b>Gross weight:</b>	Well, it depends...The FAA Type certificate says 4300 lb, but there is supplementary letter from the FAA authorizing 4400 lb. The USAF said 4400 lb, but you could take off with 4600 lb as long as you landed with only 4400 lb, and it could weigh up to 4850 lb if anything above 4400 lb was on the wings. The USAF flight manual has performance data for up to 5000 lb. Veteran pilots report regularly taking off at weights in excess that!

<b>Fuel capacity:</b>	122 gallons. This provides a maximum loiter time of 7.2 hours or 900 nm range.
<b>Oil capacity:</b>	10 quarts each engine (7 quarts indicated is recommended for flight)
<b>Engines:</b>	Two 210 hp Continental IO-360D piston engines
<b>Propellers:</b>	McCaughey constant speed, full feathering, 76" diameter
<b>Maximum speed:</b>	180 knots (That is what the book says, anyway)
<b>Cruise speed:</b>	At 75% power, 152 knots: fuel consumption 25 gph (best power). At 65% power, 144 knots: fuel consumption 19.6 gph.
<b>Rate of climb:</b>	Sea level to 8000 feet in 9 minutes at FAA Maximum Gross Weight, standard day.
<b>Service ceiling:</b>	18,000 feet, no stores, FAA maximum gross weight
<b>Crew:</b>	One or two, depending on mission (Seats for three and sometimes 4 were available.)
<b>Armament:</b>	Four hard-points, two on each on wing. Typical weapon load included 2.75" folding fin aerial rockets and aerial or ground burning flares

The O-2A, like the O-1 before it, was not well armoured. In the beginning armour was restricted to steel plates in the bottom of the pilots' seats. Later, a fully armoured pilot's seat became available, much like those fitted to Army attack helicopters. In addition, the mission profile required both target location and battle damage assessment after a strike drew a lot of attention – and enemy fire - to the light, slow flying aircraft. Different tactics were employed to reduce exposure and manage risk. Nonetheless, of the 456 O-2As deployed to South East Asia, 82 were lost to enemy fire.

### Early vs Late O-2As

After delivery of the initial order of O-2As the USAF asked Cessna to make some modifications because of experience in the field.

Most important of these was enlarging the window on the pilot's side for better visibility in turns to the left. The window also bulged out a bit, improving downward visibility out the left side. This change included an external emergency window release handle, allowing rescue crews to get immediate access to the pilot.

According to pilots who have flown both airplanes, the bulging window is supposed to reduce the speed of the O-2A by as much as four knots. This reported decrease in performance may be airplane specific, rather than valid across the modification. The USAF Dash 1 does not indicate any change in performance for early vs late models and no two O-2As seem to have the same performance, anyway.

The new window design required replumbing the fuel lines, so that the fuel selector switch for the left tank (feeding the front engine) was moved to the right side of the cockpit. You might think that having both the left and right fuel selectors on the right side of the cockpit could create some confusion, but it solved a different problem. The left fuel tank selector was now to the left, or forward of the right fuel tank selector. This now made it clear which engine was drawing fuel from that tank. The second delivery of O-2As (68-6857 thru 68-6903) had the same layout of the earlier 145 planes, but all deliveries from 68-10828 and higher are with the larger, bubble window.



## O-2A vs C-337

It is often said that the O-2A was just a civilian Cessna Skymaster in Air Force grey. Although this is true for the O-2B it is NOT true for the O-2A.

The O-2A was special purpose built to USAF requirements to perform forward air control missions in a low-intensity conflict environment. It was expected that manoeuvring stresses would certainly exceed that encountered flying in a civilian, peacetime environment; there was the requirement to carry and fire a variety of weapons; and – to be certain – there was the requirement to survive hostile encounters with unfriendly people.

Here is a list of some of the features that make the O-2A different from the civilian C-337 Skymaster:

- Wings equipped with four hard points capable of mounting weapons pylons and 350 pounds of ordnance each or 550 pounds total among all four pylons. Allowable weapons weight was in addition to the 4300 pounds maximum weight for the civilian model C-337B. (Actual combat weight frequently exceeded 5000 lbs.)
- Armaments panel and gunsight to use the weapons on the wings
- Wing spar was reinforced and the wing mounting bolts were 25% thicker
- Landing gear mountings were reinforced
- Heavy duty brakes
- Self-sealing fuel tanks
- Military furnishings on the interior: seatbelts, armoured seats, rifle mounts
- Instrument and switches: Military standard. Power management instruments moved closer to pilot.
- Observation windows above, on right side, and built into door (and door could be jettisoned in flight)
- The observation windows required the fuel system to be re-routed, with selectors moved from overhead to above the doors. Also, an emergency fuel selector was installed, to allow fuel to go from both tanks to both engines at the same time.
- All electric instrumentation – no vacuum system
- 60 amp alternators (C-337 had 50 amp generator systems)
- 400 Amp inverter to run AC electrical equipment
- Fire detection system mounted on rear engine (I suppose that they thought an engine fire in the front engine would be self-evident.)
- Larger cowl flaps for rear engine: aided cooling on hot days and slow flight at low altitude
- Different baffling to aid cooling without propeller spinners
- Belly skids and lifting eyes to enable quick repair after a belly landing or for recovery after an unexpected landing away from the airbase. (These also provide extra drag, with estimates of losing 8 knots of cruise speed over the civilian C-337)
- Lots of other little things which makes many similar parts between the civilian and military versions NOT interchangeable; eg, engine control cables and attachments are thicker or built stronger (\$)

## Other O-2As

In addition to the O-2A, there were 31 O-2Bs. The O-2B was a C-337A built for the civilian market by Cessna, and re-fitted with loudspeakers and leaflet dispensers for psychological operations (PSYOP) use. In this case, that meant propaganda (or battlefield information.)

The USAF purchased 31 C-337As that had already been built by Cessna, but not yet sold. These had the standard civilian instruments and layout, interior, and none of the unique attributes of the O-2A.

One quick way to tell the difference is that the O-2B, like its civilian counterpart, had propeller spinners on the front and back, while the O-2A did not. That is not universally true, as some O-2As had been fitted with spinners as part of their transition to civilian life. (The spinners added about 4 knots to the cruise speed.)

The USAF was not the only purchaser or user of the O-2A. Thirty-five O-2As were transferred to the Republic of Vietnam. Others had a somewhat longer service life. In 1969, the Imperial Iranian Air Force purchased 12 O-2As. Current whereabouts unknown, but the FAA Type Certificate allowing O-2As to be registered in the normal category specifically EXCLUDES these Iranian aircraft. Other Air Forces that have flown the O-2A include Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ivory Coast, Haiti, Namibia, Solomon Islands, South Korea, and Zimbabwe.



Zimbabwe is an interesting case. Two former USAF O-2As were delivered in the mid-1990s. As the Government of Rhodesia, however, the country purchased more than 20 French built 337 variants, with O-2A features such as hard points, observation windows, and a very interesting pair of machine gun mounts on top of the fuselage.

These are reported to have been very effective counter-insurgency aircraft, working in cooperation with other air and ground elements.

Chile, El Salvador, and Botswana are reported to still have O-2s in service. I have been told, however, that Botswana was seeking to transfer their O-2A's to civilian aero-club status.

Some O-2As were reported to have been used by non-State armed groups in the conflicts in Africa. In one example, the Private Military Company, *Sandline*, reportedly used O-2As when operating under contract with the Government of Sierra Leone in that government's fight against the Revolutionary United Front and various foreign mercenaries.

A former officer of *Sandline* related to me that while he was flying an O-2A, he forced down two Mi-24 Hind helicopters, piloted by Russian mercenaries. Sadly, I never secured permission from him to tell the whole story in public.

The Private Security Company, *AirScan* used O-2As and C-337s in support of US government contracts in Iraq and elsewhere and the humanitarian relief organization "Brothers to the Rescue" used O-2As and C-337s providing support to people fleeing Communist Cuba.

Oh, The US Navy and the US Army have both used O-2As. The Army used them for liaison type work out of West Berlin and for range patrol duties at Yuma proving ground. The Navy used them for similar range safety purposes. They were recently retired from that duty.

## The FAC Mission

The concept of controlling bombardment of enemy targets, using visual reconnaissance from airborne platforms began in the American Civil War, with Thaddeus Lowe and the Union Balloon Corps. It did not come into its own, however, until the First World War. It was always a dangerous mission. The effectiveness of 337As controlling fires from the air made shooting these aircraft down a special priority of the enemy. The first pursuit, or fighter, planes were specifically developed to counter these first Forward Air Controllers. Their use continued in World War Two, not only by the Liaison/Artillery Spotter aircraft of the US Army and Marine Corps (L-4 Piper Cubs and L-5 Stinsons) and the equivalent Fieseler Storchs of the Luftwaffe, but also at home, in the submarine spotting (and targeting missions) by similar Piper and Stinson aircraft flown by volunteer civilian pilots of the Civil Air Patrol, providing targeting for the Army Air Force Anti-Submarine Squadrons.

These spotting missions continued in the Pacific Theatre and later in Korea, where the USAF used the AT-6 Texan (a WW2 training aircraft) and the Army L-19 "Bird Dog" replaced the Piper Cubs.



Later, the USAF also adopted the Bird Dog, giving it the USAF designation of O-1. The O-1/L-19 aircraft were in combat again more than ten years later with involvement of the United States in the Vietnam conflict.

*O-1 BIRD DOG*

Improvements in anti-aircraft fire and the non-linear battlefield of Vietnam made the FAC mission more dangerous than the artillery spotters of World War Two. It also became exponentially more complex.

The Forward Air Controller, usually operating alone, was required to find enemy targets in conditions where the enemy was not moving in the open (often through thick vegetation), contact Airborne Command and Control Centre (a C-130 Hercules controlling all air operations within a given area), determine the air defence threat, contact the fighter/bombers directed to the target on their frequency, determine the proper ordnance mix and best approach to the target, then come in and fire on the target – only with smoke mind you – and move away so that the aircraft he was clearing in hot would not hit him as they released their ordnance. After all of that, he had to return to the target, assess damage, and provide percent hit and effectiveness ratings to the fighter/bomber aircraft. Of course, he had to do all of that without getting shot down himself. This second run was more dangerous than the first. When initially spotting a target, the enemy might withhold fire, hoping that they were not seen by the FAC. After the strike came, they were not hiding any more...and probably not very appreciative of the FAC being there.

To effectively direct the fighter aircraft, the FAC himself needed to be a qualified fighter pilot. This was the only way he could visualize the strike from the perspective of those he was directing and to know what the best ordnance, ingress, and egress routes for the attacking aircraft. This was not enough, however.

The FAC might also be called upon to direct artillery fire, just as in the First World War, or even coordinate strikes with what was then the newest weapon system on the battlefield, Army Attack Helicopters.

When directing strikes in support of troops on the ground, the FAC also had to be able to talk to those soldiers or marines – which required different frequencies and radios and to understand ground combat.

The most challenging missions were the rescue of downed air crewman (Combat Search and Rescue or CSAR) or to assist in the extraction of special operations forces. Some missions included both, one as part of the other. In these missions, the FAC was trying to maintain contact with the isolated airman or team, keep another eye out for the enemy, direct “SANDY” ground attack aircraft to keep the foe away from the friend, and provide instructions to the rescue helicopters. Flying profiles took on a special twist as the FAC had to maintain visual contact with the friendlies while not giving their position away. The movie “Bat 21” (which refers to the airman being rescued, not the FAC) does not come close to depicting the true complexity of that operation or the sacrifice of the FAC and special operations forces involved in the rescue. (Also, the airplane in the film is a civilian C-337, NOT an O-2A.) I strongly recommend reading the book, The Rescue of Bat 21 by Darrel Whitcomb (a 23rd TASS FAC pilot), to get a true feel for the conditions faced in these rescue operations.

Adding to the interest level in all these missions was increasing sophistication of the enemy. This included his ability to listen in on radio transmissions and even spoof them. It also included ever better anti-aircraft capabilities - first in the form of bigger visually-directed guns, then radar directed guns, surface to air missiles, and finally the emerging shoulder fired heat seeking missiles. It quickly became apparent that, despite the genuine love many pilots had for the venerable Bird Dog, it was both obsolete and not survivable in the late 1960s war-form. The O-2A Skymaster was quickly adapted from the civilian Cessna 337 to meet the needs of the FAC while awaiting the purpose-built OV-10. The O-2A offered better survivability in the form of two engines and two electrical systems. It could carry more radios, more ordnance, and more fuel. It had some drawbacks from the O-1 in terms of visibility, maintenance requirements and ability to operate out of primitive airstrips, but it was a necessary transition.

USAF Squadrons flying the O-2A over South East Asia included the 19th TASS out of Bien Hoa, RVN; the 20th TASS out of Pleiku, RVN; the 21st TASS out of Tan Son Nhut and Phu Cat, RVN; and the 22nd TASS out of Da Nang, RVN, and the 23rd TASS (where my airplane was assigned), based on the Royal Thai Air Force Base at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand.

The OV-10 was a twin turbo-prop aircraft. It had the dual redundancy of the O-2A, but with a heavier payload, real weapons capability, real armour protection, better daytime visibility (more on that later) and the ability to carry two dedicated aircrew, easing the load on the FAC as pilot and controller.



Early on, the enemy learned that the US military had some serious limitations in night operations. This was particularly true for our use of airpower to find and strike targets. It was not a new limitation. The Germans took advantage of it in World War Two but it took on new meaning in the triple canopy rainforest environment.



Necessity is the mother of invention and the FACs developed means to find, target, and direct strikes on enemy forces moving along the Ho Chi Minh Trail under cover of darkness.

The O-2A has a side window that can be opened in flight at speeds up to 122 knots indicated airspeed (or about 135 knots true airspeed at typical operating altitudes.) This open window could be taken advantage of by a second aircrewman on the FAC team, a Forward Area Navigator, or FAN. The FAN used a "starlight scope" designed to be fitted to U.S. Army infantry rifles. The technique was to use it as though it were a telescope, looking out through the open window. (Night vision devices do not work through a closed window.) The FAC would then drop a flare on or over the target spotted by the FAN and call in the strike aircraft as in a daytime mission. The early OV-10s were not designed for such night operations. This meant that many of the Tactical Air Support Squadrons could not retire their O-2As when they got the OV-10s. The O-2As remained in service for night operations.



The FAC mission continues today, performed by OV-10 aircraft: the Thunderbolt II, or "Warthog" adapted for the FAC and CSAR Mission with specially trained aircrew. All the OV-10 pilots I have met are enthusiastic about their planes and their mission. Although the USAF higher ups keep wanting to kill the A-10, as a retired Army officer, I cannot think of a worse decision if our goal is to control the battlefield on the ground and keep our soldiers and airmen alive.

## **FIRING THE 2.75" FFAR**

From Ned Helm (Nail 27 and Bronco 07)



I was an OV-10 driver in SEA and when the war was "called" I volunteered to spend the rest of my 2-year tour at Osan. We flew 12 OV-10s from NKP to Saigon, Clark, CCK, Kadena, Osan.

When we got there, it was my job with three other IPs to covert the O-2 drivers to the OV-10. During that I got about 50 hours in the "Duck" (the O-2 was usually called the Duck or the Oscar Duck.)



When you fire a 2.75 rocket in the OV-10 there was a very subdued Whoosh....when you fired one in the Duck (especially when you were in the right seat!) it was more of a KERBLAM!!!! The first time I got lifted right out of my seat when unannounced the guy in the Driver in the left seat pickled one off!

# THE STORY THAT CAN NEVER BE TOLD!

From FAC pilot Al Matheson

It seems the TOC had scheduled a night combat mission with the most dangerous combination of crew members possible!

“Would you believe” he lamented,

“Two --count them-- (2) O-2A flight instructors in the same airplane, AND at the same time...?”

“Yeah, that would be deadly” I opined; nothing could be more hazardous that I can think of ...

“So, how did you survive?” I asked. “I didn’t” was the quiet reply.

It seems the daring duo set out to dual with death quite determinedly on a midnight tour of the HCMT, only to find that an earlier mission aborted. Ops had pulled their bird to log themselves an on-time take off.

They then ordered maintenance to service an alternate bird for the second flight. The replacement O-2A was coming out of an annual inspection, it only needed a new rear engine “installed”.

So, the new engine was dutifully installed, signed off and presented to the intrepid duo of flight instructors, who appropriately out macho’d each other in loading the airplane with its customary compliment..., to which they added a couple of CAR-15s, multiple 32 round clips of ammo, their AN-PVS-2A night scope... and, oh yes, a venerable ‘rubber ducky’.

Walk-around looked good from 100 yds? Yep, three wheels and black paint.

**Pilot #1:** in the seat.

**Pilot #2:** forms and secrets; engine start rear, check oil, mags, carb heat... OK.

Engine idle, sounds a bit noisy, but good.

Engine start front OK, Yay!

Taxi power front engine (rear engine still in idle) and off we go to the ordnance ramp for souvenir pins and flags, right? (CTM note: Remove before flight/safety pins)

**NKP Tower:** “Oscar Ducky 2...go fly now?”

“Nail xx, cleared for taxi and run up, call for clearance.”

Full power engine number front. No lights, idle.

Full power engine number rear. No lights..., bit noisy still?

“Quiet! I am busy with Brigham.”

**NKP Tower:** "Oscar Ducky 2 ... go fly now?"

"Roger, cleared for take-off, Nail xx, call Brigham airborne!"

Engine Front, taxi power to runway.

Engines front and rear full power on the numbers????

Brake release...?

No Go...!

Engine rear idle... Now go really fast down runway ...

Now where are those damned Brakes???

No go fly! #@\$#@\$@!\*#\$

Time for Bell to ring!

**Note:**

1. The front and rear engines are identical and interchangeable on the 0-2 and Cessna 337. The original front propeller is a McCauley D2AF34C59/76C.
2. The rear aft facing pusher propeller is a McCauley D2AF34C61/L76C prop. Putting the front engine prop on a rear facing engine???
3. Airplane all suck, no Blow!
4. Tough on both take-off times and performance.

## JADE

### FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS (FACs) in SUPPORT of the FIRST AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE (1ATF) in VIETNAM



David Robson (Jade 07) 1969 - 1970

#### A BRIEF HISTORY of FAC AIRCRAFT in VIETNAM - in particular, the CESSNA O-2A 368

#### Why this story was written

About 15 years ago, I was approached to write a story about a particular aircraft - Cessna O-2A Serial Number 21368.

Hurlburt Field in Florida, was the airfield where most FACs trained before being deployed to Vietnam, so it was decided to establish a memorial park at that location. The park displayed an aircraft of each type that was deployed on special operations in Vietnam - together with a memorial stone listing the names of all 219 FACs who lost their lives in that conflict.

This O-2A was one that I personally had flown for 67 missions in support of the First Australian Task Force in Phuoc Tuy Province. Hence, I was asked to write this story.

The booklet was given to the attendees at the consecration of the memorial park but, more recently, I thought it might also be of interest to some Australian history buffs. I have modified the story to focus on operations in support of 1ATF.

Thirty-six Australian fighter pilots and fourteen Kiwi pilots, served as forward air controllers throughout Vietnam and in all FAC aircraft types.

Many were decorated. Fortunately, none were lost.

#### Introduction

What is a *Forward Air Controller*? How did he come about?

Military aviation started with aerial reconnaissance to spot troop disposition and movements and then artillery direction to correct the fall of shot of the big guns. These were roles and adjuncts of the ground army – thus the Army Air Corps was born, in the United States, Europe and Australia. They were known as *scouts*.

While the roles and capabilities of fighters and bombers expanded dramatically, there remained a need for *observation* (visual reconnaissance) and direction of artillery fire. This was expanded to include naval gunfire, which also needed visual correction at the massive distances that their heavy guns could fire.



Also, you had to be careful not to be shelling your own troops. So, any fire near 'friendlies' had to be controlled and accurately directed. The spotter would call the shots and the corrections – and take the blame for misses.

Interestingly, the US Army designation for these aircraft had the prefix L. The L was for *liaison* – between air and ground units. It later became O for Observation in USAF service. (The O-1 Bird Dog was originally designated L-19.)

The aeroplane became a powerful weapon of war and a new military force was born – an *Air Force*. As well as strategic bombing and air defence of cities and countries, air power offered another form of firepower to support the ground operations but it, too, needed direction. The fighter and bomber pilots could not always tell where the target was nor who was friendly and who was the enemy – there wasn't always a 'front line'. In the case of air support, the spotter now had to provide a clear visual marker for the fighters to aim at. Smoke grenades, incendiary bombs and tracer bullets were used.

Thus, the airborne Forward Air Controller evolved from the artillery spotters and observers of WW1, through the *Pathfinders* and *Grasshoppers* of WW2 and the *Mosquitoes* of Korea to the most contentious war of all – Vietnam. With the tropical jungle cover of Vietnam there was no way that high performance fighter aircraft could drop weapons in support of friendly troops without the target being marked for them. Neither side could be seen from the air.

Nowadays, modern systems employ laser target designators and target-seeking cruise missiles but, in Vietnam, the FAC was the eyes and the designator of the target for the fighters.

Perhaps they will never be used in this way ever again.

### **What did a FAC do?**

A FAC's daily menu of tasks included visual reconnaissance of a defined Tactical Area of Responsibility of about 20 miles square. He got to know this area like the back of his hand. He attended a daily briefing to know what friendly troop movements and tactical operations were planned. He knew what airstrikes were pre-planned for his area. He looked for signs of troop movements, fires, digging, vehicle tracks, cut-down trees, structures, rope bridges – anything that had changed since the day before.

He listened on up to five radios to the infantry, the fire support base (artillery), the helicopter fire support teams and Air Cavalry units, the FACnet (the FACs own communications link) and the radar controller for his area. He could call his Tactical Air Control Party for fighters any time his troops were ambushed.

Sometimes he would cover and navigate for a *Light Observation Helicopter* (LOH pronounced *Loach*) or a *Long-Range Patrol* (LRP) team who would be working deep into enemy territory. He might provide top cover for an armoured convoy, a helicopter *medevac* (called a *dust-off*) or he may direct ground or naval artillery fire. He could map-read to within 100 metres or less and often provided navigation assistance to the LOHs and LRPs.

But his real value was close air support – directing the fighters in support of friendly troops. He may have to mark targets and control airstrikes less than 150 metres from friendly positions, direct artillery, co-ordinate helicopter fire teams and lay down suppressive minigun fire from a gunship – all at the same time. Ultimately, the FAC was responsible for the safety of his troops on the ground. He carried full responsibility for the accuracy of the strike and for not having the fighters fly into a hill – and some of these guys were only 20 years old!

### **What was special about a FAC aeroplane?**

The observation plane had to be low and slow and easy to fly. However, the ground fire in some areas prevented these operations. To survive, the FAC would have to fly faster and higher. The compromise in Vietnam was to fly above the small arms fire, at 1,500 feet, where there was still a reasonable view of detail on the ground and where an increased speed and distance meant greater safety. However, the FAC now had to mark targets 3,000 – 10,000 feet away.

The FAC aeroplane had to have adequate communications and target marking ability. More radios and better comms (Ultra High Frequency and FM *Fox-Mike*) were easy. Accurate target marking was not so easy. Smoke grenades made the FAC too vulnerable. A new system was needed.

In the 1950s the USAF developed a new weapon for shooting down heavy bombers. It was called the *High Velocity Aerial Rocket* (HVAR). It was 2.75 inches in diameter and could be fitted with several different warheads. One was *white phosphorous* (WP, or *Willy-Pete*). The white phosphorous gave clearly visible white smoke on impact which continued for 30 seconds or so.

The rocket was designed for interceptors but they could also be carried in small launching tubes or pods. They were light and cheap and many were held in the USAF inventory. Because they were designed for air-to-air combat, they were very high velocity and very accurate.

This was an ideal target marker. The FAC could stand-off a little and still accurately direct the air strike. Thus, the FAC aircraft in Vietnam carried tubes or pods of 'Willy-Petes'. When the FAC was spot-on target with his 'Willy-Pete', he could simply say to the fighters, '*Hit my smoke*'.

It was a matter of great personal pride for the FAC to be able to say this.

### **What were the FAC aircraft?**

In the Vietnam war, many different aircraft were used for a type of forward air control – depending on the combat scenario and threat of ground fire. However, there were only three common types of specific FAC aircraft which fulfilled the total span of FAC duties.

These were the *Cessna O-1 BIRD DOG*, the *Cessna O-2A*, and the *North American OV-10 BRONCO*



*CESSNA O-1 BIRD DOG*



*NORTH AMERICAN OV-10  
BRONCO*



*CESSNA O-2A 'OSCAR  
DEUCE' FIRING A 'WILLY-  
PETE' ROCKET*

When the Bird Dog was to be replaced in military service, it was felt that a higher performance aircraft was needed – for survival against small arms ground fire. The ability of the O-1 to loiter lowly and slowly, and spot targets between the trees, was sacrificed for survivability. The FAC had to fly higher and faster and to redress this, in safer areas, the FAC was used in conjunction with a Light Observation Helicopter (LOH).

When hostilities broke out in South Vietnam, it was only intended that a small number of O-1s would be used to support the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) but when the war escalated, it was clear that more and higher performance aircraft were going to be needed – and needed ASAP!

The USAF had previously held a competition for a COIN (Counter Insurgency) aircraft capable of multiple missions, including light Close Air Support, para-dropping, medevac, surveillance, and light attack against small marine craft. The OV-10 Bronco had been chosen to assume the FAC role – but they were not yet available in sufficient numbers.

Thus, the O-2 was born – but it was born nameless. I am not sure why. Most USAF aircraft, although known by their designation, e.g. F-4, C-130, B-52, still had a full name, *Phantom*, *Hercules* or *Stratofortress*.



As a result, the O-2 was called, variously, *Oscar Deuce*, *Push-me-pull-you*, *Superdog* and the civil name of *Super Skymaster* became *Super Mixmaster* or, simply, *Mixmaster*.

*O-2A AT VUNG TAU (RAAF MUSEUM)*

The O-2 was a development of the civilian Cessna 337 (Super Skymaster) which offered the safety and performance of a twin-engine aircraft without the penalty of control problems in the event of an engine failure. It was a radical, but very effective, design.

Despite the inevitable comparisons of speed and firepower, we need to remember the roles that the O-2 was to fulfill – reconnaissance, communications, target-marking, command and control and direction of fire support. The O-2 had five radios to talk to the troops, the fighters, his base, radar control – as well as tactical navigation and electronic identification equipment.



JADE O-2S AT VUNG TAU (DR)

It had a weapons sight (although the chinagraph mark on the windshield still came in handy).

It had good field-of-view, especially up and left, where the FAC could see his fighters, and down and left, where he could see his target.

It had four under-wing hard points which could each carry rocket pods, flares or mini-guns.

It had good transit speed, two engines and some armour protection for the pilot. Sure, it was underpowered (actually overweight) but it did the job well. It did not have ejection seats and I am not sure if anyone ever bailed out of an O-2 – but what more could you ask of this little aeroplane?



O-2A COCKPIT (DR)



A FULL POD OF 'WILLY-PETES' (DR)

### History of this O-2 – Serial Number 67-21368

This aircraft was built in 1967 by the Cessna corporation in Wichita, Kansas. It was delivered to the USAF in August of that year.


South East Asia was *hot* at that time and, without delay, '368' was assigned to the Seventh Air Force and deployed to Nakhom Phanom (NKP) in North Eastern Thailand, right next to the Mekong River, the border with Laos.

In February 1968, the aircraft was relocated to Da Nang air base in South Vietnam near the ancient capital of Hue and, in November of that year, re-assigned to the 504th Tactical Air Support Group (TASG), 19 Tactical Air Support Squadron (19TASS) at Bien Hoa, 15 miles north-east of Saigon.

By then, the 504th TASG was responsible for all in-country FAC operations, and squadrons were assigned to each of the four military regions of South Vietnam. Saigon and Bien Hoa were in 3 Corps and the squadron responsible for this district was the 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron. Also at Bien Hoa was the Direct Air Support Centre which assigned (*fragged*) pre-planned air-strikes and close air support resources and prioritized air support for hot situations. *Troops in Contact* with the enemy (TIC), were always given top priority. The major maintenance base for all the FAC aircraft was also at Bien Hoa.




The region of 3 Corps extended from the Mekong River to the north-west (the Cambodian border), to the Mekong Delta (4 Corps) to the south-west, the South China Sea to the south-east and to the mountains running inland from Phan Thiet on the coast.



*THE STRATEGIC DIVISION OF SOUTH VIETNAM INTO CORPS AREAS.*

*Note: DASC is Direct Air Support Centre - which assigned the fighters, PARIS CRC is the Radar Control Centre. Phan Rang was home base for RAAF Canberra bombers and the location of the FAC in-country training school. Vung Tau was the support airfield for FAC operations with 1ATF and home base for the RAAF Iroquois and Caribou squadrons. Tan Son Nhut was the primary airfield for Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh city)*



*VUNG TAU AIRFIELD 1969 - (THE RUNWAY SHOWN WITH A CROSS WAS A TAXIWAY - A NEW RUNWAY WAS TO THE LEFT OF THE PICTURE). THIS WAS MID-DAY WITH MOST OF THE CARIBOUS, CHINOOKS AND OTTERS OUT ON MISSIONS.*

In 1969 and 1970, 368 served in 3 Corps at Vung Tau and Nui Dat and spent much time as a guardian angel for the 1st Australian Task Force in Phuoc Tuy province – south east of Saigon and Bien Hoa. The primary airfield was Vung Tau but many operations were from the forward airfield at Nui Dat – headquarters of the Task Force.



Our tarmac was pierced aluminium planking with non-skid paint – positioned in the upper centre of the photo. Vung Tau was ‘home’ to 368 and her sisters.

*21368 - ARMED AND READY AT VUNG TAU - DESPITE THE RAIN AND THE NIGHT*

The Aussies have a special regard for this O-2 aircraft. Her callsign was *Jade*. Her mission here was dedicated to support the 1st Australian Task Force.



Charles M Schulz’s ‘*Snoopy*’, had been adopted generally as the FAC emblem.

*INSIGNIA OF THE IN-COUNTRY FAC SCHOOL AT PHAN RANG*

The *Jade* aircraft carried an extra marking – Snoopy was given a kangaroo on which to ride and he carried a ‘*Willy-Pete*’ rocket over his shoulder.

It was a battle to keep the logo as the aircraft were returned for servicing at Bien Hoa, and the Colonel insisted that the kangaroos were removed. Sometimes we had to be a little devious.



*SNOOPY ON HIS ‘ROO CARRYING HIS ‘WILLY-PETE’  
(COURTESY: AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL)*



*SNOOPY AND HIS KANGAROO ON THE  
FIN OF 972 (DR)*

Six to eight FACs were assigned to support the Australian Task Force which consisted of three Infantry Battalions, Artillery, Army Aviation, and a Base Hospital. Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) helicopter and transport squadrons also supported the Task Force. The Jade FACs were regular USAF FACs in a USAF squadron – the 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron. We were based at Vung Tau with the squadron headquarters at Bien Hoa. Many missions were flown from the Australian base camp at Nui Dat, which had its own airfield called *Luscombe Field*.



*368 AT LUSCOMBE FIELD, NUI DAT (DR)*



*O-2A 310 AT LUSCOMBE FIELD (NUI DAT)  
(COURTESY: AUSTRALIAN WAR  
MEMORIAL)*



*JADE TEAM - CHRISTMAS 1969*

The role of the FAC was only possible through his lines of communications and his maintenance support. Jade relied on its team of pilots, maintenance personnel and radio operators. We had a radio shack at Nui Dat, managed by SGT Bob Curci, and a mobile Tactical Air Control Party (some party!) from our FAC jeep – which was used for occasional off-base deployments with the troops.



*JADE FAC JEEP AT FIRE SUPPORT BASE BARBARA - 1969 (DR)*

Within the Jade unit there was also one Aussie FAC, an experienced fighter pilot, who was assigned to this unit.

Callsign *Jade 07* was reserved for this pilot.



At one point, for three months, we also had an Aussie ALO (Air Liaison Officer) – Wing Commander Pete Larard, callsign *Jade 01*. He flew twenty-plus missions in 368.

*WING COMMANDER PETER LARARD - JADE 01 - ALO  
(COURTESY: RAAF MUSEUM, POINT COOK)*





Flying Officer Barry Schulz, from South Australia, flew 16 missions in 368 during 1970 – for a total of 29 hours and 10 minutes (during which time he unofficially claimed the in-country, high altitude record for an O-2A, of 14,700 feet!).

*FLYING OFFICER BARRY SCHULZ - JADE 07*



From my information, the greatest number of missions in 368 were flown by Captain Chris Neale, USAF. Chris flew 78 missions in 368 in support of the Australian Task Force.

I personally flew several missions with him – including night strikes – one of which was very (very) memorable.

*CAPTAIN CHRIS NEALE IN 368 (DR)*

## **A Day in the Life of '368'**

I had the honour to spend 8 months as Jade 07 and to fly 67 missions in 368. One notable day was in August of 1969.

*A platoon from 5 Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (5 RAR) was on a search-and-destroy mission about 20 'klicks' (kilometres) north-east of the Nui Thi Vai mountains in Phuoc Tuy province. A patrol hit upon a bunker system and was soon head-to-head in a firefight with the unfriendlies. They went to ground and called for air support.*

*I was scrambled for an immediate task – Troops in Contact. I knew the operation and the planned dispersion of friendlies but this was a recce and positions were not clearly delineated.*

*The pre-flight was simple and quick. The aeroplane was ready to go – armed with two pods, each of 7 'Willy-Petes'. I donned my flak vest. I was already wet with sweat in the humid air and the parachute (for morale?) made matters worse. I placed my M-16 on the rear floor and my bag of maps next to the pilot's seat. I could find my way as accurately as any orienteer.*

*Start, taxi and take-off were normal although the wet taxiway matting (PAP) was a little worn and slippery in places. It was only 10 minutes to the rendezvous. The fighters had been given a TACAN radial and distance for the rendezvous and, while I was still in transit, I contacted the fighters, checked their ordnance, and gave them their safe ejection and escape routes.*



*We had requested immediate air support and were assigned two consecutive flights of fighters – Air National Guard F-100s with high drags, unfinned napalm and 20 mike-mike (20 mm cannon). (I loved to get those Guard guys – they could hit what you wanted them to – reliably.) Next was a flight of F-4s with more high drags.*

*The troops were supported by intense mortar fire and did not want to stop their fire support. It was usual procedure to keep the fighters and the FAC over the friendly side of the battle but, in this case, they, and I, agreed to stayover the enemy side so that the mortars could keep firing. We had a pair of ‘Bushrangers’ (Aussie UH-1H gunships) in close support waiting for the VC to run from cover – also on the unfriendly side.*

*Muzzle flashes of ground fire were visible through the jungle canopy and the troops warned me of more ground fire as I orbited and marked the positions. It got fairly hot from the intensity of concentration and the workload.*

*For nearly two hours, 368, and I, orbited the position, briefed, and controlled the fighters and gunships and cleared the mortar fire. I used the full load of 14 ‘Willy-Petes’ and all my fuel.*

*The air support had to be placed down to 75 metres from friendlies. Confirmed Bomb Damage Assessment included their collapsed bunker system, clothing, documents – and VC casualties, Killed-by-Air. The gunships caught several more, as the unfriendlies tried to retreat from the area.*



*SOME O-2S DID NOT MAKE IT. THIS ONE WAS WHEELBARROWED TO DEATH.*



*As well as marking targets, we tried to ease the pain on the civilian population.*

*This young lady is Vanh with her ‘brothers’ at the Ba Ria orphanage. I hope she made it through the war.*

After the war, 368 was assigned to several Air National Guard units, back home in the US, but her activities during this time are unknown. She was then retired to storage and, thanks to the efforts of the restoration team, is proudly preserved here in the FAC memorial park.

This memorial is important for us and our future generations – to remember and to reflect.

## A MEMORIAL TO OUR BROTHERS

On Friday, 5 July 2013, the Colorado Springs FACs dedicated a new memorial to honour the brave FACs and support personnel who have been killed in military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan since 1975.

*There were nearly 350 people in attendance at the TACP/FAC memorial dedication ceremony in Memorial Park in Colorado Springs. We honoured the six new FACs or Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs) who had been killed in Southwest Asia since the end of the war in SEA. There was an additional name added to the existing FAC Memorial that was inadvertently left off the 2008 FAC Memorial. The new name was Lt Colonel Andrew Matyas, an O-1 pilot killed in 1968.*

*Some of the 45 Honoured Family members who attended the activities had never had the opportunity to honour their loved ones. It was a very moving ceremony. The USAF Academy Band, an Honour Guard from Peterson AFB, a bagpiper, a 21-gun volley and the playing of taps. Due to sequestration the only fly over, we could get was a GPS satellite. Phil Litts, the FAC Association President read the name and circumstances of the death of Lt. Colonel Matyas and together with the dedication speaker, Colonel Sam Milam, the Commander of the 93<sup>rd</sup> Operations Support Wing placed a wreath at the base of the new granite monument.*

This Memorial, shown below, is in the Military Section of Memorial Park in Colorado Springs where the FAC Association memorial was installed in 2008.



These events were funded almost entirely from donations from fellow FACs. There was one large grant from a local Colorado Springs philanthropic organization and a donation from the FAC Association. Because of the generosity of the FACs we were able to pay for all the travel expenses, hotel rooms and food for all the Honoured Family members that attended the events. There were some very happy folks who otherwise would not have been able to travel to this event.

One of the daughters of Lt Colonel Matyas, who was a very young girl when her father died, really captured what this event was all about in an email she sent to one of our dedication planning team members.

*"It was such a true honour to meet all of you and spend some time finally gaining some understanding of just how important the FAC units were in Vietnam. I was too young at 10 to ask the questions, and there was really no one in my circle that could have answered the questions anyway.*

*In a way I feel empowered, I can now actually tell people a bit about what my father did in the war and I can also intelligently discuss some of the locations he experienced and even point out on a map where he was killed.*

*I knew so little previously that I would shy away from talking about his history; I knew I was proud of him, that was a given, but I never had the words to express all that entailed.*

*I will never forget that the greatest gift that you all provided to me over the past few days was that I now can articulate my feelings.*

*Being silent because of ignorance is not very cathartic. Thanks to you and the others that I met in Colorado, I now have a voice."*

## **Dedication**

A total of 544 O-2s were manufactured, in various versions. Many were lost – 22 in accidents, 82 in combat (3 to Surface-to-Air Missiles). They achieved a wonderful record – for what was an interim aeroplane! I would like to dedicate this poem to the O-2, to the people who built her, to those who maintained her and to all the FACs who flew her.

## **Ode to an O-2**

by David Robson

### ***Tail-dragging Bird Dogs***

***aptly named  
to point the way  
ground hugging  
flutter-bugging  
sparrow-like***

***between the trees.***

***Hawkish OV-10s***

***blasting, bursting, bucking, Broncos***

***blazing guns and smoking dives,***

***But best I recall***

***and relate to you***

***my push-me-pull-you***

***Oscar Two.***

***Nameless, fameless,***

***elegant but ugly too***

***its duck-like legs***

***dangling briefly***

***before it flew***

***double-buzzing***

***about its vital task,***

***This ugly duckling***

***did its job***

***well and truly too,***

***There were times***

***when I too***

***had to push and pull,***

***my Oscar Two***

***and never once***

***did you let me down***

***my push-me-pull-you***


***Oscar Two***

***Thank you.***



## FACs – In Memoriam

by Flying Officer David Robson, RAAF  
jade 07 - Vung Tau - 1969/70



*They were young not yet wise,  
but clear in what was right and what was fair.  
They knew that they, in their little grey planes,  
could cover their troops with a mantle of care  
They did their duty their duty of care  
their presence alone enough to deter  
even the worst of what was there.  
Eyes in the sky, ears in the air  
not painted for war, nor painted for show, they were  
uncamouflaged ringmasters of the greatest show on earth  
Small, grey, guardians -  
aerial shields with aerial swords  
alone, and unarmed but with unlimited power -  
accurate, immediate, and fatal.  
How do they count, those analysts of war,  
account, amount, and total the score,  
compile and record their statistical war?  
BDA, KIA, MIA, KBA?  
What does it mean? What does it matter?  
What matters above all else  
is the unknown number of unknown soldiers  
who didn't fall  
and who, decades later, can still enjoy  
the love of their families, the pleasure of friends  
the smell of spring and the song of birds -  
purely because those solitary, little gray planes  
were there  
whenever, and wherever, they were needed.  
  
God bless them*

## CONCLUSION

This memorial is dedicated to the many FACs who did not come home – as well as those that did. We hope that it will keep alive their memories and their names, in your hearts and in your thoughts.

Let us hope they will never be needed again – but, of course, they will, in one form or another – and, when they are, they will be ready to serve, proudly, once more.

Most FACs came back. Many did not. Some were heroes. Some were not. All were there, then, when, and where, they were needed.

This memorial is to all – but especially to those whose names are recorded here – those that fell in combat. These FACs gave their all – without hesitation.

***The greatest human sacrifice is to give your life for your comrades***

**This memorial is dedicated to the 219 FACs who did just that.  
Remember they who have gone before – as FACs always have.  
This memorial honours those young heroes.**

***Amen***

## RAAF FACs

	Rank	Name	Period	TASS	Call Sign	Units Supported
1	Wing Commander	Vance Drummond	Jul 66- Nov 66	19	Unk.	25th ARVN
2	Wing Commander	Tony Powell	Dec 66- Dec 67	19,21	Jade 01	
3	Squadron Leader	Rex Ramsey	Jan 67-May 67	19	Ascot 09 Bart 97	
4	Flight Lieutenant	Pete Smith	Oct 67-Apr 68	19	Sidewinder 33 Drama 05	1st Group
5	Flight Lieutenant	Tony Ford	Oct 67-Apr 68	19	Tamale 17	
6	Flying Officer	Brian Fooks	Oct 67-Apr 68	19	Issue 05 Jade 07	
7	Wing Commander	Barry Thomas	Dec 67-Nov 68	19	Thirsty 07 Rod 01	
8	Flight Lieutenant	Garry Cooper	Apr 68 - Oct 68	19	Tamale 35	2nd Group
9	Flight Lieutenant	Roger Wilson	Apr 68 -Oct 68	19	Jade 07 Sidewinder 32	
10	Flying Officer	Mac Cottrell	Apr 68 - Oct 68	19	Sidewinder 34	
11	Flight Lieutenant	Arthur Sibthorpe	Oct 68-Apr 69	19	Issue 37 Tamale 15	3rd Group
12	Flight Lieutenant	Ken Mitchell	Oct 68-Apr 69	19	Sidewinder 32	
13	Flying Officer	Dick Kelloway	Oct 68-May 69	19	Sidewinder 34 Nile 05	
14	Wing Commander	Peter Larard	Nov 68-Nov 69	19	Sidewinder 31 Jade 01	
15	Flight Lieutenant	Doug Riding	Apr 69-Dec 69	19	Sidewinder 35 Slugger 35	4th Group
16	Flying Officer	Pete Condon	Apr 69-Dec 69	19	Tamale 15 Slugger 23	
17	Flying Officer	Huck Ennis	Apr 69-Dec 69	19	Tamale 23 Sidewinder 37	
18	Flying Officer	Dave Robson	Jun 69-Feb 70	19	Jade 07	5th Group
19	Flight Lieutenant	Chris Langton	Jul 69-Mar 70	19	Slugger 13 Sidewinder 13	
20	Flight Lieutenant	Ron Slater	Aug 69-Apr 70	19	Slugger 22	
21	Squadron Leader	Dave Owens	Sep 69-May 70	19	Drama 02 Slugger 35	

22	Flight Lieutenant	Bruce Searle	Nov 69-Jun 70	19	Slugger Issue	<b>6th Group</b>
23	Flight Lieutenant	Dick Gregory	Nov 69-Jun 70	19	Issue 25 Drama 03	
24	Flight Lieutenant	Ray Butler	Nov 69-Aug 70	19	Drama 02 Issue 23	
25	Squadron Leader	Graham Neil	Nov 69- Oct 70	19	Slugger 23 Issue 21	
26	Flying Officer	Barry Schulz	Jan 70-Sep 70	19	Jade 07	<b>7th Group</b>
27	Flying Officer	Ken Semmler	Feb 70-Oct 70	19	Issue 28 Rash 38	
28	Flight Lieutenant	Jack Hayden	Mar 70-Nov 70	20	Helix 15	
29	Flight Lieutenant	Chris Hudnott	Aug 70-Apr 71	19	Issue 27	<b>8th Group</b>
30	Flight Lieutenant	Frank Fry	Sep 70-May 71	20	Helix 37	
31	Flight Lieutenant	Gavin Thoms	Oct 70-Jun 71	20	Helix 15	
32	Wing Commander	Colin Ackland	Oct 70-Oct 71	20	Helix 02 Helix 01	
33	Flight Lieutenant	Bruce Wood	Apr 71-Dec 71	20	Helix 33	<b>9th Group</b>
34	Flying Officer	Bruce Mouatt	Apr 71-Dec 71	20	Helix 24	
35	Flying Officer	Chris Mirow	May 71-Dec 71	20	Helix 36	
36	Squadron Leader	Nobby Williams	Jul 71-Dec 71	20	Bilk 02	





## FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS

Between 1966 and 1971, a total of 36 RAAF fighter pilots served as Forward Air Controllers (FACs) with the USAF in Vietnam.

The early FACs flew the Cessna O-1 'Bird Dog', a single-engine, high-wing, tandem-seat aircraft, first used by the US Army in 1950.

The twin-engine Cessna O-2A 'Super Skymaster' was introduced as an FAC aircraft in early 1967 to replace the O-1.

In 1968, the USAF introduced the twin-engine turboprop OV-10 'Bronco' to replace both Cessnas, but the O-2A continued until the end of the war because it was more suited to two-crew night operations. The OV-10 suffered from internal canopy reflections at night, and the crew could not operate a starlight scope through an open window like in the O-2.

RAAF pilots flew in all these aircraft.

Three short Forward Air Controller stories are included below.

The first two are by Squadron Leader Graham Neil, who was the Air Liaison Officer (ALO) for the 'Issue' FACs flying OV-10 aircraft out of Cu Chi in 1970. The third story is by Aussie FAC Arthur Sibthorpe, who arrived in Vietnam in October 1968. Arthur flew the Cessna O-1 Bird Dog aircraft.

The last two stories illustrate how easy it was (is) to confuse fellow warriors.

*There are 488 real-life stories written by USAF and RAAF pilots who participated in the Vietnam war as Forward Air Controllers, and included in two books titled, "Cleared Hot," and "Cleared Hot Book Two," (which are available for sale at <http://www.lulu.com>. Just type "Cleared Hot" into the search window), and 'Hit my Smoke: Targeting the enemy in Vietnam' Coulthard-Clark 1997, ISBN 1 86448 480 2.*

## ATTITUDE! By Graham Neil



GRAHAM NEIL, RAAF, CU CHI, 1969-70.

One day in 1970, I was flying my OV-10 on a visual reconnaissance sortie in the Long Thanh area of III Corps when a relatively calm American voice came up on 'Guard', a frequency reserved for distress, emergency, and rescue calls. Unfortunately, though, the frequency was habitually misused so that it often became a common chatter net, as this story shows.

The voice stated coolly, *"Helicopter approaching Sanford circuit area come up 341 decimal 7"*. No reply. Thirty seconds later, in a more agitated voice the caller stated, *"OH-6 Alpha flying through Sanford circuit come up 341 decimal 7!"* Still no reply was made. Nor was there any response for at least another 30 seconds. In a decidedly angry voice, the Sanford Tower controller came up with another call, *"Loach that just flew through Sanford circuit, next time you come through you come up 341 decimal 7! Do you hear?"*

There was a pause for about five seconds when another American voice came up on Guard. One could tell that he was a helicopter pilot by the rotor vibrations affecting his voice. In a thoughtful and laidback voice, he called, *"Heeeyy Sanford – you know what the trouble is? They just don't care!"*

There was another five-second pause before the rot set in and I will swear every helicopter pilot within 50 miles radius passed comment on why or how they didn't care. Calls like: *"I don't care."* *"I don't care either."* *"I don't give a shit."* *"I'm short."* *"I don't give a stuff."* *"Where's Sanford anyway?"*

The calls continued for about two minutes with more offensive expletives as time went on. One could picture the frustrated and angry controller having to listen to the ribald and uncooperative comments expressed on Guard. Eventually the calls subsided and the first helicopter voice came up on Guard again and said, *"See Sanford, they don't care!"*

## UNDERSTANDING 'STRINE' (THE AUSTRALIAN ACCENT) By Graham Neil



OV-10 'BRONCO' USAF, 1970-71.

All Australian and New Zealand FACs had trouble in making themselves understood with Americans or Vietnamese unfamiliar with the antipodean accent. The problems were highlighted when using radio or telephone nets or when dealing with operators who had not become more familiar with such accents.

In the Issue FACs hooch at Cu Chi we had three telephones - an 'A' Class telephone for direct dialling to major US units in South-East Asia; a 'B' Class telephone for direct dialling to major US units in South Vietnam; and, when all else failed (often), a 'C' Class telephone that had to be hand cranked and that was controlled by switchboard operators at each base switchboard.

The switchboard operators were very adept at finding available lines to route calls through, but the callers had to be quick to respond to any operator who, out of the blue, found any pause in conversation and queried whether the line was in use by stating, rather than querying, "working". If either user failed to respond quickly enough their line would be disconnected. One morning I had cause to use the 'C' Class telephone, but found it out of order. I searched the directory for a means of reporting such unserviceability, but rather than going half a mile to gain access to another 'C' Class telephone, I tried to report the failure to the 25th Division 'Lightning' switch. I dialled the 'B' Class telephone and after about 30 seconds an African American operator answered stating, "Lightning Frame".

I explained that I was Squadron Leader Neil, the ALO for the 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade. I explained that our 'C' Class 'Lightning phone' was out of order and that I needed a number to ring and report it. My unfamiliar accent, along with the different rank title, obviously did not help the situation. The operator responded in a querying voice, "A *Lightning Fan*?" I again responded, "No, a *Lightning phone*." The operator again queried, "A *Lightning Fan*?" I again responded, "A *Lightning phone* – a *TELEPHONE!*" (Rather tersely I must admit.) The operator shouted at me, "Well why don't you say so, man – 2477," and slammed the phone down.

I was rather annoyed at the treatment received so I rang back the 'Lightning Frame'. The phone rang, and rang, and rang. After quite some time, the same operator answered, "Cu Chi 7, Sir". I said, "Cu Chi 7 – are you the guy who just yelled at me over the phone and hung up on me?" He replied, "Sir, I'm sorry Sir, but I just didn't understand your reticulation".

My anger subsided – I thought – forget it, you have given me a story for life!

## GUY FAWKES WAS EARLY THIS YEAR

*By Arthur Sibthorpe*



*FLIGHT LIEUTENANT ARTHUR SIBTHORPE,  
RAAF, DONG TAM, 1968-69.*



*CESSNA O-1 'BIRD DOG' FAC AIRCRAFT.*

During my tour as an FAC in South Vietnam I flew 254 sorties in the O-1 in support of the US 1st Division at Lai Khe, the 82nd Airborne Division at Tan Son Nhut, the 25th Division at Dau Tieng and the 9th Division at Dong Tam. Normally I flew a three hour stint every day.

Often there would be little work available and airborne time could be very mundane, but the areas had to be always covered by a FAC because emergencies did occur with little warning.

On one occasion I was operating in the Delta area at the start of what promised to be yet another boring day. Ground activity seemed to be non-existent, so after about an hour I began badgering the 'head shed' to see if they could find me some work.

Finally, the reply was, "OK, Tamale 15, try calling 'Keen Razor' on Fox Mike frequency. He has moved into your area on a recce patrol and may be able to use you".

Thankful for the diversion, I made contact and had a chat with 'Keen Razor', but gained the impression that he was in the same boat so far as lack of work was concerned. He indicated, though, that his outfit was about to search out a treed area near the Hotmont Canal, and that if I would like to wander over and have a looksee, I might be able to help.

As 'Keen Razor's' location was some distance from my position it took me a little time to arrive on station, given the exotic speed of the O-1. About 20 minutes later I was in the area and could clearly see the outfit on the ground as I circled. The troops were strung out at right angles to the large waterway and moving towards a heavily timbered area beside it. I commented to 'Keen Razor' that all seemed quiet and peaceful, and he agreed.



A few minutes later all hell broke loose and the treeline erupted in a barrage that would have done justice to Fourth of July celebrations. Either that or Guy Fawkes Day was early this year! The advance suddenly became a controlled withdrawal as the troops hurriedly sought more secure positions. Luckily for the troops, Charlie had opened early, so they managed to reach reasonable safety with only a couple of WIA. Almost immediately I had 'Keen Razor' on the air, panting away in a voice considerably higher in decibels than during his previous transmissions.

*"For Christ's sake, FAC – huff – get us some air – puff. We have stirred up – huff – a hornet's nest – puff."*

I told him to get back as far as he could, then hit the deck and wait, since help was on the way.

Fortunately, the wait was very short, as the Ops people had been monitoring the transmissions and were able to divert fighters going to a target of lesser priority. Meantime, I requested as much air as possible, as this was obviously a major contact, and was assured that more aircraft were on their way. The fighters were soon on station and we wasted no time in getting to work.

Because of the proximity of the canal and the clearly defined tree line, it was a breeze for the fighters to flatten the target. This they did with great gusto – much to the delight of 'Keen Razor'. The subsequent air strikes were just as successful but, unfortunately, after the sixth packet of fighters had finished, I had run out of marking rockets.

I called 'Keen Razor' to tell him I had to go off-station, but that another FAC and more air was on the way. Although all was presently quiet down in the treed area and we appeared to have put the fire out, if his troops did move into the target area, they would have cover. His parting comment was, "Well, Tamale 15, I don't know who you are, but if we ever meet, you're on free booze for the rest of your life".

The moral of this story is that we Australians who went to Vietnam as FACs did not get much money, but at times were in a position to earn a big drink.

When RAAF FACs first arrived in-country, there is no doubt that we all had some language problems in working with our American allies. Everyone knows that both Americans and Australians speak bastardised versions of the English language. Australia, though, is unique in the fact that there is little in the way of provincial accents throughout the country; while minor differences might be apparent between city and country, in general terms it is usually difficult for one Australian to determine another's geographic origin by speech alone.

Americans, on the other hand, with their vast population and many States, have a huge number of different accents, and this gives them a head start when it comes to understanding yet another accent such as our own. Despite the Americans' linguistic abilities, at times Australian pilots were still able to confuse their USAF colleagues – as the following incident well illustrates.

It was one of those days down in the Delta area where, as Tamale 15, I was working for the US 9th Division. There was no activity on the ground and it seemed that the war had been called off due to lack of interest. Boredom, in the shape of three hours' searching for 'intelligence targets' (those that were there once, and might be there again), seemed the order of the day until the 'head shed' advised that relief was at hand. A couple of fighters were on their way to expend their stores on one of these mystery targets.

The fighters checked in and I began a normal brief by emphasising the fact that the target was ice cold. A bet on the fighters' ability to hit the smoke marker could be an interesting option. The flight leader asked my position which I gave as, "330 at 18" from the appropriate rendezvous. Time passed, however, and no fighters arrived. Then I received a transmission from a very perturbed leader that went something like: "*FAC, you said this area was cold. Well, we're taking a lot of crap from the ground.*"

I looked around, but could not see any ground activity, let alone any fighters. "*Your position, lead?*" I asked. "*About 330 at 80.*" "*Goddam, lead,*" I said, "*get your backside out of there – you're in Cambodia!*"

Then the penny dropped. It was a rather embarrassed Tamale 15 who had to explain to the flight leader that he had mistaken my '18' for '80' – a not unreasonable mistake under the circumstances. "*No sweat, FAC, we're OK. Be with you soon.*"

The fighters arrived, the strike went well, the bomb damage assessment was liberal and we departed good friends. I am sure that later the leader would have seen, as I did, the funny side of what could have been a dicey situation.

But then, in Vietnam, one always had to retain a sense of humour.

## NEW FAC WEAPON EXPOSED

### Ideal Weapon for Interdiction

While breaking down a daily FRAG order from 7/13 AF, Captain Joe Demarco cautioned me to “read the whole FRAG.” It seems that every so often, the FRAG contains more than the daily mission tasking. Joe’s specific reference was a request to submit ideas for ideal weapons to use in the war of interdiction.

Responses to this query included the truck-dog, gun-pit dog, and jacks (from ball and jacks’ game).

The truck-dogs were to be airdropped wearing small satchel charges. The dogs were trained to eat under trucks. Find a truck and the magnetic charge damages the truck.

The gun-dog worked on the same principle. Airdrop dogs that eat in gun pits. The dogs are trained that they get food when they bite the gunner. The result would be hungry dogs in gun pits that the gunners would not occupy.

The jacks were to be about three-inch jacks with pointed tips. The jacks were to be dropped on the roads to cause flat tires on the trucks. None of these ideas were given Consideration.

However, one suggestion generated considerable study and discussion. FACs suggested,

**“Drop bowling balls rather than 500-pound bombs.”**



People began to discuss bowling balls and the discussions were insightful.

The first issue addressed was the question, “Are bowling balls lethal?”


Bowlers know that if you drop a bowling ball from waist level on your foot, it is capable of breaking your toes.

Dropped from higher level should give the bowling balls more power; from ten feet it will break other bones. If dropped from a high enough level, a bowling ball could kill a person or cause great damage to a vehicle. Few would argue that a bowling ball dropped from 3,500 feet could destroy a military truck.

Bowling balls are lethal. The second question raised was, “How accurate can you drop a bowling ball?” This is a complex problem compounded by the delivery platform, airspeed, altitude, and other considerations. After a lot of discussion, there was general consensus that an F-4 could drop bowling balls at least as accurate as 500-pound balls. (Insert your own F-4 pitching bombs story.) *Relatively speaking*, bowling balls are accurate.

The combination of being lethal with the able to be delivered accurately, suggested the bowling ball should be given more study. The F-4 example was further explored.

(16) 500-Pound Bombs




One would be analyst drew a circle representing the 50-meter diameter that estimated the accuracy of an F-4 delivered 500-pound bombs. He marked the damage ratio for each of the (16) 500-pound bombs the F-4 could deliver. He determined that there was a two percent chance that one of the 500-pound bombs could damage a truck.

Plotting the 500-pound projectiles within the 50-meter diameter circle indicates that any truck within the circle would be hit by one or more bowling balls.

Another person then raised the question, "If an F-4 can drop 16 500-pound bombs, why not have it drop 500 16-pound bowling balls?"

FAC AFIT trained engineer took credit for understanding the warfare principle of mass. But, the issue of how to carry the 500 bowling balls was determined to be a maintenance issue. An F-4 laden with bowling balls could kill trucks.



(500) 16-Pound Bowling Bombs

Theoretical gaming of the bowling ball option identified other exciting facts about bowling balls. Actual experience has shown that a 500-pound dropped more than 50 meters from a truck target, will explode in the karsts and break off lime stone rocks that could be used by road crews to fill in the holes caused by the 500-pound bombs that damaged the road. Conversely, gaming showed the bowling ball would not explode. During initial use, the bowling balls would remain in the karsts and deny road repair materials to the road crews.

Gaming showed that the bowling ball would adapt when used for an extended operation.

After the bowling balls filled the cracks in the karsts, the bowling balls will bounce down the karsts to land on the roadway. Engineers determined that the bowling ball should be viewed as a self-correcting ordinance.

Gaming also raised the issue that because bowling balls did not explode, they could be used to destroy or render anti-aircraft guns to be unusable.

They noted that guns hit be bowling balls dropped from 3,500 feet would damage or destroy by the bowling balls. Also noted was the ability of the bowling balls to fill up dug in gun pits. Dropping enough bowling balls will fill up the gun pits, leaving no room for the gun crew to operate the weapon.

The study designated the bowling ball as an anti-gun weapon.




Gaming showed that as self-adjusted bowling balls are initially used, the road crews would use them to pave the roads. However, extensive use of the bowling balls creates logistic problems for the road crews.

The bowling balls don't explode; they simply lie on the roads or bounce down the karsts until they reach the road. The road crews would have to do something to get the growing number of bowling balls off of the road.



Initial speculation suggested the bowling balls might be thrown into the back of trucks heading south on the trail or placed on the bike handle bars of south bound bikes. This would displace the people transported in the trucks forcing them to walk south delaying their arrival about two months.

Further discussions gave more respect to the North Vietnamese. Speculators noted that the North VN engineers would quickly determine that the bowling balls should be moved the shorter distance to move them out of Laos and into North Vietnam. Trucks would be emptied on the trail near the bowling ball surplus and loaded with bowling balls to be taken to North Vietnam. The bowling balls would stop the flow of supplies south to Vietnam and Cambodia.



The manpower specialists contributing to the analysis noted that the individuals loading the bowling balls into the trucks are not efficient.

They suggested the efficiency would improve if loaders could pick-up bowling balls with one hand rather than two hands. Manpower specialists anticipated that North Vietnam would begin drilling holes in the bowling balls to permit the loading crews to lift the balls with one hand.

The ability to quickly remove the bowling balls would be of great interest to North Vietnam, because the expanded delivery of bowling balls by aircraft other than the F-4 would be possible when the guns were destroyed or the gun pits were full of bowling balls.

Initially, the versatile B-52 would be used to drop bowling balls. Just think rather than over 100 500-pound bombs, the B-52 could drop over three thousand bowling balls. Nearly 20,000 from a six-ship Arc-light. The C-123 aircraft could have been converted to drop bowling balls. The C-130s, C-141s, and C-5s could also deliver bowling balls after the anti-aircraft guns were silenced.

Energetic FACs (in and out of South Vietnam) might enjoy dropping a few bowling balls. The bowling ball is not limited to specific types of aircraft.

The dirty trick gamers determined that after North Vietnam started to drill out the bowling balls, the Navy could drop predrilled bowling balls. After the loading crews adjusted to picking up the pre-drilled balls, the Navy could modify a portion of the balls to have Chinese finger traps in the drill holes. Eventually, workers would get their fingers stuck in the ball. The balls would have to be removed at ball removal stations established along the trail. Ball removal would logically be done with available road building equipment. It is likely that the bowling ball would be removed by breaking the ball with sledge hammers which might be rough on the hands. Loading crews would quickly notice team members with busted hands and go back to lifting the balls one at a time to avoid having their balls removed.

Using all available aircraft, the Ranch Hand could be used to spray a slick substance on the bowling balls that are waiting to be loaded by the removal crews. These crew's efficiency would be greatly degraded by only picking up one ball at a time and having problems dealing with the sprayed bowling balls. Remember, a bowling ball dropped from waist level can easily break a person's toes.



The damage may be more pronounced for individuals wearing Ho Chi Min sandals. The ball removal stations might have to be expanded to include foot repairs. Bowling balls could be viewed as anti-personnel weapons.

To review, the bowling ball is a lethal weapon that may be delivered as accurately as an F-4 dropped 500-pound bomb.


Bowling balls are self-correcting ordinance that can destroy trucks and damage or render anti-aircraft guns unusable.

The bowling balls create logistics problems for the enemy that must remove the balls to clear the trails before normal truck traffic could be re-established.

Removal would reverse the flow of traffic on the trail causing the bowling balls to be removed from Laos to be dumped into North Vietnam.

Results of the initial discussions on bowling balls spread throughout the FAC community. Knowing that the bowling ball was a usable weapon, every AFIT grad flying the FAC mission voluntarily contributed to planning efforts for employment of the bowling balls. They quickly figured out it would take about eight days of F-4 and B-52 efforts to quiet the guns in one pass area and approximately two months to quiet the guns in all of the pass areas.

Calculations determined the optimal loading for the airlift aircraft. The details included information on trade-off studies between using 16 pound bowling balls or using lighter balls that would take up the same space blocking the trail, filling up the trucks, or occupying ground space in North Vietnam. The lighter balls could be loaded based upon the maximum allowable cabin space rather than max gross weight. A C-5 could drop over 3,000 more of the lighter balls.



Knowing how many bowling balls that they could carry provided the insights needed to determine how long it would take to fill up the pass areas. Estimates ranged between three to four months based upon the availability of aircraft and bowling balls.

Senior HQ staffers doubted the bowling ball plans because they did not know where the government could purchase the required number of bowling balls.

FACs familiar with Cambodia identified multiple rubber plantations that could be sourced to produce the bowling balls. This makes the bowling ball a locally procured ordinance.

The balls might even be made by North Vietnamese road crews that walked south looking for food. This makes the bowling ball a post-war recovery tool to establish industry and employment throughout SEA.

